No. 62 (2022): January - June
Articles

Kantian Formal Intuition as a Result of Cooperation between Sensibility and Understanding

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  • Matías Oroño
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v62i0.1623

Published 2021-12-11

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How to Cite

Oroño, M. (2021). Kantian Formal Intuition as a Result of Cooperation between Sensibility and Understanding. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (62), 97–120. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v62i0.1623

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Abstract

The main purpose of this article is to offer an interpretation of the Kantian notion of formal intuition, which admits an analytical distinction from the concept of form of intuition. I hold that formal intuition is the result of the intersection between sensibility and understanding as mutually irreducible faculties. In this way, the necessary cooperation between faculties is emphasized. The radical heterogeneity between the sensible contribution and the intellectual contribution is also indicated. This interpretation allows to take distance from strongly conceptualist interpretations (which reduce the sensible unity to the unity of understanding) and from non-conceptualist readings (which consider that the sensible unity does not imply the activity of the understanding).

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