No. 62 (2022): January - June
Articles

On the Distinction Between the Epistemic Principles of Closure and Transmission

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  • Diego Rodríguez Téllez
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v62i0.1594

Published 2021-12-11

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How to Cite

Rodríguez Téllez, D. (2021). On the Distinction Between the Epistemic Principles of Closure and Transmission. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (62), 349–381. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v62i0.1594

Copyright (c) 2021 Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía

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Abstract

Epistemólogos involucrados en algunos debates contemporáneos aceptan la distinción entre los principios epistémicos de clausura y de transmisión. Una discusión en la que esto sucede es la que se da en torno al diagnóstico adecuado de razonamientos como el involucrado en los casos de las cebras de Dretske. El objetivo de este texto es ofrecer razones para cuestionar la distinción entre ambos principios. Primero, introduzco la distinción entre los principios. Segundo, expongo las motivaciones más fuertes detrás de los principios; en particular, establezco que la motivación central detrás de clausura consiste en explicar el fenómeno de ampliación del conocimiento mediante la deducción. Tercero, basado en la identificación de una restricción sobre cualquier formulación apropiada de clausura capaz de explicar el fenómeno mencionado, cuestiono la aceptación de la distinción entre este principio y el de transmisión. Finamente, concluyo que cualquier formulación del principio epistémico de clausura que satisfaga la motivación central tras el principio lo colapsa con el principio epistémico de transmisión.

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