No 76 (2026): Número en curso
Artículos

Disfunción, desajuste y subdeterminación empírica

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  • Federico Burdman,
  • Juan R. Loaiza ,
  • Francisco Pereira
Federico Burdman Alberto Hurtado University image/svg+xml
Juan R. Loaiza
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0570-3832 (non authentifié) Alberto Hurtado University image/svg+xml

Publiée 2026-06-14

Comment citer

Burdman, F., Loaiza, J. R., & Pereira, F. (2026). Disfunción, desajuste y subdeterminación empírica. Tópicos. Revista De Filosofía, 76, 219-253. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v760.3359

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Résumé

¿Son los trastornos psiquiátricos causados por el funcionamiento incorrecto de la maquinaria de la mente? ¿O pueden explicarse como el resultado de la falta de ajuste entre nuestros mecanismos psicológicos y un ambiente diferente a aquel en el cual estos sistemas evolucionaron? En este artículo, adoptamos elementos centrales de la concepción de la función propia desarrollada por Daniel Dennett para abordar una versión particular del debate entre teorías de la disfunción y teorías del desajuste, enfocándonos en casos de adicción a sustancias. Siguiendo la idea de Dennett según la cual no hay un hecho decisivo que determine la función propia de los sistemas biológicos, sostenemos que la decisión sobre la disfunción del sistema de recompensa en la adicción está subdeterminada por la evidencia. Nuestro argumento invita a reorientar la discusión, sugiriendo un nuevo foco en las consideraciones pragmáticas que pueden esgrimirse para elegir entre dos teorías empíricamente equivalentes.

Mots-clés

  • adicción,
  • disfunción,
  • desajuste,
  • función propia,
  • sistema de recompensa,
  • subdeterminación,
  • evolución,
  • mecanismo,
  • actitud de diseño,
  • enfermedad
    • ...Plus
    Moins
PDF (espagnol)

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