No. 76 (2026): Número en curso
Articles

The “Strange Inversion of Reasoning” about Language in Dennett’s Work

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  • Carolina Scotto
Carolina Scotto National University of Córdoba image/svg+xml

Published 2026-05-20

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Scotto, C. (2026). The “Strange Inversion of Reasoning” about Language in Dennett’s Work. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, 76, 21-65. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v760.3371

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Abstract

In this paper, I aim to show how, according to Dennett, Darwin’s “dangerous idea” also extends to language and its distinctive properties. According to Dennett, by Darwin’s “strange inversion of reasoning,” all “intelligent design” follows the principle of competence without comprehension: the former precedes and is presupposed by the latter, so that, sometimes, it is possible to explain it without comprehension taking place. As will be seen, the reconfiguration that results from that “inversion of reasoning” about the relationship between humans and language—how it emerged, how it is learned, how it is used, what its cognitive and cultural effects are—as well as language itself as a set of communicative and cognitive tools, is contrary to that offered by many contemporary philosophical and linguistic conceptions, rooted in the opposite principle: the primacy of comprehension over competence.

Keywords

  • strange inversion of reasoning,
  • competence without comprehension,
  • language,
  • Darwin,
  • Dennett,
  • evolution of language,
  • memes,
  • words,
  • meanings,
  • communication
    • ...More
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