No. 75 (2026): Mayo-agosto
Articles

In Defense of the Naive Conception of Set

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  • Manuel Eduardo Tapia Navarro
Manuel Eduardo Tapia Navarro UNAM

Published 2026-04-01

How to Cite

Tapia Navarro, M. E. (2026). In Defense of the Naive Conception of Set. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, 75, 455-500. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v750.3316

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Abstract

In this paper, I reply to Incurvati’s (2020, pp. 101-127) objections against the naive conception of set. This is the conception according to which a set is the collection of objects that satisfy a given property. Following Incurvati’s objections, I claim that (i) the weakness of a variety of inconsistent theories is no reason to reject them, (ii) naive set theories are as ad hoc as ZFC (and others classical theories), and that (iii) there is no compelling reason to believe that naive set theories (formalized in relevant logics) are theories of non-extensional objects.

Keywords

  • set theory,
  • Comprehension Axiom,
  • theoretical weakness,
  • ad hoc theories,
  • extensionality,
  • naive conception,
  • iterative conception,
  • paraconsistent logic,
  • inconsistent theory,
  • non-classical mathematics
    • ...More
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