Núm. 57 (2019): Julio-diciembre
Artículos

¿Qué reglas y leyes obedece Sócrates?

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  • David Lévystone
David Lévystone
Universidad Panamericana
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i57.1024

Publicado 2019-06-29

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Lévystone, D. (2019). ¿Qué reglas y leyes obedece Sócrates?. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (57), 399–430. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i57.1024
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El pensamiento de Sócrates sobre la justicia y la obediencia a las leyes trata de evitar los efectos destructivos de las críticas y teorías sofísticas de las leyes. Así, él requiere, en contra de las teorías de ley natural, una obediencia casi absoluta de la ley, en tanto esta ley respete el sistema legal de la ciudad. Sin embargo, en contra del positivismo legal, Sócrates no admitirá que una ley es justa solo porque es una ley: él busca la verdadera Justicia. Aún así, como es común en la filosofía socrática, Sócrates no puede aceptar que dos derechos o valores morales igualmente justificados y legítimos estén en conflicto.

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