

TÓPICOS

REVISTA DE **FILOSOFÍA**

ISSN 01 88-6649

What Should We Do with Heidegger?

André Laks, comp.

TÓPICOS, REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA

UNIVERSIDAD PANAMERICANA
México 2018

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"What Should We Do with Heidegger?" es la compilación del Coloquio que se llevó a cabo con el mismo nombre del 30 de marzo al 1 de abril de 2016 en la Universidad Panamericana.

Compilador: André Laks.

Edición: Karen González Fernández.

Revisión: Luis Xavier López Farjeat y Diego Espinoza Bustamante.

Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía aparece en los siguientes servicios de indización y resúmenes: The Philosopher's Index, Répertoire bibliographique de la philosophie, Sistema de Clasificación de Revistas Mexicanas de Ciencia y Tecnología CONACYT, DIALNET, Latindex, Filos, Redalyc, Clase, SCOPUS, Elsevier, Scielo, Scielo Citation Index, REDIB, DOAJ y Fuente Académica EBSCO.

Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía es una publicación semestral editada y publicada por Centros Culturales de México, A.C., propietaria de la Universidad Panamericana, Facultad de Filosofía, Augusto Rodin #498, Col. Insurgentes Mixcoac, Del. Benito Juárez, C.P. 03920, México, DF. Tel. 54821649, topicos@up.edu.mx; topicosojs@up.edu.mx. Editor Responsable: Dr. Luis Xavier López Farjeat. Reservas de derechos al Uso Exclusivo No. 04 - 2013 - 101810182700 - 203. ISSN impreso: 01 88 - 6649, ambos otorgados por el Instituto Nacional del Derecho de Autor. Licitud de título y contenido No. 16092, otorgado por la Comisión Calificadora de Publicaciones y Revistas Ilustradas de la Secretaría de Gobernación. Reservas de derechos al Uso Exclusivo electrónico: 04-2013-102110203400-102. ISSN electrónico: 2007-8498; otorgados por el Instituto Nacional del Derecho de Autor. Impresa por Editorial Ducere, S.A. de C.V. Rosa Esmeralda num3-bis. Col. Molino de Rosas, C.P. 01470, Deleg. Álvaro Obregón, México, D.F.

Diseño de Portada: Litholred, Rúbrica Contemporánea.

Diseño de Caja: J. Luis Rivera N.

Compuesto en Palatino Linotype y Computer Modern Roman, con InDesign.

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Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía

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03920 México, D.F. México

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André Laks, comp.

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Para citar el material de este volumen favor de proceder de la siguiente manera: Laks, A. (comp.) What Should We Do with Heidegger? *Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía*, vol. extraordinario, Universidad Panamericana. México: 2018.

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INTRODUCTION

André Laks

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My intention in organizing the workshop “What Should We Do with Heidegger?”, which took place at the Universidad Panamericana (Mexico City) from March 30th to April 1st of 2016, was twofold: firstly, I wanted to get clearer about how I should and could handle Heidegger in my own work as interpreter of ancient thought and as practitioner of a sort of hermeneutics standing very far from Heidegger’s heritage. In this sense, I was anticipating Steven Crowell’s opening remark in his statement that the “we” in the title of this meeting should not be taken as a collective one (see *infra*, p. 13). My second intention was to get clearer about the new situation prevailing among Heidegger-oriented interpreters and opponents alike after the publishing of Heidegger’s *Black Notebooks*. I thought that Mexico was a neutral place enough to initiate a reasonable discussion about that terrible corpus and its relationship to Heidegger’s intellectual and political trajectory. What interested me most was less to hear about representative standpoints on the question (most of them already known or foreseeable) than to understand better the hermeneutical principles on which these standpoints explicitly or implicitly rely: this is because Heidegger’s writings themselves raise acute hermeneutical problems that are crucial far beyond his very specific case. How and to what purposes does Heidegger use the words in the way he does? How can he read philosophical and non-philosophical texts in the way he does? Are Heidegger’s hermeneutical starting points legitimate or irresponsible? What are their consequences? These were the kind of preliminary questions that I had in mind when planning this workshop, and they were actually part of it.

The workshop was meant to be a workshop: few participants, no reading of papers followed by a short time for questions, but short introductory statements followed by extended discussion. The debate

reproduced at the end of each of the papers has been revised by the participants, closely reflecting the original discussion. Most of the papers here reproduced offer an extended version of the original statement, but many of their original oral features have been kept. The vast majority of the contributions and discussions are in English, which was the “lingua franca” adopted for this international meeting. In some cases, a Spanish version was prepared for this edition.

I wish to thank María Elena García Peláez Cruz, dean of the Department of Philosophy at the Universidad Panamericana, where this very event was hosted and which kindly funded it; the Centre de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, which defrayed Denis Thouard’s travel; the technical staff of the Universidad Panamericana, whose participants made possible the recording of the sessions; María de las Mercedes Espinosa Quintana, Sofía Sánchez Garci Crespo and Salvador Escalante Díaz Barreiro, all of them students at the Universidad Panamericana, who took care of the transcription of the debate; Eduardo Oscar Charpenel Elorduy and Fernando Galindo Cruz, professors at the same university, for translating some German texts. In a nutshell, I thank the whole Department of Philosophy at the Universidad Panamericana and its students for having manifested their interest and commitment by attending to this workshop.

SESSION 1

PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS IN HEIDEGGER

Steven Galt Crowell

Rice University

I would love to change this event's title to "What do I do with Heidegger?", since that is something I know a little more about. My title for the subsequent remarks is "Phenomenology and the problem of metaphysics in Heidegger", which designates a general issue that I have been working on. It is a broad question. I wish to make clear that I will not discuss everything related to this subject that Heidegger took up! My investigation encompasses Heidegger's writings from the late 1920s to the early 1930s. I do not intend to be highly technical about the topic in the present context.

Heidegger is a wide ranging author. Despite what he says about only having one thought, namely, the question of being, his writings contain sundry intellectual and personal agendas that are not, as I see it, easily combined into one hermeneutic whole. The hermeneutics of how to read Heidegger is an even more interesting and challenging project than interpreting Heidegger's own hermeneutics.

My interest does not emerge from a particularly scholarly vantage; I am primarily interested in philosophy from an epistemological point of view. By that I mean the following: what interests me the most of Heidegger are those aspects of his thought that can be somehow rethought from an independent perspective. Let me explain myself: even though Heidegger had his own understanding of the limits of phenomenology and was certainly a critic of his teacher, Edmund Husserl, I think my understanding of the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics is not wholly tied to some particular interpretation of Husserl or any other phenomenologist. I think philosophical questions should be approached in an independent way, and indeed both Husserl and, to some extent, Heidegger, seemed to think that phenomenology was

just another name for ultimate philosophical self-responsibility or, in a manner of speaking, not taking anything on faith.

If one approaches Heidegger through phenomenological lens, it is possible to see that though many of his claims may not look like technical phenomenology, or even like philosophy (as it happens in his reading of poets), they have a deep phenomenological vein. Those are the facets of Heidegger that I am most attentive to.

Turning now to the question of phenomenology and metaphysics, I think the most valuable and lasting of Heidegger's contributions are found in his works from the mid to the late 1920s. Hence, for me *Being and Time* is by no means a kind of *Holzweg* or dead-end. Perhaps, this places me in the long line of scholars that read Heidegger *against* Heidegger, as it were.

Why this interest in metaphysics? The issue arises because of a dimension of phenomenology that is generally agreed upon, namely, that phenomenological philosophy begins with a commitment to take nothing for granted, which is to say, it begins with a certain kind of neutrality regarding metaphysical claims. Husserl, for instance, conceived his thinking as a kind of transcendental philosophy that begins with an *epoché* of all positive science and moves on to a transcendental reduction to consciousness. Together, these reductions preclude the phenomenologist from making statements about the particular attributes and features of entities. This is the job of the positive sciences, which are set up to articulate judgments about what characterizes various kinds of beings, but philosophy, in contrast, is an armchair science: it does not use any experiments, and it does not have any independent resources for determining the composition of animals, objects or any kind of being.

Husserl was interested in trying to understand what philosophy's distinctive and particular dimension of inquiry is, and how it relates to other fields. In my view, he came to a very rich and important idea, namely, that philosophy should be based on the analysis of intentionality: the consciousness of something as something.

Phenomenology in this sense explores not the attributes and relations between things as such, but the way in which those attributes, things and relations, present themselves in our experience. It is neutral with regard to the properties of things as such, including their metaphysical properties, and this sort of neutrality is shared, I would argue, by the early Heidegger. His early conception of metaphysics was influenced by the neo-Scholastic reading of Aristotle, and he argued that

such metaphysics failed to do justice to the central insights of modern philosophy. More pointedly, it missed the Kantian point about the kind of inquiry philosophy is: a transcendental inquiry. So, I would argue that Heidegger too embraces a transcendental phenomenological reduction. This defines the character of his early thinking as phenomenological.¹

1. How does that show up?

One of Heidegger's greatest ideas is the notion of ontological difference, namely, the difference between what is (*das Seiende*) and being (*Sein*). In my idiosyncratic reading, this is just another way for referring to something like the phenomenological reduction. Of course, this immediately raises the question "what is being?" In effect, one can point to things or count them, but it is not that easy to pick out what is meant by "being" or, even, to know where to look for it. As is well-known, Heidegger begins *Being and Time* stating that this question has been forgotten, and that there is a need to restate the sense for what that question is.

To clarify what the precise question is proves to be a quite difficult enterprise. This is because Heidegger poses it in two ways: (1) as the question "what is being?" and (2) as the question of the meaning of being (*Sinn von Sein*). For our purposes, I will just state my own view that the ontological difference is equivalent to the difference between entities and the meaning (*Sinn*) through which entities are given as the things they are. Obviously, this is a controversial point; but in my opinion it puts us on the track to appreciate a contribution that Heidegger's thought can make to contemporary philosophical debates. Even though Heidegger himself might well reject much of what I will say about these matters today, I still think that we can draw upon his phenomenology to lead the debate in new directions.

Heidegger's inquiry into being in its phenomenological character asks about the conditions of possibility for our experiencing a world in which things have significance or meaning for us. One might think that this "for us" condemns such an inquiry to subjectivism, but it does not. Many of the texts that I suggested for this workshop revolve around the question of whether this "for us" reduces Heidegger's position to some sort anthropologism or subjectivism. Heidegger confronted this

¹ For the full argument, see Crowell (2001).

purported reduction many times in print, and he rejected it for very good reasons. Both in *Being and Time* and in his later work Heidegger named this “for us” character *die Lichtung* or clearing, a space of meaning in which things show themselves as they are. Though the clearing involves the human being, it is nothing subjective, and it is one of the ideas that can make Heidegger’s work fruitful for contemporary debates in philosophy of mind. In my own work I have been most keen to understanding how Heidegger can help us toward a less rationalistic conception of reason. In my view, his position sketches out an understanding of mind that does not presuppose the definition of the human being as *animal rationalis*, either implicitly or explicitly. This last point takes us to the threshold of the kind of metaphysics I see emerging in Heidegger’s writings after *Being and Time*.

If we want to understand the phenomenon of intentionality (our experience of something as something), Heidegger’s thought allows us to move beyond a focus on the brain, on the notion of “mental representation,” and on what is called “phenomenal consciousness”. This a very important contribution, but the question is how Heidegger does it.

Being and Time goes a long way toward replacing the traditional definition of human being (rational animal) with the idea of *Dasein* as care (*Sorge*). Heidegger achieves this by focusing on the phenomenology of agency: what are the necessary conditions for being an intentional agent, a subject who dwells within a world in which things show up meaningfully, as this or that? Such a subject can neither be a substance with fixed properties nor a purely formal principle, nor a pure consciousness. These are the alternatives that we are left with in ancient and modern philosophy, and also, according to Heidegger, in the case of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.

2. So, how does Heidegger characterize the subject of agency?

Heidegger’s most important characterization of *Dasein* is: “that being in whose being that very being is at issue”. As is often the case in reading Heidegger, this sounds initially as though it could not get us much further in the discussion, since it is hard to grasp what it means.

What does it mean to affirm that to be *Dasein* is to be at issue for oneself? Or, what does it mean that the “to be” (*zu-sein*) is at stake or in question in being *Dasein*? I will have to return to this question later. For

now, we just need to recognize the formal point that it defines what it means to be the kind of being that human beings are; this is fundamental, because of his commitment to phenomenological neutrality, Heidegger is here talking not about human beings *per se*, that is to say, about the properties and relations of a particular natural kind (*homo sapiens*), but about a transcendental structure in which human beings share a mode of being (*Sein*). This introduces a kind of ambiguity in the notion of *Dasein* that has given rise to much contentious interpretation. But it is precisely at this point that we can best see the problem of the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics, which Heidegger began to explore in 1928.

The context for raising the question of the relation between *Dasein* and human beings is provided by the widespread interest in Germany at that time in ideas belonging to philosophical anthropology and *Lebensphilosophie*. How does phenomenology respond to these movements, all of which saw themselves as engaging in metaphysics?

The Husserlian answer is quite simple: “human being” is a meaning and so is grounded and constituted on transcendental subjectivity. Heidegger’s answer is more complex and is bound up with a project already hinted at in *Being and Time*. He suggests that after the transcendental analysis of *Dasein* as *Sorge* is complete, it is necessary to study how this structure of care is “grounded” on what he begins to call “beings as a whole and as such” (“*das Seiende im Ganzen und als solches*”). My current research is an attempt to understand just what such a ground is, and what method such an inquiry into beings as a whole requires, and I have yet to arrive at a satisfactory answer. My hunch is that the idea of such an inquiry is unintelligible. Be that as it may, it is clear that Heidegger thinks of it as a kind of metaphysics.

3. How then should we understand metaphysics?

Metaphysics in this sense would be some kind of philosophical inquiry into entities that is not concerned with the ontological question of the being of beings (“ontological difference”), but with entities themselves in their totality. Heidegger calls this “metontology” and defines it as a “metaphysical ontic”, namely, as an inquiry into entities, which is not the same as any “positive” science like physics or biology. In relation to *Being and Time*, such an inquiry is connected to the two ontological categories of *Dasein*: “projection” (*Entwurf* or *Transzendenz*)

and “thrownness” (*Geworfenheit*). *Dasein* already finds itself “thrown” into the midst of beings. From the phenomenological perspective of *Being and Time*, it is impossible to characterize further that into which *Dasein* is thrown, because to do so would already presuppose the phenomenological analysis of meaning. At the purely ontological level one cannot say that *Dasein* is thrown into history, language, nature or anything else, since these are all meanings whose disclosure already presupposes the pure ontological category of thrownness. They are not something just given to which ontological analysis can appeal. They belong to some specific world that is disclosed through particular ways in which *Dasein* is at issue for itself. For this reason, it is not easy to say what an appeal to beings as a whole is supposed to involve. Nevertheless, metontology (or phenomenological metaphysics) is supposed to be able to say something about it.

Now that we have sketched a bit of the context, we need to make note of the fact that in 1928 Heidegger began to take interest in Leibniz. This has not received much attention in the literature, and I have been trying to investigate it further. Why does Heidegger take up Leibniz at just this time? A clue comes from one of his seminars in which he claims that Leibniz discovered an entirely new *modus existendi*, and not merely a new essential structure (*modus essendi*): the monad.

My hunch is that Heidegger’s concept of metaphysics during the period between 1928 and 1935 is intended to appropriate Leibniz’s monadology in terms of the categories of *Being and Time*. The idea is that a new version of monadology could be grounded in the structure of *Dasein* as care, which means that this structure could somehow be extended to all beings as the basis for a metaphysical ontic conception of the totality of what is. Such conception seems to lie behind his discussions, at this time, of philosophical anthropologists like Scheler and various versions of *Lebensphilosophie*. As we noted, such thinkers were already offering accounts of *das Seiende im Ganzen*, but their views were grounded on what Heidegger saw as outdated ontological concepts like “life” or “spirit.” Something of what Heidegger had in mind can be found in the selection from 1929 that I suggested: *Aus der letzten Marburg Vorlesung*.

Heidegger argues that it is a mistake to think that Leibniz’s monadology is based on an anthropological extension of the concept of ego to everything that is, which implies a kind of subjective idealism. Rather, Leibniz is said to argue from a metaphysical principle: since nothing in the universe can be infinitely different from everything else,

we must admit that what we find in the ego is but an example of what is present in all entities. In other words, one does not arbitrarily impose anthropomorphic concepts onto reality as a whole, but discovers in oneself an example of what constitutes beings as such. Heidegger's twist on this position is to replace the idea of the *ego* with the structures of *Dasein*.

What difference does this replacement make? Most simply, Leibniz's concept of the monad retains the traditional definition of human beings as rational animal. Heidegger, in contrast, rejects this conception, as can be seen in the readings I assigned from *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* in which Heidegger insists on a very radical distinction between *Dasein* and the natural kind, "human being," the animal that possesses the property of rationality.

Human beings are animals; they are not free. Rather, like all animals it is world-poor. Whereas *Dasein* is being-in-the-world, human beings, like all animals, operate within a species-specific environing ring (*Umring*) that circumscribes the way it is able to encounter entities. Such animal environing rings are like monads, all of whose possible reactions are pre-figured in their essence (the *in esse* of Leibniz, thanks to which everything that will ever be true of the monad is true of it timelessly). *Dasein*, in contrast, does not have such a natural environment but it is characterized by a historical environment or *Geschichtlichkeit*. Nevertheless, it too has something like a monadological character, and so when we consider the relation between *Dasein* and human beings, trying to extend phenomenology "metaphysically" to beings as a whole, we must ask what about the historical equivalent of the animal's species-specific *Umring*.

The answer –and I emphasize that all of this would have to be argued far more carefully and in detail– is that, metaphysically, *Dasein* is the *Volk*, a historical people. Each historical *Volk* has an internal principal which mirrors the universe from a certain point of view and is not shared by any other *Volk*. On this basis, each has a destiny that sketches out an essential way of historical being, a vocation. And just as individual animal bodies are organs of the organism that is the monad or animal *Umring*, so individual human beings are agents of the vocation that is the historical monad or *Volk*. Hence, it is not surprising that Heidegger's metaphysics leads to what, in the *Black notebooks*, he calls "meta-politics", the metaphysical vocation of the German *Volk*. It is not an accident, I think, that shortly after the failure of Heidegger's

term as Rector of the University of Freiburg in 1934, Heidegger had stopped talking in positive terms about a sort of metaphysics that he wanted to work out on the basis of phenomenology and instead turns to the project of overcoming metaphysics altogether. The attempt to move from the phenomenological neutrality of an inquiry into the meaning of being to an inquiry into the properties and attributes of beings as a whole produced very unfortunate consequences. At the philosophical level, one might be forgiven for thinking that the project is incoherent; but, at the political level, it seems to justify many of the most offensive and unfortunate elements of Heidegger's practice at this time.

Given the constraints of time, I must now conclude my presentation. But if I were to continue I would try to explain how Heidegger's political engagement is an example of his translation of the ontological (neutral) concept of *Dasein* as world-disclosing in its character as being an issue for itself into the metaphysical concept of human beings as world-building (*Welt-bildend*). The language of "disclosing" (*erschliessen*) is found throughout Heidegger's writings, and it carries with it a kind of normative sense: disclosing the world is to disclose how things truly are. The language of "world-building", in contrast, is found only in this metaphysical period of Heidegger's writings and it lacks any normative sense: building (or imagining) a world is normatively promiscuous and is tied, in this period, to the destiny of a particular *Volk*. If there is decisionism anywhere in Heidegger, it is not in *Being and Time* but in his meta-politics of the German *Volk*.

DISCUSSION

Carlota Santini

At the very beginning of your talk you gave a definition related to phenomenology and you spoke about metaphysical neutrality, which is a very clever term. What I like in particular of phenomenology is that it can move forward without any kind of metaphysics, because it has an autonomous path. In short: phenomenology does not enquire metaphysical subjects. However, I was wondering why Heidegger starts with an autonomous path of phenomenology but still feels the need to

ask about metaphysics? Also, why did he try to frame metaphysics into a speech not related to being but to phenomenology?

Steven Crowell

If you go back to Heidegger's criticism to Husserl, one way of interpreting phenomenological neutrality makes it seem as if the reduction reduces phenomenology to a concern about the inner workings of subjectivity, a concern which cuts it off from the world. Heidegger is well aware that Husserl is not Descartes and that transcendental subjectivity is not an encapsulated *ego*. For strategic reasons, he often ignores this point, and so he stresses Husserl's proximity to Descartes. The real point, it seems to me, is that Heidegger believes that transcendental subjectivity cannot be conceived as intentional consciousness. In effect, Heidegger's notion of world is completely compatible with a proper understanding of Husserl's reduction, and it is interesting to note that in the period between 1925 and 1934 Husserl too was exploring a move from transcendental phenomenology to metaphysics. So, even though both thinkers start with the reduction, they also hold that one can move from that very reduction to a theory that takes up entities as such, while still remaining phenomenological; for both Husserl and Heidegger, phenomenology was intended to be an entirely new type of metaphysics.

Such idea is also present in the work of other phenomenologists, such as Max Scheler; and today it is once more an issue in phenomenology, above all in France. The urge to say something about the world and the feeling that phenomenological neutrality leaves one only with something subjective is very strong.

In the particular case of Heidegger, there are aspects of his concept of thrownness that make it seem imperative to say something about beings as a whole. According to my reading, thrownness is a structure of *Sorge*, a transcendental condition of meaning whose ontic manifestation is found in moods like anxiety, joy or boredom. Such transcendental conditions are not instances of anything. By that I mean that asking what threw me into the world, for which purpose I am thrown into the world or who actually threw me, does not make any sense. Heidegger expresses this transcendental character with the idea that the whence and the whither of my thrownness remains in darkness; moods tell us nothing about that but testify only to the enigmatic character of my existence: that I am not the ground of myself. Nevertheless, it is quite common

in literature to find that the facticity of thrownness is identified with some particular ontic context: *Dasein* is thrown into a particular given cultural, historical, social, linguistic and natural context. This reading was common in the Sartrean and existentialist concept of situation, and it is supposed to express the finitude of the subject. If that is so, then it looks as though one must specify the nature of subjectivity by spelling out its relation to these contexts; in particular, nature and historico-cultural contexts. For example, if one specifies the context as language, then we get the structuralist critique of the pretensions of transcendental subjectivity; if we specify the context as nature, we get versions of naturalized phenomenology in which the very idea of a transcendental subject seems like a methodological mistake. Heidegger's metaphysics moves in this direction too, though I think the move is caught up in what Kant would call a "transcendental *Schein*": while there appears to be a kind of grounding relation between transcendental subjectivity (or *Dasein*) and the entities whose meaning is disclosed or constituted in that subjectivity, it is an illusion to think that phenomenology can say something about it. Of course, there are things to say about nature or history, but it is the sciences of these regions, and not metaphysics, that have the normative resources to say them.

Alejandro Vigo

I like the way you are trying to explain this period of transition in Heidegger's thought from *Being and Time* to the beginning of the 1930s, a period which is very dark and puzzling, where it is hard to know accurately what Heidegger was trying to do. I share your view that the writings of this period are perhaps, from a speculative point of view, the most important texts of Heidegger; but then again, it is quite difficult to see to what he is steering his work and in which way.

You were trying to connect the project that Heidegger starts with *Being and Time*, characterized by his phenomenological interests, with a transition to a more specific way to do phenomenology but with another intonation. In both cases, he is trying to say not only that it is possible to do transcendental phenomenology, but also that we can cope with regional ontologies within transcendental phenomenology. According to my understanding of your exposition, the first approach would be the project of *Being and Time*, including the possibility of regional ontologies. A second different input comes from the fact that we find

in *Wesen des Grundes*, in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* and in *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, the formula “*Das Seiende im Ganzen*” in which the important element is the adverb “*im Ganzen*” and the attempt to explain the origin of the possibility of this *im Ganzen*. Hence, my questions are the followings: what is your reading of “*im Ganzen*” in these writings? And, what is the relation between the second input and monadology, given that speaking of *Das Seiende im Ganzen* comes in connection with the new reception of Leibniz. It is a fact that there is a reception of Leibniz in Heidegger, but what is the point against Leibniz? As a matter of fact, we find in Husserl an attempt to construct a kind of phenomenological monadology, but only in the case of relation with other people. And there is again in Heidegger the project of a very special kind of monadology encompassed within his framework of meta-ontology.

André Laks

I had the impression that there is a tension between Professor Crowell’s description of the possibility of reading *Sein und Zeit* in an autonomous way and the explanation he gave about the transition of the mid 1930s. Is it not the case that Heidegger conceived from the very beginning of *Sein und Zeit* as a first step the project of looking at the question of being holistically as part of the re-thinking of Aristotle’s views on the senses of being? Is the project to say something about *Das Seiendes im Ganzen* a new step in Heidegger’s thought or is it just a reformulation, under certain circumstances, of the initial project?

Steven Crowell

Regarding regional ontologies, Heidegger makes it clear that metontology is not the same as the kind of regional-ontological inquiry that both Husserl and Heidegger held to belong to phenomenology. Regional ontologies are precisely ontological, that is to say, they deal with the *Sein* of some specific region of entities (nature, history or artworks), and not *Seiendes*, which are entities as such. That sort of regional-ontological inquiry is already contained in the project of *Being and Time*, which in certain sense is a regional ontology of *Dasein*. In any case, fundamental ontology is supposed to lay the groundwork for regional ontologies. Regional ontologies are doctrines of essence, and so, since essence is one way in which being is said, they belong to the sort

of Aristotelian inquiry that Professor Laks mentions as the prototype for *Being and Time*.

Within this context, it is interesting to note that in *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger moves beyond the tradition by including both the *modus essendi* and the *modus existendi* under the umbrella of *Wesenserkenntnis*: not only the “what-being” of things involves different regions but also the “that-being”, their ways of existing. To talk about ways of existing is still not to try to determine the empirical properties and relations of things. Rather, it is to specify essential differences between, say, being as *vorhanden* and as *zuhanden*, or being as *Dasein*. In Leibniz, the *modus existendi* of the monad is *vis*, which Heidegger translates as *Drang* (drive). Heidegger is interested in this *modus existendi* because it can be interpreted in terms of the structures of *Dasein* and thereby freed from the metaphysical horizon of Cartesianism in which Leibniz conceived it. This suggested to Heidegger that he could build a new monadology, a new metaphysics, on the basis of this Leibnizian conception.

It is true, of course, as Professor Laks proposes, that *Being and Time* was conceived as merely part of a complete ontology, which would have explored various meanings of being and unified them in the horizon of time. That type of ontology would have covered some of the same ground as we find in Aristotle’s metaphysics, but it would not be the sort of metaphysical realism that is often attributed to Aristotle. Instead, Heidegger proposes that his concept of metaphysics as metontology will cultivate what Aristotle’s metaphysics identifies as τὸ θεῖον, *das Übermächtige*, “the overpowering”; this is Heidegger’s name for *das Seiende im Ganzen*. In contrast to Aristotle, however, this involves what Heidegger calls an “*Umschlag*” (ἡ μεταβολή), in which transcendental inquiry turns back to the context from which it arose. Heidegger is not too clear about this, but here is where questions about sexual division or ethics are supposed to be answered by going back to the totality of entities upon which *Dasein* is supposed to depend.

Of course, such things are well within the reach of phenomenological investigation, but Heidegger seems to have some other things in mind here rather than phenomenological inquiry into essences. As a matter of fact, Heidegger never specifies in detail what the character of metontological inquiry is supposed to be, and I do not think that even he had a clear idea of it. My hunch is that Heidegger thought Leibniz could point the way, because of Leibniz’s retrieval of Aristotle’s notion of ἐντελέχεια. Part of

my project, then, is to show how the notion of ἐντελέχεια plays a key role, though not under that specific name, in Heidegger's discussions of metaphysics. How Heidegger understands this Leibnizian notion is directly derived from his understanding of *Dasein* as that being who is for the sake of some possibility of its being. So, ἐντελέχεια as Heidegger interprets it in Leibniz is the *Worumwillen* of *Dasein*. According to Heidegger, Leibniz's reading of ἐντελέχεια in terms of the Cartesian *ego cogito* rather than in terms of *Dasein* is the reason that he could not have seen the inner unity of *appetitus* and *perceptio*. For Heidegger, in contrast, *appetitus* as *Befindlichkeit* and *perceptio* as *Verstehen* are mutually founded in *Dasein*'s unity as care.

So, where does "*Das Seiende im Ganzen*" come from and how is this connected with monadology? The phrase "*Das Seiende im Ganzen*" should always be read as part of the unity "*Das Seiende im Ganzen und als solches*", as it is found in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. The "*als solches*" ("as such") plays a crucial role here because it points out that we are concerned with entities as entities. In particular cases, entities show up under certain description; for instance, in use, the hammer shows up as hammer and the car as car. Such meaning is not something that can be characterized in a purely rational, intellectual way. Rather there is an affective aspect of it: the world in which we encounter hammers and cars has to matter to me, and mattering, as Heidegger tells us in *Being and Time*, is a function of *Befindlichkeit*, of mood or affectedness. The way the world as a whole is there for us matters to us is through mood. The point is that in *Being and Time* the proper meaning of the phrase "*das Seiende im Ganzen*" has nothing to do with some set of all entities but rather with the way in which wholeness is given through mood. This is also the primary meaning of the term in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, but frequently when Heidegger refers to it in other texts he sometimes yields to the temptation of thinking of "*Das Seiendes im Ganzen*" as a totality in the sense of the Kantian Antinomy: a collection of all entities there are, with an eye toward determining the way that they belong together. In Leibnizian terms, this totality is the pre-established harmony of monads, "metaphysical points," while what appears to us as nature and the other regions of phenomenal being are *phenomena bene fundata*, a measurable and quantifiable appearance grounded on the pre-established harmony. Thus, it appears that Heidegger was moving toward a kind of metaphysics in which he would be entitled to say that nature as such consists in entities constituted by *vis*. Such view is

quite evident in his characterization of animals in the *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, but I find it hard to imagine that Heidegger would really want to go all the way and declare that at bottom stones and other lifeless things are *phenomena bene fundata* whose *modus existendi* is ultimately that of the lowest level of monadic apperception. The path to metaphysics through Leibniz seems here to encounter an ultimate roadblock.

Peter Trawny

Earlier on, you declared that you actually do not know the type of inquiry Heidegger is practising after writing *Being and Time*. In fact, when one analyses the way Heidegger is thinking journeys to the beginning of the 1930s, it is possible to read the years running from 1927 to 1930 as a transition. I wonder why Heidegger took interests in Leibniz, when it is clear that Heidegger did not have at that moment a systematic project or even a plan. In those three years, it is possible to see that his lecture courses are in themselves very different: when one reads *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, which was written during that period, it is notorious that Heidegger suddenly begins to quote novelists. Afterwards, he stated that everything was boring, and then he affirmed that somebody had to bring terror back; that humans needed to experience terror again. For me, those declarations have nothing to do with Leibniz; they come from wherever.

In *The Black notebooks* from 1930 and on, it is evident that he began to take interest in *National-sozialismus*. My question is: what went wrong in your eyes? What is the problem during that period? Is there a subtext or something unclear in Heidegger's thought? He says himself that from *Metaphysics of Dasein* to *Metapolitics of the people* there is a lapse in which there was something blurry in his philosophy. Later on, he tried to give an interpretation to it. My question is whether we can really believe in this or not; and if we can, what would be the consequences?

Steven Crowell

I agree fundamentally with your point of view. During that period, Heidegger was experimenting with all kinds of thought-figures that he found in the German tradition. In contrast to the Heidegger of *Being and Time*, the Heidegger from that period wants to become a cultural force serving the ends of a kind of "conservative-revolutionary" agenda, as

Fritz Ringer has put it; hence, his commitment to National Socialism is not a surprising outcome. What really went wrong after *Being and Time*? I cannot explain it thoroughly, but one can imagine that an ambitious megalomaniac like Heidegger might want to see his personal, political ideas “concretized” in, say, university structure. I think his notion of metaphysics indicates a kind of “fall” into ontic questions, and that is how I read his comment to Karl Löwith that Heidegger’s concept of *Geschichtlichkeit* was the basis for his political involvement.

I must say that I have never been a fan of the chapter in *Being and Time* where this concept is introduced. I agree with Carl-Friedrich Gethmann, who claimed that from a systematic point of view, the chapter adds nothing to the central argument of *Being and Time*, which concerns the transcendental conditions of possibility for an understanding of being. If one queries for the reason why, one comes face to face with the fact that there are a number of perhaps competing agendas in *Being and Time* itself, not all of which can be defended phenomenologically. One of Heidegger’s agendas was to enter into the debate over historicism and politics that were part of German cultural discourse at the time. It seems to me that many of these extra-phenomenological agendas in Heidegger’s thought come into view during that transitional period.

But what exactly “went wrong” here? Philosophically, we might say something like the following: when Heidegger took up Leibniz’s monadology in terms of the *Worumwillen*, he did so with a crucial difference: whereas Leibniz’s whole conception of pre-established harmony was grounded on a distinctively normative orientation, namely, toward the will of God as the creator of the best of all possible worlds, Heidegger’s conception lacked just this point. The *Worumwillen*, which does involve an orientation toward the normative, has no *a priori* “pole,” so to speak whereby to orient itself. It can glean its direction only from the historical situation.

The monadology that Heidegger develops is *völkisch*: historical. *Dasein* is a historical entity. While he also muses on the sense in which we are embedded in nature, he does not seem to grant it much importance relative to the sense in which we are metaphysically grounded on this factual and *völkisch* situation. Here Heidegger continues to distinguish between the mere “populace” (*Bevölkerung*), namely, *das Man*, the many who go along with whatever is of “today”, and the genuine *Volk* that is connected to what he calls the “*Dasein* in man.” His lecture courses of that period are filled with exhortations to his students to “awaken” or

“liberate” the Da-sein in them, which will reveal the decisive direction they must follow to be true to their historical “destiny” –a destiny already anticipated in the monadological unity of the *Volk*, its “entelechy” or vocation.

How do we awaken the *Dasein* in us? It seems this is what Heidegger had in mind by promoting terror (*das Schrecken*). There are all kinds of such shocks in every period of Heidegger’s thought; they all seem roughly to transport us from the ontic to the ontological level of thinking. Here he seems to say that it is to scare the daylights out of people to free them from their dogmatic slumbers, so that they do not think of themselves as «ontic Germans», but as *das deutsches Volk*, a “futural” (*zukünftig*) meaning of being German that can now finally come to light as a “vocation” of a “metaphysical people.” Needless to say, the term “terror” has more semantic baggage in that context than this sheer philosophical explication, and that is what makes that period in Heidegger’s thought so disgusting.

André Laks

I have two questions of semantics. First, talking about Heidegger’s interest in Leibniz, you mentioned that the term he uses to refer to *Worumwillen* and ἐντελέχεια is *Drang*. I would like to know about the implications of this word, which I assume is not part of Leibniz’s vocabulary. Is it not the case that *Worumwillen* understood as ἐντελέχεια is teleologically oriented in a normative way, whereas *Drang* lacks this normative orientation?

Then, you repeatedly talked about *völkisch*. Do you mean it? Is not *völkisch* part and parcel of Nazi ideology? There is obviously a historical representation of the monad which is not bound to be *völkisch* in this sense, namely, in the wake of Herder. Should not we distinguish between monadically oriented entities that can be a nation (*ein Volk*) and *völkisch*?

Steven Crowell

Thank you for mentioning Herder, since I think Heidegger’s interest in Leibniz at that time reflects a reaction to a certain strict kind of transcendental philosophy (the kind Herder found in Kant) according to which “dogmatic” metaphysics of the sort Leibniz used to practice is epistemically in bankrupt. Very broadly speaking, Leibniz was not merely a rationalist metaphysician, so to speak, he was also the founder

of what has been called the “expressivist” tradition in German thought, of which Herder is a representative and of which the hermeneutics of Dilthey is a later example. Herder’s way of talking about culture and nature borrows heavily from Leibnizian monadology and he thinks of himself as free from the constraints of the Kantian transcendental critique of metaphysics. This seems to me to be the background of Heidegger’s appropriation of Leibniz, which thus fits into a very familiar strand in German thought, one that was also revived in neo-vitalism.

While it is true that Herder aims ultimately to a conception of humanity (*Menschheit*) in general, he does so through the notion of a plurality of *Völker*, which have their own quasi-organic characteristics and norms that are not to be measured by those of others. Herder has been called the founder of cultural relativism, even though he has a certain conception of humanity that, like Leibniz’s notion of God, kind of holds the plurality of peoples together in principle. But the situation with Heidegger is more complicated, since the overarching norm (if one can christen it in that manner) is not something that is shared by all peoples, even in principle; it belongs to the German *Volk* alone, as the one genuine “metaphysical” people.

Returning to Professor Laks’ main question: what I find most important about how Heidegger deploys the concept of *Worumwillen* is the way he leverages it precisely against the imperatives of teleological thought: Heidegger’s interest in the concept of *Worumwillen* lies in its contrast to the structure of the making (ἡ τέχνη), represented by the *Um-zu* formula. As Alejandro Vigo has emphasized, the *Worumwillen* has rather the structure of acting (ἡ πράξις). This latter Aristotelian notion can be called “teleological” in a certain sense, because, as it turns out, there is a reason why for the action, but it does not have a sequential temporal structure and it is not measured by something that is achieved at the end of such a sequence (the ἔργον). Rather, it is, as Aristotle might say, “complete” at every moment, which I interpret it to mean that its success or failure is measured continuously, not just at the end. For Heidegger, to act for the sake of something is always to act for some possibility of *Dasein*, that is to say, some way that I am able to be. As I put it, such acting is trying to be something.

Now, this is often taken in a misleadingly teleological way: one imagines that to act for the sake of, say, being a doctor, is to go through a set of sequential steps to become a doctor: going through undergraduate school; then, medical school; next, internships; residency; until one

is finally a doctor. But that is not Heidegger's thought. Rather, in a Heideggerian jargon, acting for the sake of being a doctor is to actually exercise an ability that I currently have, namely, playing a role that is available to me in *Das Man* and for which I have the requisite credentials, to try to be this role here and now. For instance, right now I am acting for the sake of being a professor and an interlocutor in the world of university life; I am giving a lecture in just this way because it seems to me the currently best way of succeeding at what I am trying to be, namely, a professor. The *Worumwillen* is thus always governed by a norm, but the norm is continually at issue or in play in what I am trying to be. Because I care about succeeding or failing at being a professor, the norm binds me and I am continually succeeding or failing; my success or failure is not to be found at the end of the day. This structure is the essence of care and the origin of our orientation toward the normative.²

This whole idea lies behind Heidegger's enthusiasm for Leibniz's revival of the notion of *vis activa*, which is always *in actu*. As in Aristotle, this is a $\pi\rho\tilde{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$ that is complete at every stage. Thus, it is teleological *iv* a peculiar sense. In *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger tells the story of Hermolaus Barbarus, a translator of Aristotle who was so perplexed by how to translate the Greek term " $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\alpha$ " that he "invoked the Devil to provide him with instruction." (GA 26, p. 104; English trans, p. 84). The term he came up with is "*perfectihabia*", which contains the reference to the norm, to the measure of certain perfection. The question now is what that perfection is and how it is there. Heidegger claims that even Aristotle did not get to the bottom of these questions, but in his own notion of the *Worumwillen* he thinks he can provide an account, since in acting, for instance, for the sake of being a professor I am oriented toward a measure or norm of what being a professor is or means, that is, what a professor ought to be.

Being *Dasein* is to have that very being at issue for one. In other words: being *Dasein* is always to be oriented toward a norm, a measure of success or failure. Being a professor (or father, or carpenter, or anything else) is to try to be one, to care about succeeding or failing at it. Only when I try to be something can the world in which things appear as relevant and meaningful for such a $\pi\rho\tilde{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$ open up. Thus, this normative orientation is necessary for having any intentional

² For a complete account of this, see Steven Crowell (2013).

content, which is why phenomenal consciousness cannot be intrinsically intentional. This is Heidegger's move beyond Husserl.

I now return to the question about *Drang*. As I understand it, Heidegger attributes the structure of the *Worumwillen* to Leibniz's notion of *vis primitiva*, which means that it is norm-oriented. He then translates this as "*Drang*". It is the normative orientation that makes it possible for him to then claim that *Drang* incorporates both *appetitus* and *perceptio* (or *representatio*), since both of these are, on Heidegger's view, connected in our caring orientation toward measures of what we are trying to be. As I suggested above, it is because we can act for the sake of being something that things can matter to us (*appetitus*) and that they can show up for us as this or that (*perceptio, representatio*). The *Worumwillen* is the ground of intentionality.

From a metaphysical point of view, the problem is as follows: while this is all demonstrated on the example of *Dasein*, the Leibnizian monadology is supposed to be a new account of reality as a whole. For this reason, Heidegger's interpretation of *Drang* in terms of the *Worumwillen* leaves him with a problem: not only *Dasein*, but animals too, must be characterized metaphysically by *Drang*. Why, then, are they world-poor? The answer comes late in the text of *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, when Heidegger points out that there are "degrees of apperception": only *Dasein* possesses freedom to bind itself explicitly to a measure or norm; only *Dasein* tries to be something. This highest stage of apperception is what Heidegger describes in the chapters on existential breakdown in *Being and Time*, the chapters on *Angst, Tod* and *Gewissen*, in which *Dasein* gains a certain kind of phenomenological insight about itself, namely, that it is what Heidegger in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* calls "freedom for reasons." As Heidegger claims in *Being and Time*, one's being is such that one has to take over being a ground. That is as deep as it gets phenomenologically in terms of an analytic description of the kind of being that each of us is.

Denis Thouard

I would like to go back to a very basic question in order to understand better your presentation and the main topic: metaphysics. You alluded to the fact that metaphysics is something that Heidegger tried to overcome after the Rectorate. We saw at the beginning of the discussion that metaphysics was something that Heidegger tried to

oppose to Husserl. Heidegger was engaged in an attempt to construct a new kind of metaphysics, which could be called metaphysics of finitude (*Endlichkeit*). Nevertheless, he tries not to overcome his own attempt, but rather this specific construction he calls onto-theology. So, we have to consider two sorts of metaphysics:

1. The metaphysics Heidegger wanted from the beginning but which he developed quite slowly; and,
2. The metaphysics emerging from his interpretation of the whole of Western philosophical history.

My question is how to interpret the contemporaneity of these two types of metaphysics and how to deal with this contradiction. When did Heidegger abandon his first attempt on metaphysics? When do you think Heidegger wants to overcome metaphysics? Was it around 1934 or earlier?

Steven Crowell

It seems to me that through the Rectorate Heidegger was still developing his own version of this metaphysical project, and that very soon thereafter he decided upon a project of overcoming metaphysics. To me, the relation between the term “metaphysics” prior to the Rectorate, namely, metontology, and its use after the Rectorate, as in “overcoming ‘metaphysics’”, is not at all clear. In the latter case, he seems to identify “metaphysics” as an inquiry into the “*Seiendheit*” or “beingness” of beings, which leaves the truth of being itself out of account: the oblivion of the truth of being that must be recovered by overcoming our metaphysical habits of thought. Heidegger affirms that the whole history of metaphysics is the substitution of *Seiendheit* for that which clears and discloses this beingness of beings. Heidegger’s goal in later highlighting *Seyn*, *Lichtung* and *Ereignis*, then, is not the production of a new metaphysics but rather a new form of thinking on metaphysics.

So, while I do not know exactly when the project of overcoming metaphysics became explicit, I do think that Heidegger’s attempt at a positive metaphysics in the form of a metaphysical ontic in connection with Leibniz seems to end right away after the Rectorate. That is why I think there is a very close connection between this type of metaphysics and his motives, his self-understanding, in his engagement with the

Nazionalsozialismus. But this is something I am only now trying to write about in detail.

Federica González

First, I want to add something to the issue of teleology. I believe there is an Aristotelian origin of the concept of *Worumwillen* in Heidegger's lecture on Plato's *Sophist* from the mid-twenties. The translation that Heidegger makes of "τέλος" is "*Worumwillen*". This is when Heidegger refers to φρόνησις, and distinguishes it from τέχνη. Consequently, it is possible to state that there are two kinds of τέλος in Aristotle:

1. The *poietical* (from ποιήσις) τέλος, which means that the end is different (ἕτερον) from the action itself; and,
2. The *πραξις*, in which the τέλος is the εὐπραξία because the τέλος is inside it; this is the normative way which Professor Crowell was referring to.

Referring to φρόνησις, Heidegger says that *Dasein* is discovered as τέλος and ἀρχή, where ἀρχή is thought as a meaning of τέλος and whose exact translation is "*Worumwillen*". That is why I believe the *Worumwillen* has an Aristotelian concept.

Secondly, I have a question related to the notion of *Weltbildend*, which features in the 1920s in *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*. My understanding of it is that there is an empowerment of *Dasein*, so to speak, who is taking an active role. It is the only moment in Heidegger's philosophy, I would risk to state, in which *Dasein* has something to do actively. My question is whether this has something to do with what you said about the problematic concept related to the Nazism. Linked to this, would you say that Heidegger falls again with this metaphysics in a theoretical way of doing philosophy and so forgets the theoretical path?

Steven Crowell

The *Worumwillen* has an Aristotelian origin. My point is only that Heidegger interprets Leibniz's *vis primitiva* in terms of the *Worumwillen*, and he seems to suggest that even Aristotle had not gotten to the bottom of this particular type of teleology. The end is always immanent to the action, in such a way that this is a kind of perfection or completion. If one tries to think phenomenologically about what this actually signifies,

interesting things start to appear; for example, “teleology” would not merely mean a process, notwithstanding that it is not what “*πρᾶξις*” means. Rather the latter must involve a measure of perfection which is both immanent to the process and at issue for the one engaged in it. Though this is already in Aristotle, Heidegger makes it explicit as the essential characteristic of selfhood, namely, trying to be something. Animal processes lack this trait, which stresses the salient differences among Heideggerian phenomenology and Aristotelian first philosophy. Animal striving, say, instinct, is not to try to be anything. No human being tries to be a human being; no bat tries to be a bat; no dog tries to be a dog. For Heidegger, this is because the animal’s being does not have the structure of being at issue for it (*Sorge*). That structure is necessary for *πρᾶξις* or the trying to be something, since care provides the necessary normative orientation, namely, a concern for succeeding or failing at something. It is only because we have such a normative orientation that we inhabit a world whose things can show themselves as the things they are. Regarding the notion of *τέλος*, then, what Heidegger does is to take the Aristotelian analysis and demonstrate that it is not just spread out across the whole of what is, so to speak, but it is the normative orientation that arises from the phenomenological essence of selfhood.

When Heidegger refers to *Weltbildend* it seems that *Dasein* is taking an active role, but phenomenologically this is a mistaken way of characterizing *Dasein*’s transcendental capacity. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger notes that the care structure, through the *Worumwillen*, discloses (*erschliesst*) a world. In contrast, when one says that *Dasein* is *Weltbildend*, one rather imagines a situation in which *Dasein* is constructing or imagining a world. Certainly, human beings do this too, but it is not the same as disclosing a world. The latter allows things to show themselves as they are, since it is inherently governed by a norm of success or failure; the former is rather more like forcing things into an imaginative construct, where the notion of success or failure has no place. I realize that things are more complicated than this in Heidegger’s thought, especially in the relation between *Weltbild* and *Urbild*, which is a very polysemic and interesting term in Heidegger’s philosophy. In a nutshell, I do think this period, in which *Dasein* plays a more active role, eventually puts us in a more solipsistic position, which finds expression in Heidegger’s notion of the *Volk*. Later on in his overcoming metaphysics period, Heidegger returns to the notion of *Weltbildend* and

criticizes it as a form of representational thought and will to power. See, for instance, Heidegger's essay *Die Zeit des Weltbildes*.

As for the question of whether Heidegger's metaphysics is a form of theoretical philosophy that is regressive in relation to his achieved insights into the pre-theoretical nature of philosophical inquiry I must say that it is a complicated question, but my quick answer is no: the problem with Heidegger's attempt at a positive metaphysics is not that it is too theoretical but that it is a theory lacking any kind of principle or method. In my opinion, *Being and Time* is a theoretical work, a work in the categorial theory of transcendental phenomenology. I cannot agree with those who think it is mainly instructions for philosophy as a way of life. Yes: philosophy can be a way of life, but that is not the point for Heidegger. *Being and Time* is not a way of life, it is a theoretical treatise, and Heidegger was clear about that. In *Letter on Humanism*, he states that the problem with his earlier work was that its insights were spoiled by the theoretical aims of science and research. But there he also states that such a path is even now necessary. For my own part, I have nothing against science and research. I would defend the idea that at least some part of philosophy is something like a noetic or theoretical task. I am not here trying to convince you to lead a certain way of life.

Peter Trawny

I have two remarks: the first one is related to what you said about ἐντελέχεια. It is interesting to me —since I read the interpretation of Leibniz— how Heidegger cuts off every theological aspect of the monadology. When one reads the *Monadology* it is quite clear, especially at the end, that there is an eschatology, that Leibniz shows himself as a Christian thinker. However, for Heidegger this aspect does not even exist. Even if one reads Aristotle, one can think about the relation between the ἐντελέχεια and the νοῦς as if there was a cosmological meaning of ἐντελέχεια. But then again, Heidegger omits it. It is of course interesting for the relation of Heidegger to Christianity that he exposes in the *Black notebooks*, because he wants to destroy Christianity in a certain way.

My second remark may be more interesting: you affirmed that one has to try to be something. What I find interesting in *Being and Time* is that at the moment Heidegger introduces the analytics of *Dasein*, he says that it is not the question "what is the *Dasein*?" the interesting one, but

“who is *Dasein*?” In my opinion, this is really important in reference to selfhood, because one can say that the self that Heidegger is dealing with at first refers to a structure which Heidegger often explains as the structure in virtue of which one is being related to oneself; that is care (*Sorge*). Hence, that is a very neutral structural understanding of the self. However, it is evident afterwards that in the next text self also denotes identity. So, the question “who am I?” is actually a different question to analyse “care” as structure of my self-relation.

Regarding the example you gave about one wanting to be a professor. I think that in a phenomenological analysis Heidegger could ask you “why do you not want to be a German professor?” This expresses the sense of the analysis of historicity. If one asks himself “who am I?”, and the answer is “I am a professor”, it is not enough in a phenomenological sense. I do not know whether Heidegger had that clear, because, on one hand, sometimes he uses the term of “self” —especially in *The Principle of Reason*— when understanding identity; on the other hand, sometimes he uses this term in the old sense of the self-relating structure. My guess is that this issue is something important to understand: to be conscious that right after writing *Being and Time*, Heidegger faces these problems with the concept of self, which then leads to the question “who are we?” in the year of 1933.

Would you not say that this problem is present in the strange question “who is the *Dasein*?”?

Steven Crowell

I do think that there are these two aspects of approaching the self: (1) the structural aspect (what is *Dasein*?) and (2) the *existentiell* aspect (who is (this) *Dasein*?) The relation between the two is precisely at issue, as you suggest, in Heidegger’s invocation of “German-ness” in the period of the first of the *Black notebooks*. But I think the chapter on historicity addresses this problem in a misleading way. The structural concept is existential, understood as a transcendental categorial form. The *existentiell* —trying to be a professor— refers to particular possible instantiations of that structure. Those *existentiell* possibilities are always located in *das Man*, that is to say, in a particular time and in a particular public. There are things that one can try to be and others that one cannot try to be; for example, I cannot try to be a Samurai warrior, because the conditions are not in existence.

Returning to your question regarding Heidegger's omission of Leibniz's theology. The implication of the structural point is that there is nothing that the structured *Dasein* is supposed to be. One cannot imagine the *existentiell* question of "who I am" being answered as follows: "I have been trying to be a professor all my life, but I really am a poet". There is no such thing as what I really am in that sense. Being a poet is something that I can try to be, because it is not anywhere inscribed as my real nature: what I really am supposed to be. Aristotle encounters a similar problem when he tries to specify the end of human life: on one hand, it seems as if Aristotle were encouraging us to pursue the contemplative life; but, on the other hand, it seems that he is actually encouraging us to pursue the political one.

The problem with the *Geschichtlichkeit* chapter is that Heidegger attributes to the generation (*Volk*) categories that only *Dasein* can possess. It is as though *Dasein's* being were somehow mirrored in this collective. In *Being and Time*, it could seem that *Dasein* discovers what sort of being it is when its everyday absorption in the collective breaks down, and one gains insight into one's ultimate responsibility for who one is. It is true that in such situation, Heidegger will discover that he is trying to be a German professor. The dimension of this identity will be at issue in what he does. However, it is a mistake to think that the same structure is possible for what Heidegger calls "*Volk*". In effect, one can say that there is a collective anxiety, but this has a very different structure than what is outlined in the transcendental analysis shown in *Being and Time*. Attributing things like *Worumwillen* and *Entschluss* to the *Volk* is just a mistaken category from the point of view of *Being and Time*, and it skirts all the issues of collective intentionality, action and responsibility.

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SESSION 2

EXPERIENCIA, OBJETIVIDAD, HISTORIA. HEIDEGGER Y LA 'ANALÍTICA DE LOS PRINCIPIOS' KANTIANA

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Quisiera comenzar exponiendo la motivación del escrito que usaré de base para esta exposición, un escrito sobre el cual he trabajado desde hace más dos años en producción y que está aún sin publicar.¹ Además de un interés en el tema que viene de muy lejos, la motivación del texto se relaciona también con el hecho de que mi colega Ramón Rodríguez editará una guía para el pensamiento de Heidegger en la serie de guías para los pensadores filosóficos que ha organizado la editorial Comares de Granada. En ese marco, a mí se me asignó escribir el capítulo sobre Heidegger y Kant, lo cual, como es obvio, no es fácil de hacer en un espacio reducido. En ese marco, quise retomar una serie de trabajos previos y construirlos mejor, para luego poder basar en ellos la versión más resumida para la guía.

Un segundo aspecto de la motivación del trabajo es que en los últimos años mi foco principal de investigación no ha sido Heidegger, sino Kant. Nunca abandoné Heidegger, pero no estoy tan centrado en ese autor como lo estaba hace quince años. Esta presentación me sirve, pues, para decir algunas cosas también sobre de Kant, en conexión con el modo en que Heidegger lo interpreta. Voy a anticipar la moraleja de esta presentación, que puede parecer un poco extraña, pero que para los intereses, sobre todo, de André Laks, pienso que no carece de toda relevancia. La situación que se me presenta es bastante paradójica. En la recepción heideggeriana de Kant se puede hablar de dos fases. A

¹ La versión definitiva del trabajo, titulada "Experiencia, objetividad, historia. Heidegger y el «Sistema de los principios» kantiano" se publica en Basso Monteverde (2017, en prensa).

los efectos que aquí interesan, el primer Heidegger, que en lo personal siempre me ha motivado intereses filosóficos más profundos, es el que llega hasta la escritura de *Ser y tiempo* y de ahí en más hasta los escritos de comienzos de los años treinta. En mi opinión, en esta primera fase Heidegger hace una recepción de Kant que es extremadamente inspiradora, desde el punto de vista filosófico, pero que, en varios de sus aspectos centrales, resulta filológicamente insostenible. En cambio, el segundo Heidegger, representado por el pensamiento onto-histórico, que es el que a mí siempre me ha interesado menos, hace una interpretación mucho más correcta, filológicamente hablando, de Kant. La paradoja es, pues, la siguiente: el Heidegger que, a mi modo de ver, es menos rentable desde el punto de vista filosófico, sin embargo, en ocasiones, hace interpretaciones de autores canónicos de la tradición filosófica que resultan ellas mismas más rentables que el Heidegger que a mí me interesa filosóficamente, pero que filológicamente, muy a menudo, produce interpretaciones difíciles de aceptar.

La primera parte del texto que estoy comentando contiene una sección en la cual trato de recopilar algunos de los datos más relevantes que hay para dar cuenta del modo en que Heidegger recibe a Kant, sobre todo, en los años que preceden inmediatamente a la publicación de *Ser y tiempo*. Hay más material del que uno esperaría a primera vista, aunque se trata, en muchos casos, sobre todo, cuando nos alejamos de *Ser y tiempo* en dirección de los primeros años de la carrera filosófica de Heidegger, de observaciones más bien dispersas. El material que considero en el trabajo retrocede, pues, hasta el comienzo de la carrera filosófica de Heidegger. Hay referencias a Kant ya en los escritos que oscilan entre los años de 1912 y 1914. Hay algunas referencias importantes a Kant también en el escrito de *Habilitación* de 1915, sobre todo, en el epílogo, que es de suma importancia por otros motivos, y donde la relación entre Aristóteles y Kant es presentada como el punto de partida para la elaboración de una adecuada teoría de las categorías.

Como nadie ignora, Kant no fue la figura dominante en el largo período de formación que conduce hasta *Ser y tiempo*. Si uno repasa el período de los años veinte, la figura que está en el centro de atención, por lo menos hasta el año 1925, es Aristóteles, y no Kant. Sin embargo, a partir de 1925 Kant es redescubierto con un renovado interés, lo cual impacta fuertemente en la redacción final de *Ser y tiempo*. En este sentido, quiero mencionar algunos juicios que Heidegger expresa en el epistolario de esa época, para mostrar hasta qué punto el redescubierto

de Kant a partir del año de 1925 impactó en el período de la redacción final de *Ser y tiempo*. Aquí importa señalar algo que Steven Crowell ha marcado en trabajos muy importantes, porque permite corregir presentaciones unilaterales muy frecuentes: mientras que la primera mitad de la obra es marcadamente aristotélica, la segunda, en cambio, presenta aspectos que revelan el impacto de la nueva recepción de Kant, a partir del redescubrimiento del año 1925. Sobre algunos aspectos de la presencia de Kant en la segunda mitad de la obra ha llamado la atención también Ramón Rodríguez. Y el propio Franco Volpi, que fue el iniciador de la línea interpretativa que hace centro en la relación de la concepción de *Ser y tiempo* con el Aristóteles práctico, ha enfatizado, en un brillante trabajo publicado en 2006, el carácter decisivo del redescubrimiento de Kant en 1925, y describió el camino que Heidegger sigue a partir de allí por medio de la divisa: “De Husserl a Aristóteles, de Aristóteles a Kant”. Tenemos, pues, en *Ser y tiempo* un proyecto que no puede verse como basado meramente en Aristóteles y Husserl, sino que incorpora también, en lugares centrales y fáciles de identificar, elementos importantes derivados de la recepción de Kant.

Las cartas que interesan aquí son algunas dirigidas a Hannah Arendt de 1925, donde Heidegger relata que trata de compensar el agobio de las tareas de profesor universitario con regulares “visitas espirituales” a Königsberg. En esos meses, Heidegger le anuncia a Arendt que ha decidido dar un seminario acerca de Kant. Además, encontramos la carta a Karl Jaspers, donde está la famosa sentencia que da pie al famoso escrito precioso de Franco Volpi, en la cual Heidegger le dice a Jaspers: “pero lo más bonito es que comienzo a amar realmente a Kant”. Algunas cartas posteriores a Elizabeth Blochmann y nuevamente a Jaspers, ya en 1927 y 1928, hablan en el mismo sentido.

Lo relevante es ver cuáles son los motivos del pensamiento kantiano que interesaron centralmente a Heidegger a partir de 1925. Para eso tenemos el testimonio de dos textos fundamentales: uno es la lección sobre la “Crítica de la razón pura” del año académico 1927-1928 (GA 25), que ofrece una interpretación fenomenológica de parte importante de la primera Crítica; y, el segundo es el libro sobre Kant de 1929 (GA 3), que en lo fundamental procede de la lección mencionada. A esto se añaden la importante lección sobre lógica del semestre de invierno de 1925-1926, el momento de la repentina recuperación de Kant, que en su parte final contiene una primera versión de la interpretación de la primera Crítica (GA 21) y también la famosa lección sobre los problemas fundamentales

de la fenomenología del semestre de verano de 1927 (GA 24), donde hay toda una serie de elementos que dan cuenta no sólo de la asimilación de Kant dentro del proyecto filosófico de *Ser y tiempo*, incluidos algunos de los aspectos que conciernen a la recepción de motivos centrales del Kant práctico.

Pues bien, lo que Heidegger procura con su interpretación de la primera Crítica es llevar a cabo un intento de apropiarse de Kant de una manera transformadora, que no está exenta de violencia exegética. Heidegger se adueña, sobre todo, de la concepción kantiana de la experiencia, tal como se elabora en la *Crítica de la razón pura*, con el fin de alinearla con el proyecto trascendental que el propio Heidegger presenta en *Ser y tiempo*. Más concretamente, se trata aquí, sobre todo, de la intuición básica según el cual el punto de referencia, la clave, por así decir, de la comprensión del sentido del ser se halla en la temporalidad originaria: el ser es comprendido a partir del tiempo. El eje de la recepción de Kant en estos escritos consiste, pues, en tomarlo como precedente de la propia concepción que presenta Heidegger en *Ser y tiempo*, según la cual el tiempo constituye el horizonte de la comprensión del ser. Por ello, al leer a Kant, Heidegger pone aquí todo énfasis en la “Doctrina del esquematismo de los conceptos puros del entendimiento”, vale decir, en la “Doctrina de la imaginación trascendental”. Según esta decisión hermenéutica, el centro especulativo de la Crítica de la razón pura está en la “Doctrina del esquematismo”.

De este modo, Heidegger adopta una perspectiva que, como se verá, va en contra de palabras expresas del propio Kant, una decisión que, por otra parte, será revocada en la nueva lección sobre la primera Crítica que Heidegger dicta casi diez años después, en el semestre de invierno de 1935-1936, que se conoce con el título de “La pregunta por la cosa. La doctrina kantiana de los principios trascendentales”, que fue publicada por primera vez en 1962 y posteriormente reproducida en la *Gesamtausgabe* (GA 41). En efecto, en este nuevo intento de interpretación de la *Crítica de la razón pura* el panorama ha cambiado de manera notable: Kant ya no es leído aquí fundamentalmente como un predecesor de la concepción presentada en *Ser y tiempo*, sino que es interpretado ahora en clave ontohistórica (*seinsgeschichtlich*), a saber, como el representante más emblemático de una interpretación históricamente determinada de lo que Heidegger llama aquí la “cosidad de la cosa” (*die Dingheit des Dinges*). Pero, para poder leer a Kant de dicha manera, Heidegger reconoce ahora que el núcleo especulativo de la concepción de la

experiencia presentada en la *Crítica de la razón pura* no está ni podría estar en la “Doctrina del esquematismo”, sino que debe ser buscado, más bien, en el “Sistema de los principios” y, más precisamente, en su parte central, que viene dada por las “Analogías de la experiencia”. Como es bien sabido, en la exposición sucinta que lleva a cabo en los *Prolegómenos*, el propio Kant identificó estas últimas como el verdadero centro de su concepción de la experiencia (*Prolegómenos* § 26).

Tenemos aquí, por tanto, una autocorrección de gran alcance por parte de Heidegger, puesto que concierne al foco mismo de la interpretación que había elaborado en su primer y más enjundioso intento de apropiación de Kant, a partir de 1925. Dicha autocorrección se lleva a cabo, sin embargo, de modo completamente silente en la propia lección de 1935-1936, al menos, en la medida en que la versión publicada en 1962 no recoge ninguna referencia expresa de Heidegger a lo que estaba teniendo lugar aquí desde el punto de vista hermenéutico. Por tanto, no sólo los asistentes a la lección, salvo que hubiera mediado una aclaración no contenida en el texto conservado, sino incluso el lector de la versión publicada, a menos que poseyera información adicional, no podían estar en buenas condiciones para apreciar el drástico cambio de perspectiva que la nueva interpretación de Kant ahora ofrecida traía consigo. En cambio, en importantes escritos de la época, tales como *Contribuciones a la filosofía* de 1936-1938 (GA 65) y *Meditación* de 1938-1939 (GA 66), queda reflejado con claridad meridiana que el propio Heidegger era completamente consciente de la profundidad y la importancia del cambio de perspectiva que traía consigo el nuevo intento de recepción de Kant, al punto de que la interpretación ofrecida en los escritos de finales de los años 20, incluido el libro de 1929, es sometida ahora a severa (auto)crítica, también en lo que concierne a su carácter unilateral (*einseitig*), violento (*Gewalt, gewaltig*) y exagerado (*übertreiben*), desde el punto de vista histórico-filológico². Sin embargo, estos escritos no fueron publicados hasta mucho después, de modo que la investigación de la recepción heideggeriana de Kant no pudo tomarlos en cuenta sino hasta hace relativamente poco tiempo.

Como quiera que fuere, el punto es que en la lección de 1935-1936 termina dando razón a lo que afirma el propio Kant, cuando señala que el núcleo especulativo de la concepción de la experiencia *Crítica de la*

² Véase *Contribuciones* § 134; *Meditación* § 20, 109, 116.

razón pura está en el “Sistema de los principios” y, particularmente, en las “Analogías de la experiencia”. Pero, además, Heidegger admite ahora que la concepción kantiana codifica, por así decir, en sede filosófica, una visión de la objetividad que en su origen y su orientación fundamental está estrechamente relacionada con la ciencia natural y con la metafísica de la Modernidad. Si se compara esta nueva posición de frente a Kant y se la compara con la discusión mantenida en la famosa “Disputa de Davos”, parece inevitable concluir que, en puntos muy importantes, Heidegger tuvo que reconocer finalmente que era Ernst Cassirer el que llevaba razón. Sin embargo, a pesar de la autocrítica practicada en los escritos de la segunda mitad de los años 30, se buscará inútilmente un reconocimiento expreso de los méritos del adversario. Para Heidegger, la interpretación neokantiana se equivoca incluso cuando acierta, pues no logra ver a Kant desde la perspectiva que abre el pensamiento ontohistórico³.

En suma, tenemos que Heidegger tuvo que desarrollar una construcción hermenéutica totalmente distinta para poder hacer justicia al verdadero alcance de la concepción kantiana. Esa construcción es la que corresponde al marco general del pensamiento ontohistórico. Sólo sobre esa base Heidegger logra lo que yo creo es su interpretación filológicamente más acertada de la concepción de la experiencia que Kant elabora en la *Crítica de la razón pura*. Ahora, vamos a ver cómo desarrolla su nueva interpretación de Kant en la lección de 1935-1936. La estrategia general de la interpretación elaborada puede describirse, en general, como una “historización de la concepción kantiana de la objetividad y la experiencia”. La concepción de Kant está pensada en clave ontohistórica. Según esto, lo articulado expresamente por Kant en el plano conceptual debe verse como la documentación de una manera históricamente determinada de comprender la entidad del ente (*Seiendheit des Seienden*), en el sentido más preciso de la cosidad de la cosa (*Dingheit des Dinges*).

La manera en que Heidegger lleva a cabo la historización de la concepción kantiana procede en dos pasos. En primer lugar, Heidegger intenta poner de manifiesto, en general, el carácter irreductiblemente histórico de todo posible modo de plantear la pregunta por la cosa, así como de los posibles modos de responderla. En segundo lugar,

³ A este respecto, véase *Meditación*, GA 66, § 20.

Heidegger lleva a cabo una consideración de lo que sería el suelo histórico (*geschichtlicher Boden*) del que brota, por así decir, la peculiar concepción de la cosidad de la cosa, que Kant documenta y traspone al plano conceptual.

Respecto del primer paso, Heidegger busca poner de manifiesto que toda concepción de la cosidad de la cosa, ya en el plano pre-conceptual, está históricamente mediada. Sin embargo, ello no implica atribuir ningún tipo de arbitrariedad a las diversas respuestas históricas dadas una pregunta que debe entenderse ella misma históricamente. No ata aquí mera arbitrariedad, porque, desde la perspectiva propia del pensamiento ontohistórico, las diferencias epocales que documentan las diversas concepciones acerca de qué cosa es una cosa deben ser puestas en conexión con distintas configuraciones epocales del ser mismo, esto es, con distintos momentos en el despliegue epocal del sentido del ser mismo, a los cuales se está directa o indirectamente respondiendo, allí donde se determina en cada caso, es decir, históricamente la cosidad de la cosa. En este plano que corresponde al acaecer histórico del ser mismo, no hay, a juicio de Heidegger, libre disposición arbitraria por parte del ser humano, ni mero convencionalismo, ni mero relativismo. Lo que hay es, más bien, una sucesión de configuraciones epocales de sentido, a través de las cuales se despliega históricamente el acaecer del ser mismo. Esto es lo que Heidegger tiene primariamente en vista con la construcción hermenéutica que corresponde al llamado “pensamiento ontohistórico” (*seinsgeschichtliches Denken*). La secuencia histórica de los modos de comprensión del ser, epocalmente determinados, queda documentada en la manera de plantear en cada caso de modo expreso, es decir, tal como ocurre en la reflexión filosófica, la pregunta de “qué cosa es una cosa” y “por qué” o en “virtud de qué”, y también, naturalmente, en los modos de dar respuesta a dicha pregunta. Heidegger llama aquí la atención sobre el hecho de que hay en cada caso, e inevitablemente, determinados presupuestos (*Voraussetzungen*) que dan cuenta, de modo mediato e inmediato, de todo entramado de conexiones de sentido, de un trasfondo comprensivo e interpretativo, sin el cual la correspondiente concepción de la cosidad de la cosa resulta ella misma incomprensible. Heidegger piensa que lo dicho vale para la interpretación griega de la naturaleza, para la interpretación medieval y también para la particular comprensión que Kant documenta en el plano de la elaboración conceptual, que no es otra que la que se inaugura con el proyecto físico-

matemático de la naturaleza, tal como éste se instaura y desarrolla a partir del Renacimiento.

Ahora bien, ¿cuál es la idea rectora que permite comprender de algún modo el nexo de continuidad que vincula esas diferentes concepciones históricamente determinadas de la cosidad de la cosa? A juicio de Heidegger, se trata de la idea de que la cosa es un esto individual, es decir, un *je dieses* o τὸδε τι. A la cosa pensada como un *je dieses* o τὸδε τι pertenece esencialmente también la idea de que la cosa, en cuanto cosa, es fundamentalmente un portador de propiedades (*Träger von Eigenschaften*) (*La pregunta por la cosa*, Parte A, § 6; § 8). Por último, la concepción de la cosa como un *je dieses* o τὸδε τι, que como tal es portador de propiedades, está directamente conectada, desde el punto de vista ontológico y lingüístico, con la orientación tradicional a partir del enunciado predicativo, es decir, del enunciado que declara propiedades de cosa bajo la forma de la estructura “S es P”, que, en la terminología de Aristóteles, corresponde al *λόγος ἀποφαντικός*. Por este lado, se advierte también la conexión estructural de dicha concepción de la cosa con una determinada idea de la verdad, que es la que entiende la verdad como la adecuación del enunciado de la forma “S es P” a la estructura del estado de cosas, cuya estructura interna presenta la diferencia entre cosa y propiedad (*La pregunta por la cosa*, Parte A, § 9, 11). Ahora bien, todo lo anterior forma parte, sin embargo, de una determinación de la cosidad de la cosa que posee ella misma carácter histórico. Heidegger señala que es en este plexo de condiciones donde se pone de manifiesto la esencial historicidad de la determinación de la cosa (*Geschichtlichkeit der Dingbestimmung*). Y esto corresponde a una cierta decisión (*Entscheidung*), más precisamente, a una decisión relativa a cómo se concibe o competente el ente en totalidad (*La pregunta por la cosa*, Parte A, § 10; § 12). Aquí se ve la conexión con lo que explicaba Steven Crowell respecto del término “en totalidad” (*im Ganzen*). Tales decisiones históricas dan cuenta de lo que, en cada caso, se pone en juego en el modo de comportarse básico respecto de las cosas, de tal manera que lo que cuenta como cosa depende, en último término, de dicho marco de referencias previas, que determina el modo en el cual, en cada caso, se deja aparecer lo que aparece y se muestra desde sí mismo. Tal marco general de referencias queda definido, en lo fundamental, con arreglo a dos momentos fundamentales en su constitución de sentido, a saber, el de dónde (*woher*): por un lado, el ámbito de origen de aquello que en cada caso cuenta como cosa, aquel ámbito del cual se toma lo que

en cada caso determina la cosidad de la cosa; y, por otro, el hacia dónde (*wohin*), es decir, el ámbito de pertenencia de lo que en cada caso cuenta como cosa (*La pregunta por la cosa*, Parte A, § 13). No puedo entrar en el detalle de este punto. Me limito a decir que el ámbito de pertenencia de lo que en cada caso cuenta como cosa es, en la tradición que conduce hasta Kant, también al ámbito del cual se obtiene aquello que permite la determinación de la cosa misma. En la concepción tradicional, que Kant en este aspecto continúa, dicho ámbito no es otro que la naturaleza. Lo que cuenta como cosa se determina, pues, tomando como punto de partida su pertenencia a un ámbito más general, que no es otro sino la naturaleza, en el sentido global o colectivo del término.

El segundo paso mencionado más arriba concierne a la determinación del suelo histórico de la concepción kantiana. El punto más importante lo encontramos reiterado en diversos escritos de Heidegger, de esta época y también posteriores. Se trata del papel decisivo, desde el punto de vista ontológico, que Heidegger asigna al cambio epocal que trae consigo el nuevo paradigma de comprensión vinculado con la ciencia moderna de la naturaleza. En este sentido, en la lección de 1935-1936 Heidegger elabora, a modo de ilustración, un contraste entre la manera de determinar el movimiento que encontramos en Aristóteles, por un lado, y en Galileo y Newton, por el otro (*La pregunta por la cosa*, Parte B.I, § 5). En resumidas cuentas, Heidegger sostiene que lo que Kant afirma acerca de la cosidad de la cosa no resulta comprensible, en definitiva, más que por referencia a la determinación newtoniana de lo que es moverse, mientras que no podría entenderse de la misma manera si uno partiera de la concepción aristotélica del movimiento, en el sentido de la κίνησις. Esto pretende poner de relieve el hecho que la determinación kantiana de la cosidad de la cosa tiene ella misma un suelo histórico identificable y determinable. A diferencia de lo que ocurría en las obras dedicadas a la interpretación de Kant situadas en el entorno de *Ser y tiempo*, en la lección de 1935-1936 la "Doctrina del esquematismo" no es siquiera mencionada. En cambio, el "Sistema de los principios" es discutido con notable amplitud, porque lo que a Heidegger le interesa mostrar ahora es que la doctrina kantiana de los principios no es simplemente una doctrina sobre un determinado conjunto de conocimientos *a priori*, a los que Kant considera como constitutivos de toda posible experiencia de objetos, sino también que se trata de una concepción que hereda ciertos rasgos del modelo matemático de fundamentación del conocimiento propio del racionalismo, aun cuando Kant desarrolla un modelo que,

en su orientación fundamental, resulta ser completamente distinto al modelo dominante en la tradición del racionalismo. Lo que queda conservado en Kant, según Heidegger, es el carácter esencialmente matemático del modelo de fundamentación, y ello, entre otras cosas, en la medida en que la propia noción de principio es empleada por Kant en el sentido en que la empleaban autores como Alexander Baumgarten, Christian Wolff y otros.

Paso a decir algunas cosas más concretas acerca del modo en el cual Heidegger lee en la lección de 1935-1936 la concepción que Kant elabora en el "Sistema de los principios". Como anticipé ya, aunque el marco interpretativo más general provisto por el pensamiento ontológico pueda resultar dudoso o incluso poco convincente en diversos aspectos, lo cierto es que, en el caso de la lectura de Kant, arroja un rendimiento hermenéutico mayor que los intentos llevados a cabo en el entorno de *Ser y tiempo*.

Comienzo con una cita de un texto que confirma que es en el carácter matemático de la concepción de Kant donde Heidegger cree poder identificar el vínculo que da cuenta de su continuidad con las concepciones del racionalismo:

De aquí (*sc.* el hecho de que los principios proveen el fundamento a partir del cual se determina la cosidad de la cosa) derivamos ya que en esta *Crítica* se mantiene el rasgo fundamental (*Grundzug*) de la metafísica moderna, a saber: determinar de antemano (*im vorhinein bestimmen*) el ser del ente (*das Sein des Seienden*) a partir de principios (*aus Grundsätzen*). Es a la configuración (*Ausgestaltung*) y fundamentación (*Begründung*) de este <momento> "matemático" (*dieses "Mathematische"*) a lo que se dedica (*gilt*) el verdadero esfuerzo (*die eigentliche Anstrengung*) (*La pregunta por la cosa*, Parte B.II, § 2 p. 95)⁴.

⁴ Las traducciones de los textos citados me pertenecen. Cito la lección de 1935-1936 por la edición independiente (*Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendenten Grundsätzen* [1935/1936], Tübingen ³1987 = 1962), cuya paginación es consignada también en la versión de GA 41.

Aquí se ve qué entiende Heidegger por lo “matemático” de una concepción: la noción no se refiere exclusivamente al procedimiento de las matemáticas, sino, de modo más general, al procedimiento de determinar de antemano, es decir, *a priori*, el ser del ente con arreglo a principios. Así, lo “matemático” y lo “apriorístico” quedan tendencialmente identificados. Heidegger intenta hacer plausible tal ampliación del sentido de lo “matemático” por medio del recurso a la noción griega de *μάθημα*, entendida como una referencia a “aquello que es sabido ya de antemano”. Hay, según esto, dos momentos de continuidad de la concepción elaborada por Kant con la tradición de la metafísica moderna, que hunde sus raíces, en último término, en la ontología griega. El primer momento viene dado por la idea de la fundamentación matemática del conocimiento, en el sentido amplio de la noción de lo matemático. El segundo momento tiene que ver con el hecho de que una fundamentación matemática del conocimiento que procede según principios echa mano necesariamente de estructuras proposicionales: los principios (*Grundsätze*) son proposiciones (*Sätze*). En consecuencia, también aquí el hilo conductor del intento de fundamentación viene dado, en definitiva, por el *λόγος ἀποφαντικός*. Por consiguiente, la cosidad de la cosa viene determinada, tanto en Kant como en la tradición que lo precede, tomando como hilo conductor (*Leitfaden*) el enunciado predicativo, es decir, el enunciado declarativo de la forma “S es P”, del cual todavía Husserl afirma que constituye la célula básica (*Urzelle*) de la ontología formal. Como es obvio, tal orientación básica a partir del enunciado predicativo está en conexión directa con el hecho de que la cosa aparezca como portadora de propiedades, porque tal modo de comparecencia es el que corresponde, del lado del objeto, a la estructura formal “S es P”, del lado del conocimiento o la predicación.

Pues bien, si en la concepción de Kant se conserva el papel protagónico de lo matemático y también la orientación a partir del *λόγος ἀποφαντικός*, entonces se puede decir que la fundamentación kantiana del conocimiento presenta un carácter lógico-matemático, pero tomando la expresión en el sentido antes indicado, y no en el que hoy le damos habitualmente. La razón de Heidegger para denominarla de esta manera es la indicada: se trata de una concepción que prosigue el ideal de fundamentación de conocimiento a partir de principios e intenta realizarlo orientándose a partir del *λόγος ἀποφαντικός*. A ello se añade todavía un tercer rasgo esencial: la fundamentación lógico-matemática que, siguiendo toda una larga tradición, Kant tiene en vista

asume expresamente, a la hora de dar cuenta de la cosidad de la cosa, que el ámbito de pertenencia de la cosa en cuanto cosa no es otro que el de la naturaleza. Por lo tanto, el tercer rasgo esencial de la concepción kantiana relativa a la fundamentación del conocimiento reside en su carácter fisiológico: se trata, en definitiva, de un λόγος acerca de la φύσις. En el § 24 de *Prolegómenos*, el propio Kant se vale de la expresión “principios fisiológicos” (*physiologische Grundsätze*), en este mismo sentido que hace referencia a los principios de todo aquello que pueda contar como cosa, en cuanto pertenece como tal al ámbito de la naturaleza. El término “naturaleza” está tomado aquí en un sentido general, que refiere a un esbozo proyectivo apriorístico. Heidegger lo conecta acertadamente con el modo en que Kant trata la noción formal de naturaleza en el § 26 de la “Deducción Trascendental de las Categorías” de la segunda edición de la *Crítica de la razón pura*. Se trata de lo que Kant denomina *natura formaliter spectata*, que constituye el correlato objetivo, por así decir, de la llamada “síntesis figurativa” (*figürliche Synthesis, synthesis speciosa*) (CRP B 165). En definitiva, la pregunta kantiana es la pregunta de “¿cómo es posible una naturaleza en general (*überhaupt*)?” Aclaro, no la expresión “en totalidad” aquí, sino la expresión “en general”. Sin embargo, no es menos cierto que la naturaleza tomada en sentido formal por la que aquí se pregunta constituye un *singulare tantum*, ya que, en este nivel de análisis, no puede haber todavía distintas naturalezas ni diferentes cosas naturales. La naturaleza, en su sentido puramente formal, constituye, más bien, un conjunto de condiciones apriorísticas que delinean a modo esbozo proyectivo, es decir, apriorístico, el ámbito al cual pertenece necesariamente todo aquello que pueda contar como una cosa. En este sentido, lo que elabora Kant con la concepción desarrollada en el “Sistema de los principios” no es otra cosa, explica Heidegger, que “un sistema fisiológico, es decir, natural” (*ein physiologisches, dass heißt, ein Natürsystem*) (*La pregunta por la cosa*, Parte B.II, § 3a) p. 98 s.).

La identificación de la naturaleza como ámbito de pertenencia de lo que puede contar como cosa conduce también en Kant, como no puede ser de otro modo, a la determinación de la cosa como cosa natural. Cito a Heidegger:

<<Cosa>> –tal es el objeto de nuestra experiencia. Dado que el compendio (*Inbegriff*) de lo que puede ser experimentado (*das mögliche Erfahrbare*) es la naturaleza, entonces la cosa debe ser concebida en verdad como

cosa natural (Naturding) [...] De aquí en más resumimos la respuesta de Kant a la pregunta por la esencia de la cosa que nos es accesible (das uns zugängliche Ding) en dos proposiciones: 1. la cosa es cosa natural; 2. la cosa es objeto de experiencia posible (Gegenstand möglicher Erfahrung) (La pregunta por la cosa, Parte B.II, § 3 b) p. 100; subrayados de Heidegger).

Al pensar la cosa como cosa natural, en marco del intento por determinar en qué consiste la cosidad de la cosa, Kant incurriría, a juicio de Heidegger, en el mismo olvido o la misma omisión (*Versäumnis*) que la metafísica tradicional en su conjunto, que consiste en pasar por alto el modo en que comparecen las cosas en el acceso inmediato al mundo. En tal sentido, Kant no habla propiamente de las cosas que nos rodean, tal como éstas se nos presentan antes de toda posible mediatización tematizante. Kant se centra, más bien, en un modo fuertemente estilizado de comparecer las cosas, un modo de comparecencia que es correlato de actos objetivantes, tal como éste asoma ya en determinados contextos de experiencia, en el marco del acceso pre-científico al mundo, y resulta luego radicalizado y consolidado, a través de la correspondiente mediación metódica, en el nivel de experiencia que corresponde al discurso científico. Es aquí donde encuentra su ratificación última la concepción de la cosa como portador de propiedades. Pero lo que ya no comparece en este modo de concebir la cosidad de la cosa es la cosa misma en su carácter de ente intramundano. En tal sentido, Heidegger piensa que la pertenencia de la cosa al ámbito de la naturaleza no resulta equivalente a la pertenencia de la cosa a un mundo, entre otras cosas, porque es la propia naturaleza la que aparece siempre ya dentro de un mundo, y no viceversa (*La pregunta por la cosa, Parte B.II, § 3 b) p. 101*). Este es aspecto posee, para Heidegger, posee una importancia fundamental. En la metafísica tradicional no se hizo justicia al carácter intramundano de la cosa, entre otras cosas, ya porque la propia orientación a partir del *λόγος ἀποφαντικός* y su ulterior consolidación científica colocan en el centro de atención el esquema “cosa/propiedad”, como correlato de la matriz predicativa “sujeto/predicado”. Si se asume esta orientación básica, a la hora de intentar pensar el ámbito de pertenencia de la cosa, allí donde se trata de determinar en qué consiste su cosidad, no queda en definitiva otro remedio que recurrir a la idea de la naturaleza, pasando

por alto, al menos, tendencialmente, el mundo mismo, que no es ni puede ser pensado propiamente como una naturaleza.

A juicio de Heidegger, Kant no logra liberarse de este modo tradicional de pensar, en su intento por determinar en qué consiste la cosidad de la cosa. Hay, sin embargo, un aspecto en la concepción kantiana que, de todos modos, permite establecer una conexión con la concepción que el propio Heidegger defiende como la que resulta fenomenológicamente correcta en *Ser tiempo* e incluso ya desde mucho antes, en los tiempos de los primeros cursos de Friburgo, desde 1919 en adelante. En efecto, a pesar de que allí donde intenta pensar la cosidad de la cosa Kant tiende a perder de vista el mundo como tal, su modo de caracterizar la naturaleza, vista desde el punto de vista formal, guarda cierta conexión con el modo en el que, a juicio de Heidegger, debe pensarse el mundo mismo, en la medida en que éste constituye un plexo total de referencias significativas dentro del cual únicamente puede tener lugar la comparecencia del ente intramundano como intramundano. La idea kantiana de una *natura formaliter spectata*, aunque no coincide sin más con el modo fenomenológicamente adecuado de caracterizar lo que constituye un mundo, guarda cierta conexión con él, en la medida en que remite a un cierto esbozo proyectivo de carácter formal y totalizante, y no a lo que sería una suerte de continente cósmico dentro del cual estuvieran todas las cosas. La inflexión holística, en el sentido de totalizante, de la caracterización de la naturaleza, considerada desde el punto de vista formal, mantiene su vigencia en el conjunto de la concepción kantiana, aunque quede fuertemente desperfilada por la orientación básica a partir de un modo específico de comparecencia del ente intramundano que posee un carácter derivativo y fundado, como lo es el que corresponde a la cosa como portador de propiedades y como cosa natural. En este sentido, Heidegger explica:

Una cosa individual (*ein einzelnes Ding*) no es posible por sí (*für sich*) y, por ello, la determinación de la cosa (*Dingbestimmung*) no resulta realizable (*vollziehbar*) por medio de la referencia a cosas individuales (*durch Bezugnahme auf einzelne Dinge*). La cosa como cosa natural sólo es determinable (*bestimmbar*) a partir de la esencia de una naturaleza, en general (*aus dem Wesen einer Natur überhaupt*). De modo correspondiente, y muy

especialmente (*erst recht*), la cosa, en el sentido de lo que nos hace frente de modo inmediato, antes de toda teoría y ciencia (*im Sinne des uns zunächst –vor aller Theorie und Wissenschaft– Begegnenden*), sólo es determinable a partir de un plexo (*aus einem Zusammenhang*) que yace antes y por encima de toda naturaleza (*der vor aller und über aller Natur liegt*) (*La pregunta por la cosa*, Parte B.II, § 3 b) p. 101; subrayados de Heidegger).

Heidegger está declarando aquí que, al considerar la naturaleza como ámbito de la referencia de la cosa, Kant ve con claridad que la determinación de la (cosidad de la) cosa no puede llevarse a cabo por medio de la referencia a meras cosas individuales, sino sólo a partir de la determinación de lo que pertenece a la esencia misma de una naturaleza, en general. Sin embargo, Kant no hace justicia debidamente a la prioridad que, desde el punto de vista constitutivo, corresponde al mundo mismo, en su carácter de plexo (*Zusammenhang*) total de la significatividad, situado, como tal, antes y por encima de toda naturaleza.

Para terminar quisiera hacer algunas muy breves referencias al modo en el que Heidegger lee la doctrina que Kant presenta en el “Sistema de los principios”, con especial atención al papel central que cumplen allí las “Analogías de la experiencia”.

En la lección de 1935-1936, Heidegger proporciona una caracterización de lo que Kant entiende por “conocimiento” (*erkennen, Erkenntnis*) que resulta, en lo esencial, concordante con la que había ofrecido ya en el libro de 1929. En ambos casos, Heidegger busca enfatizar fuertemente la necesidad de una determinada forma de co-pertenencia de intuición (*Anschauung*) y pensamiento (*Denken*), para hacer posible lo que Kant llama una “experiencia”. Así, la “experiencia”, en el sentido estricto que Kant da al término cuando lo conecta con su propia concepción del conocimiento, no es el correlato de la mera percepción, sino que emerge sólo allí donde la percepción ha sido incorporada en la forma provista por los diferentes posibles tipos de enlace categorial. Usando un modo de hablar inspirado en Husserl, se puede decir, de un modo muy general, que, para Kant, experiencia es percepción investida de forma categorial, percepción categorialmente formada. Esta visión de la relación entre percepción (*Wahrnehmung*) y experiencia (*Erfahrung*) tiene un reflejo inmediato en el modo en el que Kant se vale de la noción de objeto, allí donde la emplea en el sentido técnico asociado con su

concepción de conjunto. Como se sabe, Kant habla indistintamente de "*Gegenstand*" y "*Objekt*". En la investigación especializada ha habido quienes intentaron encontrar diferencias significativas en el empleo de ambas expresiones. Pero, desde el punto de vista filológico, se puede considerar definitivamente establecido que no las hay. Heidegger lo sabe, pero, a los efectos de desarrollar su propia interpretación de la concepción kantiana, le conviene valerse de la expresión "*Gegenstand*", porque en ella encuentra los dos elementos constitutivos sobre los cuales busca llamar la atención.

Según Heidegger, "ser objeto" quiere decir, para Kant, ser algo que "está ahí delante" o "hace frente" (*Gegen*) y, además, algo que "queda fijo" o "se mantiene en pie" (*stehen*) en su hacer frente, es decir, algo que tiene su propia posición (*Stand*) y se mantiene en ella. En su teoría de la constitución de la experiencia, Kant pone de relieve el hecho básico y elemental de que a la fijeza propia de un objeto, a ese modo peculiar de mantenerse en pie, sólo se llega cuando la multiplicidad que proporciona la intuición como algo dado queda sometida al tipo de enlace que resulta de la aplicación de formas categoriales. Dicho de otro modo: lo que fija aquello que se presenta en la intuición, lo que le permite erguirse y, así, mantenerse en pie es la intervención del aparato conceptual que aporta el entendimiento (*Verstand*) desde sí mismo, esto es, la aplicación de las reglas de enlace que corresponden a los conceptos puros del entendimiento o categorías. Por lo mismo, es la introducción de enlaces categoriales lo que da lugar, por primera vez, a la posibilidad de genuina referencia objetiva. Librada a sí misma, la intuición presenta una cierta multiplicidad dada, pero no puede enlazarla ella misma de un modo tal que permita referirla a la unidad de un objeto. Como se sabe, el carácter, si se quiere, paradójico de la concepción kantiana reside en el hecho de que aquello que nos da el objeto, aquí en un sentido no vinculante del término, la intuición sensible no garantiza por sí mismo la referencia objetiva, mientras que lo que puede dar lugar a genuina referencia objetiva, las reglas de enlace provistas por las categorías, no pueden presentar por sí solas ningún objeto. Como se sabe, para Kant, intuiciones sin conceptos son ciegas, pero conceptos sin intuiciones son vacíos. En todo caso, no es exagerado decir que, por paradójica que pueda parecer a primera vista, esta división del trabajo da expresión al núcleo mismo de la concepción kantiana de la experiencia. Y es la que Heidegger cree poder encontrar ya en la propia noción kantiana de objeto, en el sentido preciso de *Gegen-stand*.

Sobre esta base, Heidegger está en condiciones de hacer justicia al papel decisivo que el propio Kant concede a las "Analogías de la experiencia" dentro del conjunto de la concepción presentada en *Crítica de la razón pura*. Aquí habría mucho para decir, pero me limito a lo más elemental. Un punto importante, no siempre adecuadamente reconocido, viene dado por el hecho de que Kant no otorga el mismo peso constitutivo a todas las categorías por igual, sino que allí donde se trata de dar cuenta de la transición del nivel de la mera percepción al nivel de la genuina experiencia son las categorías de relación (sustancia-accidente, causalidad y acción recíproca) las que juegan el papel protagónico. A este punto me he referido extensamente en algunos trabajos sobre Kant de los últimos años, pero no puedo elaborarlo aquí. En todo caso, la aplicación de las categorías de relación a los objetos, nuevamente en el sentido no vinculante, dados en la intuición empírica (percepción) es lo que Kant tematiza expresamente en el apartado dedicado a las "Analogías de la experiencia". En conexión con esto, en la exposición didáctica de *Prolegómenos*, Kant introduce la famosa y discutidísima distinción entre lo que llama "juicios de percepción" (*Wahrnehmungsurteile*) y "juicios de experiencia" (*Erfahrungsurteile*). Esta distinción fue muchas veces rechazada como inconsistente en el pasado por buena parte de la investigación especializada, pero ha sido redescubierta en su fundamental importancia en la investigación más reciente. Baste mencionar aquí nombres como los de B. Longuenesse y W. Wieland, entre otros. En la lección de 1935-1936 también Heidegger la coloca, con todo acierto, en el centro de la mira, y ello, naturalmente, en conexión directa con la centralidad que otorga a la problemática que Kant aborda en el tratamiento de las "Analogías de la experiencia".

El punto de fondo es aquí el ya mencionado: la transición desde el orden de la mera aprehensión, es decir, desde el orden contingente y subjetivamente variable en el cual la intuición nos proporciona una multiplicidad de representación, al orden de una genuina experiencia, que, como tal, se eleva más allá de la contingencia de la aprehensión y, así, da origen a pretensiones de validez intersubjetiva, sólo resulta posible a través de la aplicación a lo que presenta la intuición de las reglas de enlace correspondientes a las categorías, más precisamente, a las categorías de relación, que son las únicas cuya aplicación puede dar lugar a genuina referencia objetiva. Se puede ilustrar fácilmente el punto recurriendo al tipo de caso al que recurre el propio Kant, esto es, el de la aplicación del tipo peculiar de enlace que corresponde a la categoría

de causalidad, es decir, el enlace de causa y efecto. En la aprehensión, los hechos que quedan en una segunda instancia enlazados al modo de la causa y el efecto no necesitan presentarse en el mismo orden en el que luego quedan enlazados con pretensión de validez objetiva. Por ejemplo, al entrar en una habitación, alguien descubre que el vidrio de una ventana se ha roto y luego, mirando al suelo, descubre una piedra cerca de la ventana cuyo vidrio se ha roto. La persona que descubre la rotura del vidrio ha visto primero el vidrio roto y después la piedra. Pero, a la hora de explicar lo sucedido, dirá que el vidrio ha sido roto por el impacto de una piedra que fue arrojada desde el exterior. No interesa aquí si la explicación es materialmente correcta. Lo que importa es que en ella el orden que se pretende objetivo resulta inverso a aquel en el cual los hechos correspondientes han sido aprendidos: el impacto de la piedra es enlazado con la rotura del vidrio según el modo de enlace que corresponde a la relación de la causa con el efecto.

Este tipo de superación del orden meramente contingente de la aprehensión, es decir, el trascender dicho orden, situado en el plano de la mera percepción, en dirección de un orden diferente, que pretende constituir una genuina experiencia, sólo resulta posible, a juicio de Kant, por medio del recurso a enlaces categoriales, más precisamente, a los tres modos de enlace que corresponden a las categorías de relación. En el tratamiento de las "Analogías de la experiencia", Kant deja claro que el recurso a dichos modos de enlace se apoya, en cada caso, en determinados criterios empíricos. Así, en el caso de la relación sustancia-accidente, necesitamos recurrir a la presencia de algún tipo de acción de algo sobre otra cosa que provoca un cambio sobre ella; en el caso de la relación causa-efecto, necesitamos recurrir a la irreversibilidad de la secuencia temporal en la que se presentan los hechos que pretendemos conectar de modo que uno aparezca como causa del otro; y, en el caso de la acción recíproca, debemos apelar inversamente a la reversibilidad de la secuencia temporal. En los tres casos, pues, la introducción del enlace categorial sólo resulta posible sobre la base de ciertos presupuestos criteriológicos que, en muchos casos, hacen necesaria la intervención de procedimientos reflexivos de carácter expreso. Pero, con independencia de estas dificultades de detalle, lo que queda inmediatamente claro es el hecho de que en el tratamiento de las "Analogías de la experiencia" adquiere su más nítida expresión la dualidad de aspectos contenida en el núcleo mismo de la concepción kantiana de la objetividad, tal como Heidegger los pone también en el centro de la mira. Si se echa un vistazo

al modo en el que discute estos aspectos en la lección de 1936-1936, se podrá comprobar hasta qué punto Heidegger estuvo en condiciones de hacer justicia en el plano exegetico a toda una amplia variedad de aspectos que la investigación kantiana, en muchos casos, sólo llegó a apreciar con la debida diferenciación en tiempos muy recientes⁵. En este sentido, la nueva interpretación de Kant, desde la perspectiva propia del pensamiento ontológico, provee, sin duda, resultados de un valor permanente, con independencia de las dudas que pueda motivar el marco filosófico más general en el cual ella misma queda inscrita.

DISCUSSION

Denis Thouard

I will begin with a basic question that can be pay off for the interest of today's workshop. If Heidegger changed his first interpretation of *Kantbuch*, which in our eyes should be more attractive, does it have something to do with his view on metaphysics? For he seems to reintroduce Kant in the history of metaphysics with this second interpretation. For me it is very striking that it seems that Heidegger agrees with the neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant, which starts with Hermann Cohen, who took the Analytics of principles to the top of the systematic reconstruction of Kant. So, has it something to do with the evolution of Heidegger's view on the whole story of metaphysics? Could we state that Kant had to get a place into that story of metaphysics, which was not the case in the *Kantbuch* where Heidegger seemed to make an exception for Kant, reading positively his transcendental imagination? And has it something to do with the fact that he is about to abandon Kant to this tradition, that is, to the neo-Kantian reading, but also has to do with his views about Jewishness?

Alejandro Vigo

This is a very important and difficult matter. In the case of the *Kantbuch*, the neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant was, perhaps, the most important part of Heidegger's polemical context. The way the neo-Kantians dealt with Kant resulted in a reading of this thinker which

⁵ Véase *La pregunta por la cosa*, Parte B.II, § 7, p. 148ss.

for Heidegger was fundamentally misleading. At this time, Heidegger assumed that the correct way to approach Kant had to start from his metaphysical background. What Kant was trying to develop in his first Critique was essentially a new foundation of metaphysics starting from the finitude of human reason and human knowledge, a kind of metaphysics of finitude (*Endlichkeit*). In Heidegger's view, what Kant is doing in his first Critique must not to be taken as theory of knowledge, epistemology or methodology, in the usual sense. This was Heidegger's first approach to the matter. Of course, when he discussed with Cassirer at Davos, this basic assumption played a crucial role in his argument. But in the *Vorlesung* on Kant from 1935-1936 things have sensibly changed. By changing the focus of his reading from schematism to the system of principles, Heidegger agrees with the neo-Kantian interpretation on many important points, but, of course, not on all of them neither on the general framework of interpretation. A major shift is given by the fact that Heidegger now recognizes that in his first approach to Kant he was overstating the systematic importance of schematism. This was, in fact, a concession to Cassirer. But Heidegger never says that. In the unpublished writings from 1936-1939 (see *Beiträge zur Philosophy*, GA 65, and *Bessinung*, GA 66), he criticizes his own reading in the *Kantbuch* very sharply, but he never says that Cassirer was right on this point at Davos⁶.

Peter Trawny

When did Heidegger give this lecture course? After the lecture course *Introduction to metaphysics*? Before he gave the Herrling lecture course, and after the lecture course on Kant, comes the Schelling lecture course, and then the Nietzsche lecture course. So, it is evident that Heidegger was aware of what he wanted to do after the period 1934-1935. I guess, of course, that this is already the time when he wants to overcome metaphysics, resulting in a completely different project if it is compared to what he wanted to do at the beginning of 1920s. At that very moment, Heidegger breaks with all the principles and presuppositions of Kant; for example, the universalism of transcendental philosophy, which does not exist for Heidegger any more. At that moment, Heidegger's main interests in philosophy have to do with Husserl's philosophy. It

⁶ See *Beiträge zur Philosophy*, GA 65; *Bessinung*, GA 66.

is also visible that postmodern thinkers are especially interested in this critic of universalism and rationality. This is, by the way, not said in the lecture course; Heidegger never speaks of overcoming metaphysics in the lecture course. One could think of it as an esoteric background when Heidegger is writing the *Contributions*.

What would you say? Is not the fact that he broke with these main principles of metaphysical thinking, especially universalism, one of our main problems with Heidegger in our current moment? To put it in another way, what would you say of the whole postmodern readings of Heidegger which were quite interested in this critic of rationality? Could we go on with this? Or, is there something we can do with it beyond the Kantian thinking? Would you say, on the contrary, that we should go back to the Kantian way of thinking and forget this critical reading? For me this is a very important matter, because as you well know, a couple of years after, Heidegger will have represented his own concept of the thing, which has nothing to do with the Kantian notion.

Alejandro Vigo

First of all, I am not a big fan of a possible philosophy starting from Heidegger, especially in the case of the so called "Second Heidegger". The main reason is that I can do very little with his construction concerning *Seinsgeschichte* and *seinsgeschichtliches Denken*. I am not saying that it is simply nonsense. But, for a person like me, that is a very dubious or, at least, a not very plausible construction. In fact, with this kind of meta-philosophical construction Heidegger comes closer to thinkers, like Hegel for instance, who are rather strange to my basic understanding of philosophy, which is a more phenomenological one. I mean here the whole story concerning the "History of Being", conceived in terms of a successive series of epochal sendings of Being. In the last work published by Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*, more specifically, in the seminar about *Time and Being*, he gets a question about the relation between his thinking of Being and Hegel's philosophy. In his answer, Heidegger draws a very interesting, illuminating comparison. Hegel's thinking remains metaphysical, among other things, insofar as it remains teleological. With his conception of the "History of Being", Heidegger is trying to overcome metaphysics and his thinking of being is in no way teleological about history.

As I already said, I am not a big fan of this way of thinking about history and being on a meta-philosophical level, because it is perhaps too speculative to be credible from a phenomenological point of view. But I must say that the problem Heidegger is trying to address with his *seinsgeschichtliches Denken* is in no way a late discovery. Its origins can be traced back to the very beginning of his philosophical career. Already in the *Nachwort (Epilogue)* to the *Habilitationsschrift* (1916), Heidegger discusses, following Emil Lask, the problem concerning the connection between categories and history. Professor Lask's idea that philosophy in its historical development provides a sort of topology of the categories was present for Heidegger from the very beginning, but it was put between brackets for a long time. After this time, the transcendental inquiry—in the years Steven Crowell mentioned—collapses, because Heidegger finds no way to continue with this project. That is why the old problematic of the history of categories regains its main role.

Now, is Heidegger abolishing rationality? Or, is he trying to think rationality in a non-traditional, a non-rationalistic way? I think he tries to do the latter. From my point of view, the question should be if Heidegger was successful in his attempt. As far as I can see, the answer should be "no". But again, I would support the second option. Heidegger tried to reconstruct rationality in a non-rationalistic way, instead of eradicating it.

Peter Trawny

I think there is a crucial point to the main question of our workshop: what could we do with Heidegger? The disjunction is quite obvious to me: either we could go on with transcendental concepts of philosophy or presuppose metaphysical principles; for instance, a certain concept of eternity. Those principles are untouched by temporal circumstances, that is to say, from historical conditions; a sort of Platonistic-Aristotelian-Kantian way of thinking. Would that, then, be philosophy? Or, should we continue the discussion of the last three decades to break with these metaphysical concepts and to choose a way with Derrida, or all these French philosophers who are trying to do something else with ontological difference and the Heideggerian thinking?

Alejandro Vigo

My concerns about this are the following. Concerning rationality, I am afraid I am still quite conventional, at least, in comparison with post-modernist thinkers. On the methodological level, I endorse the view that the meta-theoretical implications of a given theory must be taken at least as seriously as the theory itself. Statements about the impossibility, invalidity or historical relativity of every possible validity claim connected with statements raise the same type of validity claims they are trying to deny. By making these statements, one is introducing, on the meta-theoretical level, the same framework of conditions that one is denying on the theoretical level. This is a huge problem that a plausible conception of rationality must necessarily address, sooner or later. Historical relativism about categories and rationality, in its radical form, possesses unsolvable problems on the meta-theoretical level. I have noticed that many post-modernist thinkers do not care so much about this. They write books declaring that there is no way to establish a set of categories which are valid across history. But at the same time, they desire that their statements about all possible sets of categories are believed as true. For me, this is a dogmatic, perhaps, irrational view, at least, on the meta-theoretical level.

André Laks

I have two remarks: the first has to do with the relation between Heidegger's two versions of Kant and their relationship to that with Aristotle. It seems there is a way to reduce the paradox you mentioned in your talk. Can we not say that we have, in the case of Kant, a diachronical implementation of what could also have been a synchronical one? If one revises Heidegger's early interpretation of Aristotle, he is appropriating Aristotelian doctrines up to a certain point, but then, he abandons Aristotle to the history of metaphysics, and this essentially because of Aristotle's conception of time, and, of course, it is striking that what Heidegger is looking for in Kant's theory of schematism in this period is a conception of time that would be congenial to his own approach. So, in Aristotle's case, appropriation and rejection are the two simultaneous faces of the same enterprise. Can we not say that in the case of Kant

rejection simply follows the attempt of appropriation? Both Aristotle and Kant have not gone as far as they could have.

The second remark concerns universalism versus ontological difference, which is a very important question indeed. I would like to know about which way you personally think we should be going and I would like to link this question with that of transcendentalism. I have always felt that Heidegger's transcendentalism in *Sein und Zeit*—in the way Steven Crowell presented it and also Alejandro Vigo— was kind of unclear, fake or dangerous, transcendentalism in the sense that the distinction between both terms “existential” and “*existentiell*” has always been very difficult to trace. This difficulty comes from Heidegger's constant insisting that the words he uses—such as “*Angst*”— have nothing to do with the usual meaning of those words. This is for me both a very dubious strategy but also a topic that one should explore in depth, because Heidegger is not the only philosopher who gives a new sense to what Mallarmé called “the words of the tribe”. In a piece that I found challenging because of its radical tone, Günther Anders asks what could be done with Heidegger if instead of the term “*Angst*” Heidegger would have used “*Hunger*” as an existential? He then tries to reconstruct Heidegger on another basis. That move maybe odd or mistaken, but I think the problem it points to is the relationship between existential and the choice of *existentiell*, which are mobilized in order to construct the whole theory. It seems to me that this has to do with the kind of universalism one can read in the young Heidegger if one is tempted to do that.

Alejandro Vigo

In the case of Kant, you are right. Of course, the reception of Aristotle and Kant has, in both cases, the same structure. Heidegger confronts Aristotle against Aristotle, and Kant against Kant: the possible Aristotle against the traditional Aristotle, and the possible Kant against the traditional Kant. In the case of Aristotle, he is not only placed in the history of metaphysics as the thinker of substance, but he is also the thinker of *φρόνησις*. Starting from *φρόνησις* and inquiring from an ontological point of view into its underlying conditions opens the path to a new reading of Aristotle. This is what can be labelled as “the possible Aristotle” Heidegger wants to highlight, in contrast to the Aristotle stemming from the metaphysical tradition. “Possibility is higher than

reality" is Heidegger's motto concerning phenomenology in *Being and Time*, but it is also the main trait for his reading of Aristotle.

As a matter of fact, in the case of Kant, the same process happens. As we saw it, there is a change of focus at different moments, but it is the same procedure: the practical Kant versus the theoretical Kant, the possible Kant against the real Kant. That is the general strategy. However, in concrete aspects, it is impossible to endorse at the same time two different visions of Kant: either one defends that the schematism is the most important part of the *Critique of Pure Reason* or one maintains that the analysis of the experience is the most relevant part of the that text.

Now, on the side of transcendentalism: I am not as sceptic as you are. I would not say that this first project is fake. Concerning the difference among "existential" and "existentiell", one can find reasons why Heidegger uses the examples he employs in each context of analysis. I do not believe that one can completely answer this question in a general or abstract way, but one can give good particular answers explaining why Heidegger chooses same particular examples or same particular phenomena in certain contexts of analysis. *Existentialien* are formal structures that are always given in different forms of ontic concretions. One does not have the structures given in a kind of "free floating state", in a "*frei schwebender Zustand*", as the Germans call it. This is impossible. One has to read the formal structures starting from particular concretions which represent these structures. But it would be wrong to identify these concretions with the corresponding formal structures themselves. This is a repeated circumstance with Heidegger. He chooses in different contexts different concretions of the formal structures he is trying to analyse and he tries to give an account of the corresponding process of formalization, in the Husserlian meaning of the word. Even though I think that in many cases Heidegger is quite successful in his attempts, it is impossible to give a general answer to this strategy. I would suggest that one revises each and every methodological steps Heidegger does, because he was methodologically very careful and also very smart.

Steven Crowell

It seems to me that in thinking of Heidegger's earlier reading of Kant in relation to the later reading in *Die Frage nach dem Ding* we must remember Heidegger's claim that it was Husserl who had given him

the eyes to see what Kant was doing. So, the earlier reading of Kant has a strong phenomenological vein. However, that phenomenological vein changed by the late 1930s; by that moment, then, phenomenology is no longer Heidegger's main interest. Peter Trawny is right: by then Heidegger has repeatedly rejected the transcendental tradition, treating it as the culmination of a Leibnizian metaphysics of power and representational thinking.

To turn to the systematic question, which I think is the important one: the difference between the Husserlian or phenomenological version of transcendental philosophy and the Kantian version is the difference between descriptive, eidetic reflection and an appeal to transcendental argument or deduction. In the *Kantbuch*, we see Heidegger trying to push Kant in Husserlian directions. Regarding the question of categories, Heidegger disagrees with the neo-Kantian idea that Kant derives such categories from looking at the presuppositions of the sciences. Rather they are grounded on and derived from a highest principle, that of the transcendental unity of apperception. They are deduced as conditions for the possibility of this transcendental unity. That kind of argument stands or falls with the idea that we have this absolute transcendental unity as structure of the self, which Heidegger, following Kant, acknowledges to be only a thought, not something that is given in experience.

On the other hand, for Husserl categories are conditional. They are not grounded on an absolute principle but are discovered on the basis of a prior description of experience: "If we have experiences of this and that sort—for instance, sense perception of individual entities distinct from our consciousness— then categories X, Y, and Z are necessary conditions of that kind of experience". These are conditions of meaning, that is, of what it is to experience something as this or that sort of thing, and so the description begins always in a concrete historical situation.

What authority does this sort of phenomenological transcendental approach possess? If one claims that one's experience involves perception of individual physical things, the transcendental phenomenologist will argue that X, Y, or Z is a normative structure (or category) that makes such an experience possible, that is an essential structure of it. One can object this in two ways. First, by claiming that "I do not have that kind of experience" or that it is not properly described. This will lead to a discussion about the description. Secondly, one might argue that this is a kind of experience that we have, but that people in earlier times or from other cultures do not have it. If that is truly the case, however, this

is no argument against the transcendental claims of phenomenology; it only means that the categories of such experiences are irrelevant for those in earlier times or other cultures.

Now, how does this relate to the question of existential structures in *Being and Time* and their *existentiell* basis? In my view, at the most general level *Being and Time* is looking for the categories that make it possible for us to experience something as something at all, the “as-structure” of all experience. These categories are not arbitrary nor can one be substituted for another and still answer the question at issue. For instance: if it is possible that we could experience things as the things they are and never feel hunger, then hunger is not a necessary condition for such experience. So, it is not an accident that Heidegger had not considered the category of hunger—which is not to say that hunger might not be a necessary condition for other sorts of experiences, ones that are not at issue in *Being and Time*. In contrast, what *Angst* reveals about *Dasein* is a necessary condition for experiencing something as something, and so Heidegger must consider it in *Being and Time*. The objection that Heidegger’s account of human being would look different if he had considered different moods, but it fails to recognize the structure of the argument of *Being and Time*, which is to uncover the conditions which make an understanding of being, and so the general experience of something as something, possible; Heidegger is not doing philosophical anthropology.

Of course, this raises other sorts of questions. For instance, non-human animals certainly seem to perceive things and have conscious experiences. Can and must we describe their perceptual experience in the same terms as our own? Do they perceive things as something? If they do, then we must conclude they too have the mode of being of *Dasein* and the care-structure. But if we find this conclusion unpalatable, then we must try to spell out how, specifically, animal perception differs from our own in a fundamental way, and this might prove unpalatable from the point of view of a naturalistic approach to the human-animal question.

I raise these issues not to answer them but only to suggest that Heidegger’s transcendentalism is, as phenomenological, much more flexible than the Kantian version. In *Being and Time*, however, both versions are at work in a confusing way: a Kantian architectonic principle of transcendental deduction is imposed on top of a Husserlian descriptive-reflective approach. What he is doing in the second book

about Kant is explaining why the Kantian version does not work. My own view is that even in his post-transcendental work something like the Husserlian version is at work.

Later, Heidegger advises us to cease all efforts of overcoming metaphysics, and in many later texts he seems to highlight a more descriptive or phenomenological procedure again. This for me raises the question of whether we can really, with Derrida and a good deal of the postmodern reception of Heidegger, accuse Heidegger of an objectionable nostalgia for one master meaning of being. If Heidegger's approach in essays like *Das Ding* and *Bauen Wohnen Denken* can rightly be said to harken back to the flexible and experience-based phenomenology of his earlier work, then I would be interested at some point in setting aside the post-structuralist fixation on *Seinsgeschichte* and explore what we can do with Heidegger's late concept of *Denken* in order to look for a less strategic way of facing up to the so-called "end of philosophy" that is found in postmodernism's uneasiness with the notion of a priori categories.

André Laks

I would like to understand better your position. You are saying two things. First, there is Heidegger the phenomenologist, whose approach, which is contrasted with what you called "the Kantian imposed architectonic deductive principle", is original and fruitful in a number of ways. But then, at some point between 1927 and 1930, there occurs a philosophical mistake related to the special interpretation of the Leibnizian monad. Nevertheless, you think that there is in the mistaken Heidegger something which is phenomenological in the sense that you are prepared to acknowledge for the earlier Heidegger. How can Heidegger proceed phenomenologically in the sense that he is longing to do, after what is recognized as a philosophical mistake?

Steven Crowell

This is my hermeneutical principle: "one should not try to make a thinker more consistent than he or she is". In regard to what Gadamer said, namely, that only that which makes up a totality is truly understandable: if that is the case, I do not think anything is truly understandable. So, my point would be that in *Being and Time*, Heidegger pursues a sort of phenomenology whose claims we can judge for ourselves to be either

successful or unsuccessful, since we have access to the evidence for them (or lack thereof) in our own experience. Heidegger often insists that we must go back to our own experience if we want to judge the validity of his claims. On the other hand, there is his general search for the meaning of being, for some principle (which he calls “time”) that will be the root of all the many ways in which being is said. This move, I think, is not phenomenological but the product of a Kantian top-down or architectonic argument. Time is supposed to provide the principle of unity that the care-structure supposedly lacks. But as I see it, the unity of the care-structure is perfectly intelligible without any further principle of unity. The only unity needed is contained already in the description.

The idea that there should be one unitary horizon or meaning of being is completely contradictory to what Heidegger says on page one of *Being and Time*, where he claims that Aristotle made a real advance in approaching the question of being when he recognized that the term is *πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον*, that it has multiple senses, that being is said in many ways and that it is a mistake to follow Plato and try to reduce them all to one.

André Laks

But is not the point of departure of Heidegger’s work precisely to overcome Aristotle, and to find another sense of being which would be an overarching one?

Steven Crowell

It is true that early on Heidegger wanted to overcome what he used to understand as the metaphysical tradition on this point. He thought that Aristotle’s doctrine of analogy, in which *οὐσία* is taken as the “leading” meaning of being, led to the concealing of the ontological difference. But I do not think that Heidegger’s pursuit of the distinction between being and beings, as a phenomenological matter, ought to entail the idea of finding a single meaning of being. This seems to me regressive, though I admit that it flies in the face of Heidegger’s stated intentions in *Being and Time*. There is no doubt that he does search for such an overarching meaning. My point is that such a search is motivated by a Kantian sort of argument and is in tension with the original phenomenological way of uncovering the ontological difference. I grant your point that Heidegger’s appeal to time is more Aristotelian than Platonic in

approach, but I would argue that none of those approaches does justice to the ontological difference.

The larger point concerns the relation between the phenomenological elements in Heidegger's thinking and the turn toward metaphysics after *Being and Time*. One should note that many other phenomenologists were making the same move at that time, including Husserl. This positive sense of "phenomenological metaphysics" could not be successfully worked out by Heidegger, and he quite soon turned to the project of overcoming metaphysics. I am interested in the reasons for this failure, both in Husserl and Heidegger. But in all of Heidegger's texts in this period and the one that followed it, one can distinguish between analyses and accounts that are based on phenomenological evidence and those that are not, deriving from other agendas in Heidegger's thinking. For instance, if one reads the lectures on Hölderlins 'Andenken' and Hölderlins 'Der Ister' from the 1940s, or the lectures on Heraclitus and Parmenides from that period, not everything is oriented toward locating such figures in relation to *Seinsgeschichte*; much of it has its basis in phenomenological description of experience. That such descriptions are then put in the service of a larger historical narrative is a different matter, and must be judged by other criteria, since it eludes phenomenological evidence. In the late 1950s, then, Heidegger loses, in a way, interest in this historical narrative and offers his distinctive essays on a cluster of topics, which, in my opinion, have a phenomenological character. It is not that the history of being is absent from such writings, but it recedes in importance. Later, he cautions us that we should cease all attempts at overcoming metaphysics and leave it to itself. As I see it, this means that the two agendas in his work, namely, the phenomenological and the historical, can come apart, and if there are reasons to reject his metaphysical meta-narrative, this does not mean that we have to reject everything in the writings that Heidegger composed when that meta-narrative was of supreme importance to him.

Alejandro Vigo

Steven Crowell explains in a very insightful way what Heidegger is trying to do in the lectures we mentioned. One can have a general framework, which is very difficult to accept. But still inside this framework, Heidegger gives brilliant phenomenological analysis of concrete problems, concrete connections and concrete fields of

experience. In my view, the main problem is still the relation between the theory and the meta-theory, which is a methodological problem, that even though he does address, it is not addressed properly. However, I do think Heidegger knows how to put the pieces together.

There lies the possibility that we cannot continue the Heideggerian project the way Heidegger wanted to develop it. Nonetheless, we have the chance to think of a mode of transcendental philosophy avoiding proceeding from top to bottom. Why is it that we do not need a deduction of categories in the case of Husserl and Heidegger? Kant was trying to derive the categories from a single principle. Nevertheless, in the case of Heidegger, Husserl, and even Lask, there is no deduction of categories, and perhaps that there is no closed system of categories. From Kant's point of view this is impossible. There are only twelve categories. The system of categories must be closed. In terms of phenomenology, there is a need for a much broader system of categories in order to do justice to the different contexts and levels of experience that one has to analyse. So, in the case of Husserl, one can think categories in another way without deducing them from a single principle, but taking them as given in different and specific contexts of experience. Husserl introduced the term of "categorical intuition" ("*kategoriale Anschauung*"), which was very important for Heidegger's philosophy at its beginning. Heidegger stated that with the notion of "categorical intuition" Husserl managed to think *das Sein*, also Being, as given; and the methodical way to proceed from now on is that there is no need of principle of categories but a phenomenological analysis working by the way of formalization in order to allow for a new kind of ontological pluralism. Now, why is Heidegger still asking after a principle of unity of this whole number of categories? This is a very interesting and important question for which I have not a definitive answer.

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SESSION 3

WHAT IS STILL TRUE ABOUT HEIDEGGER'S IDEA OF TRUTH? APPROACHING TRUTH IN *BEING AND TIME* (HEIDEGGER READS ARISTOTLE)

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La siguiente contribución constituye la respuesta a la interpretación y crítica de Tugendhat a la idea de verdad de Heidegger. Tugendhat reprueba la noción de verdad en Heidegger, aduciendo que en ésta se pierde el carácter específico de lo verdadero y, por ende, se disuelve el límite entre lo verdadero y lo falso. De ahí el título de mi ponencia: "What is still true about Heidegger's idea of truth?" ("¿Qué hay de verdadero en la idea de verdad de Heidegger?")

La postura de Tugendhat ha sido ya abiertamente criticada, por ejemplo por Carl Friedrich Gethmann (1974), pues el primero afirma la disolución de la diferencia entre verdad y falsedad, bajo el supuesto equivocado de que Heidegger postula un concepto unívoco de verdad, excluyendo posibles niveles en los cuales se puede hablar multívocamente de ella. En cambio, para Gethmann, no se trata de un solo concepto de verdad, sino de diversos niveles desde los cuáles Heidegger determina la verdad, a saber, el nivel derivado de la verdad lógica, en donde existe la diferencia entre verdad y falsedad, y el nivel originario-trascendental, que hace posible la distinción misma entre verdadero y falso; pero que para Heidegger reside en el puro descubrir, o bien apertura, en cualquier tipo de comportamiento del *Dasein*, sea éste teórico o práctico. Sin duda, Gethmann acierta en su crítica a Tugendhat, no obstante, sospechamos que hay algo de verdad en la interpretación aparentemente errada de Tugendhat. De esta manera, nuestro objetivo es sacar provecho del error de Tugendhat, en el sentido de que para Heidegger, el hecho de difuminar los límites entre lo verdadero y lo falso como elemento clave para entender el sentido auténtico de verdad constituye un punto relevante en la elaboración de sus tesis en torno a la verdad.

En el libro *Acerca de la verdad en Heidegger y Husserl*, Tugendhat afirma que en Heidegger se pierde el carácter específico de la verdad, tomando el núcleo de la concepción husserliana de verdad, la cual se sustenta en la estructura del “so wie”, es decir, “tal como”, que le da el carácter específico a la verdad frente a la falsedad. Esta estructura vale tanto para el juicio como para las verdades ante-predicativas. Por tanto, el “so wie” constituye la estructura fundamental de la *Übereinstimmung*, de la adecuación. Si un juicio predica algo de algo tal y como es, entonces hay una adecuación, es decir, es un juicio verdadero. De acuerdo a lo anterior, la verdad del juicio y la verdad ante-predicativa es verdadera en la medida en que descubre al ente tal y como es en sí mismo. La estructura fundamental de la verdad en Husserl reside en el “so wie” o “tal como”, la cual, empero, se basa en una concepción determinada de verdad, a saber, la adecuación. Dicha estructura es, por ende, una suerte de explicitación de la idea de adecuación, sin que en realidad llegue a superarse esta misma estructura. Sin embargo, para Heidegger, como retoma Tugendhat de *Ser y tiempo*, lo específicamente verdadero no se funda en la estructura del “so wie”, sino en el hecho mismo de descubrir del *Dasein*.

Ahora bien, a partir de lo dicho, Tugendhat da cuenta de que Heidegger identifica el fenómeno de la verdad con la actividad descubridora del *Dasein*; pero en esta asimilación es precisamente donde se pierde el límite entre lo verdadero y lo falso, pues se difumina el criterio husserliano del “so-wie”, dejando a la verdad indefensa frente a la falsedad. Tugendhat afirma que en la identificación heideggeriana entre el ser verdadero y el descubrir, el “ἀποφαίνεσθαι” (*show forth, display*) y “ἀληθεύειν” (*speak truth*) terminan por significar lo mismo. La crítica de Tugendhat apunta al hecho de que Heidegger realiza una reducción del ἀποφαίνεσθαι al ser verdadero: ἀληθεύειν. En el intento de Heidegger por aclarar la verdad del λόγος ἀποφαντικός, termina por identificarlo con el ἀληθεύειν. Por esta razón, Tugendhat cree que para Heidegger no hay distinción real entre el λόγος verdadero y el falso.

Asimismo, Tugendhat argumenta que Heidegger no realiza ninguna distinción cualitativa entre el ser descubridor y el ser encubridor. La tesis de Tugendhat se puede resumir, pues, de la siguiente manera: si la verdad se agota en el descubrir del *Dasein*, en desvelar al ente, sacarlo de su ocultamiento, entonces no tiene sentido hablar tanto de verdad como de no verdad; el límite entre ambas se desvanece.

Esa es la crítica de Tugendhat, que al mismo tiempo constituye un punto crucial para el pensamiento de Heidegger, y es precisamente sobre este punto en el cual ahondaré. Con miras a ello, me basaré sobre todo en los textos redactados antes de *Ser y tiempo*, especialmente el *Sofista* (1924-25) y *Logik: die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (1925-1926). En este último texto es donde Heidegger presenta por primera vez los prejuicios en torno a la concepción de verdad:

1. La proposición es el lugar de la verdad.
2. La estructura o esencia de la verdad predicativa es la adecuación.
3. Aristóteles es el autor de ambas tesis.

La estrategia de Heidegger en *Logik: die Frage nach der Wahrheit* en el párrafo 11 titulado “Der Ort der *logos* und der Wahrheit” (“El lugar del *logos* y la verdad”) consiste en intercambiar el orden jerárquico de la verdad y del *logos*, esto es, la proposición no es el lugar de la verdad, sino la verdad el lugar de la proposición. Dicho de otra manera, en lugar de suponer, como se hace tradicionalmente, que la verdad se encuentra en el juicio, Heidegger postula que es el juicio el que reside en la verdad. Para ello, retoma aquella tesis aristotélica sobre la cual se ha fundado la tradición que atribuye a Aristóteles la autoría del tercer prejuicio que afirma que el *λόγος ἀποφαντικός* es el lugar de la verdad, prejuicio que se encuentra formulado en *De Interpretatione* 4, donde Aristóteles define al *λόγος ἀποφαντικός* del siguiente modo: “todo *logos* es semántico, pero no qua instrumento, sino, como se ha dicho, por convención. Pero no todo [*λόγος*] es apofántico, sino aquel en el que se da el *ἀληθεύειν* o el *ψεύδεσθαι*”.¹

Lo primero que hace Heidegger con respecto a la cita anterior es un movimiento bastante sencillo, pues observa que Aristóteles no está definiendo a la verdad al recurrir al *logos*, sino precisamente al revés: está definiendo al *logos*, y para ello le es preciso recurrir a la verdad. De esta manera, *ἀληθεύειν* y *ψεύδεσθαι* resultan condiciones de la *ἀπόφανσις* (*declaration, statement*), mas no al revés. En otras palabras, en virtud de que Aristóteles se sirve del ser verdadero y falso para aclarar qué es el, resulta que los primeros son más originarios que el segundo.

¹ *Int* 4, 16b35-17a3: ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἅπας μὲν σημαντικός, οὐχ ὡς ὄργανον δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται κατὰ συνθήκην· ἀποφαντικός δὲ οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει.

El λόγος ἀποφαντικός se funda, pues, en el ser verdadero (y falso). Es decir, verdad y falsedad son anteriores al λόγος ἀποφαντικός; o bien, la verdad y la falsedad son el lugar del λόγος ἀποφαντικός.

El segundo movimiento, que podría denominarse etimológico, consiste en la manera en que Heidegger traduce dicha cita aristotélica. Heidegger traduce “λόγος ἀποφαντικός” como “*Sehenlassen*”, es decir, “permitir ver”, y los términos griegos “ἀληθεύειν” y “ψεύδестhai” como “descubrir” y “encubrir”, respectivamente. En dicho movimiento, Heidegger expresa que no es el permitir ver (ἀπόφανσις) lo que hace posible el descubrir, sino al contrario: para que sea posible la ἀπόφανσις, se precisa de la anterioridad de un descubrir (ἀληθεύειν). En términos genéticos, Heidegger atribuye anterioridad y mayor originariedad al descubrir, de tal manera que la ἀπόφανσις resulta un fenómeno derivado del ser verdadero, o bien del descubrir. Toda declaración es, pues, un permitir ver derivado de un descubrir previo. Por tanto, la conclusión del párrafo once de esta lección es que el λόγος no es lugar de la verdad, sino la verdad resulta ser el lugar del λόγος.

A continuación, Heidegger se pregunta por aquella estructura que permite que el λόγος sea verdadero o falso. Con este fin, se remite a una idea clave de Aristóteles presente en el *De Anima*: “τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει ἀεί” (*An Γ*, 430b1-2), que significa que “lo falso está siempre en la síntesis”. Lo que descubre Heidegger y critica en este texto tan joven es que Aristóteles no podía ir más allá del logos y que el límite que precisamente no le permite ir más allá de él reside en la síntesis. Por consiguiente, es posible declarar que hay una doble interpretación de Aristóteles: por un lado, no puede ir más allá del logos; y, por otro, como mostraré más adelante, sí es posible extraer positivamente de Aristóteles algunas ideas centrales para la entera concepción de verdad de Heidegger.

Tras haber alcanzado dichas conclusiones acerca de Aristóteles, Heidegger busca ir precisamente más allá del λόγος para explicar la verdad, es decir, superar la verdad lógica. De modo que abandona al λόγος como el hilo conductor para comprender la verdad, en busca de una estructura que yazga en el *Dasein*, la cual no sea solamente descubridora, sino que no posea un carácter derivado como la verdad de la proposición. Por consiguiente, para nuestro pensador, hablar de algo, o bien permitir ver (*sehen lassen*), a causa de su carácter derivado, se funda sobre una apertura previa: uno no podría decir nada de algo si el ente no fuera ya accesible de antemano. Para defender lo anterior,

Heidegger recurre al típico modelo práctico de lo útil, a través del cual el ente se vuelve accesible sin tener que tematizarlo, a saber, sin tener que recurrir al λόγος ἀποφαντικός para desvelarlo.² Esto significa concomitantemente que tematizar en el sentido de decir algo de algo es un movimiento derivado del descubrir-desvelar.

Heidegger utiliza un término muy interesante cuando habla del descubrir, término que también utilizará en *Ser y tiempo*, a saber, "significar", otorgándole un uso sintáctico extraño. En alemán se trata del verbo "bedeuten", que literalmente quiere decir "significar". Sin embargo, Heidegger coloca un guión en la palabra para enfatizar el prefijo "be-" otorgándole un sentido activo-transitivo, de modo que no es que la palabra tenga un significado, sino que la palabra es dotada de sentido al ser ubicada en un contexto hermenéutico, es decir, al tener que ver con algo estamos descubriendo a la cosa siempre desde un contexto: la contextualizamos. "Be-deuten" significa, pues, descubrir las cosas siempre hermenéuticamente. El significado es el lugar que ocupa la cosa en una red compleja de sentidos. Esto apunta, a su vez, a que el *be-deuten* no es una operación estrictamente lingüística, sino que es el modo en que comprendemos las cosas, incluso en situaciones ante-predicativas o pre-lingüísticas.

El tener que ver con las cosas es significarlas, es decir, la estructura del tener que ver con las cosas —sea predicativa o ante-predicativa— es significativa. Heidegger denomina a esta estructura del *bedeuten* "*das hermeneutische Als*", que se traduciría como refiere al en cuanto que hermenéutico. El *Als* se refiere a una suerte de perspectiva, es decir, a que el encuentro con una cosa siempre está determinado por un contexto y un punto de vista, es decir, una estructura hermenéutica. Lo interesante radica en que esa estructura hermenéutica es ante-predicativa, y justamente esto es lo que Heidegger buscaba, a saber, un lugar en donde la verdad acontezca independientemente de la verdad predicativa, pero que no obstante explique porque la proposición, en cuanto lugar de la verdad, es derivada de un descubrir previo.

Por otro lado, para Heidegger en toda aprehensión de las cosas está implícita la estructura del *Als*, por lo que resulta imposible un tener que ver con las cosas libre de dicho *Als*, es decir, *als-frei*. En el año 1919, en la lección intitulada "*Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*", Heidegger afirma

² Véase *Ser y tiempo*, §15.

“lo significativo es lo primario”.³ En esos momentos, Heidegger aún no tenía clara la importancia de la *Als-struktur*, pero la idea de que el significado no es un momento necesariamente lingüístico, sino presente en cualquier práctica del *Dasein*, ya se encuentra *in nuce* en esta tesis. Podríamos afirmar, incluso, que Heidegger retoma esta misma frase en las lecciones de 1925-26 (*Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*) en las siguientes palabras: “el *Als* es lo primario”. Por consiguiente, la estructura del *Als* es, para Heidegger, la estructura originaria de la verdad, la verdad hermenéutica (ἀληθεύειν) subyace, por ende, al λόγος ἀποφαντικός y lo hace posible. Dicho de modo más sencillo: el *als* hermenéutico funda el *als* apofántico (de la predicación).

Ahora bien, el siguiente movimiento de Heidegger consiste en descubrir cómo se realiza el paso de la verdad descubridora hermenéutica ante-predicativa a la verdad apofántica derivada. Para Heidegger, la estructura base del λόγος ἀποφαντικός sería un *Als* apofántico (*apophantisches Als*). De esta manera, Heidegger tratará de explicar cómo se da el paso del *hermeneutisches Als* al *apophantisches Als*. Como hemos afirmado, el hecho de dotar de significado no se agota en el acto lingüístico, sino que cualquier práctica es significativa, y en la medida en que no es necesariamente lingüística, el espacio del uso práctico de las cosas sirve a Heidegger como paradigma del descubrimiento originario del ente.⁴ El paso del *Als* hermenéutico al *Als* apofántico es una modificación en el trato con el ente. Por ejemplo: en el uso de una pluma la estoy ya interpretando como algo útil para escribir y, por ende, ubicándola dentro de un contexto. Heidegger, denomina el modo en que hace frente la pluma a la hora de utilizarla como un “*womit*”, es decir, un “tener que ver con”. En cambio, en el momento en que me refiero lingüísticamente a la pluma, apunto tan sólo a un aspecto de ella; por ejemplo, cuando afirmo que la pluma es grande. Este paso lingüístico es denominado por Heidegger “el paso del *womit* al *worüber*”, del tener que ver con- al tematizar en torno a algo. Por consiguiente, la transición del *Als* hermenéutico al apofántico reside en el paso del *womit* al *worüber*, es decir, de aquello con lo que tengo que ver en la práctica a aquello sobre/ de lo cual predico. Lo interesante de este punto es que Heidegger intenta apuntar a que la tradición filosófica se quedó con la verdad apofántica,

³ Véase *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, GA 56-57; Klostermann (1999).

⁴ Véase *Ser y tiempo*, §15-18.

dejando de lado el momento ante-predicativo y descubridor que la hace posible. Sin embargo, este hecho se puede explicar a partir de que el *Als apofántico* y el *worüber* ocultan y nivelan a través de una tematización: el *Als* primario o la significatividad primaria. Por ejemplo: cuando uno predica “el gis es blanco”, ya no es transparente el *womit*, a saber, hay un alejamiento del *Als* primario, y se oculta en dicha tematización el significado originario ante-predicativo. Incluso, Heidegger afirma que no es que los nombres signifiquen algo, sino que el hombre les pone nombre a los significados.

En virtud de lo anterior, Heidegger muestra entonces por qué la idea de que el juicio es el lugar de la verdad es un prejuicio. Como afirmamos, el *Als apofántico* resulta de una modificación, de una tematización de algo ya descubierto previamente en el trato, pero que a su vez oculta este descubrimiento previo. Por ende, esta modificación-tematización implica una nivelación de las cosas, pues al tematizarlas se les retira su carácter de útil. En este punto es importante recordar aquello que Heidegger afirmó en 1919, pues me parece mucho más plástico para explicar dicha nivelación. Recordando la famosa idea de Heidegger de que las cosas mundean, es decir, de que el mundo, en cuanto red de significados, resplandece en cada cosa en el momento de ser descubiertas-significadas, podemos ver que en el caso de la predicación, las cosas más bien son extraídas de esta red, se empobrece su significado, se abstraen del mundo, esto es, se desmundanizan. Así pues, mientras que la estructura hermenéutica ante-predicativa consiste en la mundanización de las cosas, en la predicación se desmundanizan. A dicha nivelación también le llama *Entleben*, a saber, una desvivificación del encuentro originario siempre verdadero con las cosas.

En primer lugar, tras lo dicho, podemos afirmar que: a) el ἀποφαίνεσθαι (permitir ver) es únicamente posible en la medida en que uno ya ha descubierto algo; b) el descubrimiento previo (ἀληθεύειν) es asimilado por Heidegger en la estructura hermenéutica del *Als*. Sin embargo, podemos ir más allá para retomar el último de los prejuicios, es decir, la atribución a Aristóteles de la tesis de que el lugar originario de la verdad es el λόγος. Heidegger no sólo reivindica a Aristóteles en la medida en que muestra que éste no es el padre de la tesis que afirma que el λόγος es el lugar de la verdad, sino que a su vez toma una idea aristotélica que confirma su propia tesis, es decir, que el λόγος es tan sólo una forma derivada de verdad originada en un descubrir previo. De esta manera, Heidegger retoma aquel pasaje aristotélico en donde éste

identifica al ser verdadero con el $\theta\iota\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$, es decir, con el tocar la verdad: “y así como tampoco en estas cosas [$\acute{\alpha}\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\theta\epsilon\tau\alpha$] la verdad significa lo mismo [que en las cosas compuestas], así tampoco el ser, sino que aquí lo verdadero y lo falso son: por un lado, tocar y decir la verdad (pues no es lo misma decir que afirmar algo de algo), por otro, [lo falso] ignorarla y entonces no tocarla (pues no es posible errar sobre la esencia de una cosa)”.⁵

Heidegger se apropia de este planteamiento aristotélico con el fin de sustentar tanto su idea de una verdad más originaria que la del juicio, como para contrarrestar el tercer prejuicio mencionado. Lo interesante de dicha apropiación consiste en dos puntos:

i. La idea del $\theta\iota\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ como descubrimiento previo a partir de su significado más común, es decir, como tocar.

Heidegger ve en el $\theta\iota\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ aristotélico un antecedente del “descubrimiento pre-apofántico”, es decir, un modo de acceso al ente previo a la predicación: “ $\theta\iota\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ no es sólo un modo de acceso a lo simple —en el sentido aristotélico de $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\theta\epsilon\tau\alpha$ — sino aquello que puede tenerse en la modalidad de lo simple (*Modus des Einfachen*), a saber, de modo no tematizado”.⁶ Es decir, que hay una reinterpretación tanto de $\theta\iota\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ como de lo simple en Aristóteles. El $\theta\iota\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$, en cuanto una forma pre-apofántica de descubrimiento del ente, abre el ente en la modalidad de lo simple, es decir, su modo de descubrir es equivalente al *Als* hermenéutico: anterior al acceso lingüístico al ente.

Ahora bien, pasemos al segundo punto clave que resume la recepción heideggeriana del pasaje aristotélico de *Met* Θ 10:

ii. No podría haber $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\phi\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ si el *Dasein* no habitara ya en el mundo como $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\epsilon\iota\nu$, lo cual significa que se encuentra en un constante comprender hermenéutico.

⁵ *Met* Θ 10, 1051b22-26. En general, este pasaje de *Met* Θ 10 se ha interpretado de una manera intuicionista, de modo que Enrico Berti atribuye esta misma interpretación a Heidegger. Sin embargo, diferimos de Enrico Berti en la medida en que creemos que Heidegger no tiene una visión intuicionista con respecto a este pasaje aristotélico. De este modo, la crítica de Berti a Heidegger no se sostendría. Véase Berti (1990: 97-120).

⁶ *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, GA 21, S. 189.

El ἀληθεύειν es asimilado por Heidegger en el *Als* o, mejor aún, la estructura de esta verdad performativa-ejecutiva es de tipo hermenéutica. No hay un comprender o un tener que ver libre de esta estructura, pues toda apertura es interpretativa y, a su vez, pre-apofántica o ante predicativa. Lo cual nos muestra los siguientes puntos:

α. La interpretación y la hermenéutica es ante-predicativa según Heidegger.

β. La verdad es ante-predicativa.

γ. La verdad como apertura de mundo tiene la estructura hermenéutica del comportarse del *Dasein*.

δ. La oposición entre verdad y falsedad también es una cuestión derivada.

El punto δ toca precisamente la crítica de Tugendhat a la noción de verdad de Heidegger. Sin embargo, su crítica se reduce a anunciar la disolución de la diferencia entre verdad y falsedad, sin percatarse de que Heidegger, como afirma Gethmann, no la diluye del todo, sino que la coloca en un nivel derivado, lo cual a su vez supone que Heidegger está abriendo dos ámbitos de verdad diversos. El primer nivel se refiere al *hermeneutisches Als*, y en términos aristotélicos al θιγείν. Dicho nivel es descubierto por Heidegger en parte gracias a la distinción aristotélica de *Met* Θ 10 entre la verdad apofántica y la verdad del tocar, la cual no tiene contrario. La relevancia de esta distinción reside especialmente en el énfasis aristotélico en que la verdad como θιγείν no tiene contrario, o dicho de otra manera, prescinde de la falsedad para ser auténticamente verdadera. Por ende, Heidegger pudo concluir que cualquier oposición entre verdad y no-verdad sería también algo derivado. En lo anterior se encuentra el punto más importante que hace posible la eliminación del prejuicio de la adecuación, el cual apunta a que en la verdad originaria no hay contrario, mientras que en la verdad derivada del λόγος ἀποφαντικός sí hay adecuación, pero también oposición. En consecuencia, ahí donde hay verdad y falsedad como posibilidades opuestas, ahí también reside la adecuación como criterio de verdad. Así pues, esto es lo que Heidegger gana a partir de su apropiación de *Met* Θ 10, a saber, una verdad sin contrario y una verdad pre-apofántica.

De este modo, Tugendhat tiene en parte razón en su interpretación, pues efectivamente uno de los argumentos centrales de Heidegger es

mostrar el sentido derivado de la adecuación. Esto lo hace mostrando el sentido derivado de la diferencia entre verdad y falsedad. Aunque por otra parte, el error de Tugendhat está en creer que se diluye por completo esta diferencia, pero ésta no desaparece, sino que permanece en la estructura del λόγος ἀποφαντικός, pero con un sentido derivado.

En la obra posterior de Heidegger, especialmente comenzando por *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, su concepción de verdad tiende a acercarse paulatinamente a una dimensión en la cual las esencias de la verdad y de la no-verdad convergen en un mismo punto. Dicho de otra manera: la verdad va dejando de ser verdadera.⁷ Se trata de una suerte de constante *desverdarización* —no encuentro otra manera más precisa de formular la idea más que con este término— de la verdad. En este sentido, se puede rescatar la crítica de Tugendhat, quien, sin embargo, ignora que el error de su crítica es a su vez un acierto en la interpretación de Heidegger.

DISCUSSION

María Jimena Clavel Vásquez

My question relates to Heidegger's phenomenological description of how we deal with the world in our every day. You mentioned that the useful is only an example of this hermeneutic interpretation or opening. How would you relate his phenomenological description of the moment in which dealing with the world makes no sense with the problem of truth in Heidegger? When returning to that description it seems like there is a negative moment in that interpretative phenomenon.

Federica González

Do you mean the loss of significance in *Being and Time*?

María Jimena Clavel Vásquez

Yes.

Federica González

I must clarify, before answering your question, that I have a somewhat uncommon interpretation of that problem, which I have

⁷ *Wegmarken*, GA 9; Klostermann (1999).

discussed with Peter Trawny before. In my opinion, the matter that you mention is a very relative phenomenological description, since it does not function universally. For the crucial point about this matter is that when something is not working, then it has lost its sense. I personally believe that there are some aspects in the world which simply do not make any sense, but they function. This situation makes one believe that everything has lost its sense; for instance, the traffic jam in Mexico City is quite chaotic. When the red light functions one can see all the connections around it, namely, that all the cars stop; but before that, one has just forgotten of those connections, because one is used to see that no car stops at the red light; it is simply the way it works in Mexico City.

On the other hand, I think that your question intends to point out that there is a moment of nonsense in that interpretative phenomenon. In my opinion, this loss of sense might be understood in a different sense in contrast to this way of being (*das Bedeuten* or the significant moment) in the world. I would rather say that the sense that it is given is that one is not more in the world in the same way one always is; but that doesn't mean one stops discovering something: one can see what lays under the possibility of a discovery.

André Laks

I would like to confront what you said with Alejandro Vigo's presentation yesterday, since there is an obvious parallel between Heidegger's two interpretations of Kant, on one hand, and his treatment of Aristotle, on the other hand. In the *Kantbuch*, Heidegger is looking for something that can be recuperated from Kant's philosophy and finds it in the section on schematism, where Heidegger spots an insight about the primacy of time over being. Now this move is parallel to what Heidegger does in the 1920s with Aristotle's analysis of judgment, with the idea that ante-predicative truth can be found (against the received interpretation) in Aristotle, namely, in *Metaphysics* Θ 10, the equivalent, if you want, of Kant's section on schematism. The idea is that priority of truth over judgement — $\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ in a Heideggerian sense— is already available in Aristotle's thought. Later, Heidegger will admit that Aristotle shares with the tradition issued from him that truth is to be located in judgment and is to be defined as *adaequatio rei et intellectus*.

Now, Heidegger's early interpretation is a very controversial one, as is Heidegger's interpretation of the section on schematism in the

case of Kant. And even Heidegger is officially not interested in the idea of a correct interpretation (exactitude is not truth —a challenging point, by the way, for Heideggerians committed to a correct reading of Heidegger), it is worthwhile worrying, in both Aristotle's and Kant's case, about the correct interpretation. It is widely recognized, and Alejandro Vigo mentioned it yesterday, that Heidegger's initial reading of Kant is hardly defensible from a philological point of view. The situation with Aristotle is, I think, less well known and is interestingly complex, because on one traditional reading of the relevant passages, Aristotle does recognize that in one of its meanings, ἀληθής refers to the pre-judicative, let's call it "intuitionistic", grasp by νοῦς of what a thing is, and moreover, he states that this meaning of ἀληθής is the most fundamental (κυριώτατα) one. Now, both parts of this reading, that which concerns the function of νοῦς and that which concerns the meaning of κυριώτατα (most fundamental or most common) are doubtful (more exactly: false), as Enrico Berti has shown in various contributions, where one can learn how Heidegger's interpretation of the crucial passage relies on the acceptance of Aristotle's sentence of a negation introduced by Bonitz in 1848 ("there is <no> search" about what the νοῦς grasps directly) on the basis of a tendentious neo-Platonic interpretation of the passage.⁸ Aristotle says, on the contrary, that we do search about the things of which there is a direct comprehension, stating that the grasp or comprehension of the thing is the final result of the process, not the starting point of an intuition. I am mentioning all this, because it seems to me that we have to cope with these so called philological matters in order to assess what Heidegger is doing.

Federica González

I would like to start with the second part of your remark, the section where you talked about Berti's reading. Berti accuses Heidegger of his intuitionist understanding of this chapter, and also talks about how Heidegger accepted Bonitz's addition of a negation in Aristotle's text. That is the reason why I wanted to rescue what Heidegger takes from Θ 10, which, in my opinion, is not intuitionist at all. I believe that Heidegger rather wants to emphasize the fact that there is a form of truth which has no contrary. I think this is the crucial aspect that Heidegger takes

⁸ See especially Berti (2010: 229-248).

over from Aristotle. Here "intuition" shall be understood in a very basic sense as something that precedes judgement. Nonetheless, I ponder that the terms "judgment" and "intuition" would not be used by Heidegger for understanding how *Dasein* involves with the world. He is against this approach for analyzing how *Dasein* is related to the world. The notions corresponding to "intuition" and "judgment" would be "*das hermeneutische als*" and "*das apophantisches als*".

André Laks

I am not saying that Heidegger's view on the matter is intuitionistic in an epistemological sense. Nevertheless, Heidegger does take direct vision, my seeing a red napkin as being prior to any judgement about the object.

Federica González

Still, the direct or immediate grasp on things would not be accurate to explain what involves the originaive comprehension of things, since it is already hermeneutical. This manner of speaking about mediation and immediacy would be strange from Heidegger's point of view.

I would also like to add something to the remark you made about the two different Heideggerian approaches to Aristotle. The early approach until the years 1929-1930 can be understood as a positive interpretation of Aristotle, insofar as Heidegger is capable to find fundamental insights in Aristotle's theory of truth. But afterwards, on his way to *Seinsgeschichte*, Heidegger's approach to Aristotle changes completely. For him, as you said, Aristotle's truth belongs to the traditional concept of truth, namely, *adaequatio rei et intellectus*. But I believe that it is possible to think with the early approach against the second, because as I mentioned, Heidegger's later philosophy tends to unify the truth with the untruth (*Unwahrheit*), which is exactly the insight he finds in Aristotle's concept of truth in *Metaphysics* Θ 10.

Peter Trawny

I would like to recuperate something that André Laks said in his intervention, because it is an important contribution to the principal aim of this workshop, what is problematic about Heidegger in a philosophical sense? What should we do with Heidegger?

To begin with, it is very clear that ἀλήθεια in Aristotle is not the model of what Heidegger thinks as ἀλήθεια. One has to say that the question of truth in Aristotle, of course, remains in the λόγος, therefore, even though there is an intuition that being means truth; it is clear that Heidegger takes his notion of ἀλήθεια from Parmenides or Heraclitus. Later on, he developed the historical hermeneutics of Being.

When Heidegger reads other authors, one observes that in a philological sense one never would claim that it is a true interpretation in a philological sense. I guess that it is not possible to state it so sharply. André Laks mentioned that when one is judging this, one is already outside of Heidegger's concept of historical hermeneutics of Being, because his concept of ἀλήθεια does not allow the adequational access to texts. So, here we find the difference between right interpretation and a true interpretation. This is a very interesting problem, since it represents the death of philological science. It shows that in no sense this kind of access to a text can lead us to the truth. My question would be: what should we do with that move that Heidegger performs? You spoke of this pre-predicative dimension in Heidegger's concept of truth, a dimension which is absent in Aristotle. How would you cope with this? Are we obligated to search for a true interpretation or a right interpretation?

André Laks

One can have a correct or exact or true interpretation of a text: this is a matter of semantical decision; but truth about what is at stake in the text in question may be (and usually is) somewhere else than in this text. If this is so, one does not have to choose between one and the other. In my opinion, Heidegger mixed up the two levels, and I think that we shouldn't follow him on this. Exactitude is one thing and truth another one. We should not be misled by the turn "a true interpretation".

What should I do with Heidegger? One of Heidegger's strengths, and indeed the source of much of his impact on later hermeneutic theories and practices (and not only that of Gadamer), lies in the way it allows to fight against historicism; one point of departure of Heidegger's own trajectory. If we think that Heidegger is right in his critique of historicism, then we should also determinate in the most possible accurate way where Heidegger's analysis of the *hermeneutisches als* fails. By the way, the term "Als" has an Aristotelian origin; one can even claim that the

adverb “ἤ” is the most important word in Aristotle's philosophy. What is exactly ἤ up to in Aristotle is perhaps part of the answer. This brings us back to the general problem of the relationship between correctness of an interpretation and truth, or more exactly search for truth.

Federica González

Before answering the question Peter Trawny posed, I would like to examine what he mentioned about a possible interpretation which could be true, but at the same time incorrect. My guess is that the problem is similar to what Tugendhat criticized about Heidegger, that accordingly if one follows his views there would be no difference between what is wrong and what is right. But we should also recall that truth can be understood in two different senses and levels, the level of truthness without any contrary, and the level of correctness and falseness. In accordance with this thought, in one level the interpretation could be incorrect, but in another it can be true.

I believe this problem is not a localized problem in Heidegger, it does not affect only his views on truth, but also every aspect of Heidegger's philosophy; for instance, the idea of man, ethics, and so on, since everything has lost its opposite. This neutralization is a consequence of this formal approach. In other words, everything starts losing its differentiation. For instance, truth does not have any contrary, it is no longer differentiated from falsehood, and *Mensch (Man)* is no longer differentiated sharply from animals. I think that this is what Heidegger wants to say: that at this level there is no place for a judgement of correctness. The problem that Peter Trawny stated yesterday concerning history also concerns truth. One cannot judge actual historical events or whether an interpretation is right or wrong; this is what I meant when I talked about the neutralization of judgement. I would talk of a sort of dehumanization in Heidegger's doctrine, because the neutralization of every concept affects any possible historical, ethical, logical consideration. This could be the starting point for a new reflexion around the dehumanization of Heideggerian philosophy, even more, to discuss the fact that it forgets about the man itself, namely, the individual.

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SESSION 4

HEIDEGGER READS AUGUSTINE

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Martin Heidegger is certainly one of the last German philosophers to have dealt with the major figures of the philosophical tradition ranging from antiquity to modern times. He studied this tradition free of the constraints of specialization, historical or philological, which would today be considered essential to the work of a historian of philosophy. The intelligence and significance of Heidegger's contribution to the history of philosophy certainly needs no defending. Chapters devoted to "Heidegger's readings" of the great philosophers of the past have been a requisite of academic works for the last 50 years. At the same time, the limits of Heidegger's interpretation of the history of philosophy have not been overlooked. The same Heideggerian readings have, indeed, often been sidelined on the basis of their philological inconsistency or idiosyncratic analysis.¹

By positioning myself somewhere in-between these two opposing views, I would like to propose a reflection on the hermeneutical methods of Heidegger. I will try to demonstrate how philology is in no way extraneous to his hermeneutical approach, nor to the practice of a close reading of the texts in question, which, in most cases, in fact, are carried out too literally. If this philological commentary considers the text as a pretext leading to non-neutral –if not unfaithful– readings, this is due to choices dictated by specific philosophical needs rather than any issues relating to the interpretative devices deployed to evaluate an

¹ This attitude is evidenced by familiar phrases like "Heidegger's Nietzsche" and "Heidegger's Plato", interpretations which specialists of Nietzsche and Plato could also, in principle, do without.

author and his historical context. Heidegger is indeed interested in the study of ancient authors in order to delineate and isolate certain relevant philosophical questions, which then take on their own importance within his personal philosophical reflection. At the same time, by focusing on some of the major philosophical tenets of the work of these ancient authors, and developing them to their extreme consequences regardless of the context from which he extrapolated them, Heidegger makes these hermeneutical tools sharper; we can then use them to return to the text in order to better understand it. Heidegger's readings of the great philosophers tell us a lot about Heidegger himself, but they also provide us with clever hermeneutical tools, of which it would be foolish not to take advantage.

I would like to look at a specific and closely delineated case study, namely, Heidegger's analysis of Augustine's discussion of memory, appearing in *Confessions* X, 8-25, entitled *Phenomenological Reading of Book X of Augustine's Confessions*, which is part of the 1921 lecture *Augustine and Neoplatonism*.² This case study will allow us, I hope, to identify some particular trends in Heidegger's interpretation of a "classic" from the European philosophical tradition, revealing via the issue of memory a sensitive point that clearly demonstrates the resonance, but also the dissonance, between the two philosophers. I have chosen to focus on two illuminating elements from Augustine's text and Heidegger's related commentary: (1) the use and interpretation of the Latin term "*memoria*" present in both texts and (2) the existence of two different argumentative systems in Augustine's work and Heidegger's commentary. Both of these specific elements make it necessary to proceed in two stages: firstly, in order to analyze Heidegger's commentary from a formal (rhetorical) point of view, it will be necessary to assess whether, and to what extent, he deviates, formally above all, from the Augustinian model; and, secondly, observing these formal indicators will enable us to identify a more relevant interpretative move, which sensibly departs from the original Augustinian conceptual structure and his system of reference.

² *Augustin und der Neoplatonismus*, 1921 (Gesamtausgabe, II Abteilung, Vorlesungen 1919-1944, B. 60 *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*).

1. Lexical continuity, conceptual discontinuity

As suggested by the programmatic subheading of Heidegger's lecture, the philosopher appears to propose a phenomenological reading of Augustine, which is also a deliberately unusual one.³ At first glance, however, Heidegger's text seems to offer a fairly faithful and literal reading of Augustine's work. The Latin Augustinian lexicon is respected and, generally speaking, it is not replaced by other meaningful terms in German. It is precisely this apparent lexical continuity that provides us with our first formal indicator, which I would like to focus upon. Heidegger makes clear from the very beginning of the text his decision to leave the Latin term "*memoria*" without translation. Indeed, an explicit translation never occurs within his analysis, although, as we shall see, a conceptual choice has been made from the outset.

Augustine himself does not provide a precise technical definition of the term "*memoria*", but he gives us a very detailed and refined preliminary description (X, 8, 1 ff.), one that is rejected by Heidegger in his commentary as being too meticulous. This meticulous analysis of memory in which Augustine "let himself go getting lost" (p. 182) is, on the contrary, fundamental to our contextual understanding of Augustine's concept of memory; it describes two traditional and distinct ways of considering memory:

(1) Memory conceived as a static repository, warehouse or storage room for sensitive and intelligible data resulting from the elaboration of experience; and,

(2) An active mode of memory, which is able to orient itself inside this repository and between these stored materials, retracing the paths of the objects of memory and shedding some light on them.

In the Latin (Pseudo-Cicero, Quintilian) and Greek traditions (Aristotle), this distinction was defined by the terms "*ἡ μνήμη*" or "*memoria*", and "*ἡ ἀνάμνησις*" or "*reminiscentia*", and it is still present in modern languages such as Italian ("*memoria*" and "*ricordo*", or

³ See Barizza (2004: 121-144) and Barash (1996: 104-112).

"*rimembranza*"), German ("*Gedächtnis*" and "*Erinnerung*") and Spanish ("*memoria*" and "*reminiscencia*", or "*recuerdo*").

Though aware of this tradition, as evidenced by paragraph 8 of Book X, Augustine nevertheless tends to deploy the term "*memoria*" to encompass both of these mnemonic modes; only occasionally does Augustine distinguish the second form, "remembering", by using verbs like "*memini*". In his commentary, Heidegger immediately takes advantage of Augustine's lack of terminological precision, reading it as a lack of conceptual distinction. By failing to translate the Latin term "*memoria*" into German, Heidegger allows himself to overlook the distinction between "*Gedächtnis*" and "*Erinnerung*", and he thus proceeds to analyze Augustine's text while ignoring the twofold terminology inherent to his discussion of memory, which was, nevertheless, at the base of the work of Augustine himself. This lexical aspect provides us with our first example of the conceptual discontinuity between the two authors: Heidegger focuses exclusively on the active mode of memory, only stressing the process of recalling something to memory (what he calls "*Suche*", a term whose English translation is "search"), which is less explicit in Augustine's text.

A new argumentation follows on from this first conceptual difference. Augustine claims that memory not only contains images and concepts (the first meaning of memory), but also the very procedures and thoughts that formed these images and notions, including the ways in which we remember (the second meaning of memory). The domain of memory seems, in this way, to expand its limits to include consciousness at large. Heidegger adheres to Augustine on this point, but then takes it further. For Heidegger, indeed, the existence of memory is not a given; it is there only in its active form (the second meaning of memory, namely, remembering), which is conceived as a process of presentification of the objects of memory. This presentification has to be conceived as a form of enactment (*Vergegenwärtigungsvollzug*). Heidegger describes this specific conception of memory as "noematic", referring explicitly to the terminology used by Husserl. According to this interpretation, memory would involve the processes of perceiving, remembering or judging, as in Augustinian thought), but in the sense that it contains the actuation of these processes. This means that memory contains its intentional object: the perceived, the remembered or the judged.

To understand better how different these two interpretations are, let me briefly recall some very basic points concerning Augustine's

Confessions and the particular role of Book X, which devotes several pages to the analysis of memory. It is easy to forget, even amongst specialists, that the *Confessions* is first and foremost a book that deals with an epistemological question, namely, "how can man know God merely through his own faculties?" The literary genre of the *confessio* is in itself already a response to this epistemological question: in confessing my entire life to God, who already knows everything about me, it is God himself whom I find in the memory and experience of my entire life. Behind the epistemological issue raised by the *Confessions* we can recognize Aristotle and his philosophy of the soul. In particular, the widening of the domain of memory to include all the functions of the soul involves close parallels with the role of Aristotle's imagination (ἡ φαντασία) in the *De Anima*. Here imagination is described as a fundamental faculty that seems to provide the basis for all activities relating to the soul: from perception to learning and memory.

Without the epistemological question that structures Augustine's book on memory, Heidegger's phenomenological reading could not have occurred. However, unlike the philosophical tradition depicted by Husserl's phenomenological model, Heidegger is not interested in offering a mere phenomenological description of the Augustinian epistemological model, but in locating an ontological problem. Heidegger's argument no longer centers, as it does for Augustine, on the processes of memory and their contents (essentially an epistemological problem), but on the nature of the presence of the objects of memory, which are called to mind via the process of presentification.

An additional line of reasoning will clearly show the implications of this different conception of memory. The widening of the domain of memory to include the entire spectrum of mental processes (acts of remembering, perceiving, thinking, and all those acts involving the production and reproduction of the images of memory) gives way to difficulties concerning logical order, expressed by Augustine in the form of logical paradoxes. The most important of these paradoxes is the famous one on oblivion: how is it possible to remember the fact of having forgotten something?⁴ If oblivion is the privation of memory, how do you know or remember that you have forgotten? And how to search for and find what has been lost if it lies beyond the realm of memory?

⁴ See Marion (2008).

The formulation of these paradoxes in Augustine's work was not meant, however, to cast doubt on the reality of the phenomena described. Augustine appears to ponder the mystery of these phenomena which undermine human reason but are nonetheless real and palpable within the domain of our own experience.

The speciousness of aporias that arise out of simple logical paradoxes was denounced by Plato in *Meno*, which focuses on a similar theme:

MENO: Why, on what lines will you look, Socrates, for a thing of whose nature you know nothing at all? Pray, what sort of thing, amongst those that you know not, will you treat us to as the object of your search? Or even supposing, at the best, that you hit upon it, how will you know it is the thing you did not know?

SOCRATES: I understand the point you would make, Meno. Do you see what a captious argument you are introducing—that, forsooth, a man cannot inquire either about what he knows or about what he does not know? For he cannot inquire about what he knows, because he knows it, and in that case is in no need of inquiry; nor again can he inquire about what he does not know, since he does not know about what he is to inquire (*Meno*, 80d-e).

Heidegger, who conveniently fails to mention *Meno*, has, on the contrary, good reason to develop the Augustinian paradoxes to their un-logical conclusion. According to Heidegger, Augustine's questioning would have led him to discover a form of schizophrenia internal to consciousness: by virtue of his interpretation of memory, which would therefore contain not only mental processes, such as perceiving, remembering or judging, and their enactment (*Vollzug*), but also their intentional object, namely, the perceived, the remembered or the judged, Augustinian paradoxes would not only engender logical implications but also they would reveal real ontological aporias. We are, in fact, no longer faced with an apparent contrast between two conflicting processes (remembering and forgetting), but between two entities: the remembered and the forgotten, the present and the absent.

The conception of memory as a repository allows Augustine to evade this paradox and to assume that certain elements might well be

present in memory, even if they are not actually conscious. In contrast, Heidegger radicalizes the conditions of this aporia: if remembering takes place with reference (*Bezughaft*) to something that one can remember, and oblivion marks the lack of such a reference, then the essence of these two processes is the actual availability/unavailability of the reference. In refusing to consider oblivion in relation to a wider conception of memory (as both memory and remembering), Heidegger refuses to conceive the process of remembering in terms of something that is (as something being buried within memory) even if it remains, as yet, unavailable (as not yet ready to be recalled in memory). From the point of view of enactment, “to be unavailable”, “not to be revealed”, means not to be (there) at all. In the same way, consciousness of oblivion (remembering that one has forgotten) is a contradiction in terms.

2. Decontextualizing Augustine

The second formal element upon which I would like to focus today is Heidegger’s decision not to follow Augustine’s paragraph order in his commentary, a choice justified by his desire to reconstruct more clearly the essential argumentative structure of the text. Heidegger contends that Augustine’s argument lacks order. The passages he is concerned with are those in which Augustine is prone to digression, but above all those in which the argument is interwoven with endless, often rhetorical, questioning. The structure of the open question, which is almost an invocation to God, is a key part of the rhetorical system of the *Confessions*. It is not absurd to imagine that the Augustinian *confessio* is a very special form of Socratic dialogue, transplanted within the intimate space of a single individual or, better yet, an individual who communicates with God through the practice of confession. We can observe similar examples in the philosophical tradition contemporary of Augustine. The most famous of all is surely Boethius’ *Consolatio Philosophiae*, which can be defined as a form of dialogic monologue. Boethius does nothing but talk to himself in the privacy of his prison and his interlocutor, *Philosophia*, is merely a rhetorical figure that takes the role of the narrator’s inner interlocutor.

Considered within this tradition and frame of reference, Augustine’s questions can be interpreted as follows:

(1) In part as rhetorical or tautological questions that mark certain passages in the argument; and,

(2) In other cases as maieutic questions, or in general as performative questions, which move the text forward or even construct the argument.

Placing questions within a philosophical text in order to construct an argument was a very common praxis during Augustine's time and even later. From Augustine and Boethius to Leibniz, we observe the same argumentative method. In texts like Boethius' *De Consolatione*, which provides a masterly example of argumentative consistency, the author accompanies the reader throughout the argumentation through an ascending series of proposals, all of which support each other. Each new acquired stage brings with it an attendant question that poses a new difficulty. This difficulty, in its turn, is overcome by a new argument, which, again, overcomes and renders superfluous all the previous argumentative steps. The difficulty of this method lies in the fact that it is not simply cumulative, but that at each stage you need to maintain the tension that leads to the next step. This happens because each new acquired step of the argument is unstable: it lacks something in order to be fully guaranteed. It is this final guarantee that the argument is building up to. This is frequently the reason why (and we can observe this in the Socratic dialogue too) the interlocutor of the dialogue (or the self that questions himself) loses his equilibrium, misses a beat during the discussion and comes out with a seemingly mindless question that has already been answered during the previous stage. Yet repeating such questions is, in fact, not as ridiculous as we might at first think. The individual who follows this kind of argumentation can indeed be likened to a tightrope walker, because the development of the argumentation relies on evidence that is not yet available, evidence that is prepared and which will be exposed in due course. Once the argumentation has reached its apex, the whole chain of arguments depends upon this last piece of information.

In this pyramidal structure, in which the strongest evidence lies at the top and the advancement of the argumentation depends on it, the easiest movement would be a downward one that starts at the top (the assertion of God, of a supreme Good, of an Entity superior to creatures) and descends, all the while explaining, including, and justifying all lower degrees. On the contrary, standard argumentation begins at the base of the pyramid (the complexity of the phenomena), but it pretends

to ascend through a deductive questioning to the formulation of a universally valid principle. Quite doubtless, this deductive process does not depend on proven premises, but on premises that have to be taken for granted, a route that is actually counterintuitive. For this reason, it can be frustrating to read a medieval text: the reader puts in a lot of effort to follow and understand all the points of an argument, which reveals in reality a thousand unsolved difficulties. The conclusion is, in fact, a prerequisite that delegitimizes all preceding or following questions without actually having directly responded to the difficulties raised in the development of the argument.

Now, it is the founding value of this final piece of evidence that Heidegger calls into question, making of his frustration a method and destabilizing the medieval structure of Augustine's argument. By way of an example, let us come back to our case study. One of the most important and interesting conclusions of chapter X of Augustine's *Confessions* regards the extension of the domain of memory. As we have already seen, it is so large that it even includes God: man can find Him in memory. The paradox that emerges, namely, that the interiority of a creature is greater than its Creator because it contains Him, is overcome when we remember that memory assumes, for Augustine, the connotations and the extension of the soul, and the human spirit at large. According to the neo-Platonic doctrine of the soul, there is no real qualitative difference between the soul of man and that of God. Rather, there is a quantitative difference: a difference of degree. The universal soul, which is God, includes the individual soul of man, which in turn participates in the supreme unity of God. To say that man finds God in the depths of his soul means that he finds in his heart and in his own experience the divine nature of which he is part.

The other apparent paradox that Augustine reveals is that of the incommensurability of this revelation of God within the human soul. Even if man is a creature, a finite entity, his Memory (meaning his Soul) is, for Augustine, endless and unfathomable: it holds within it things of which we are unaware, and of which we shall never be aware. The search for God in our memory provides a key example of how man can actually incorporate within himself something that transcends him, in the sense that it goes beyond the powers of his comprehension. Let us now return to the original purpose of Book X of *Confessions*. Augustine seeks God and does so by testing the faculties of his soul. The final checkmate played against the faculties, which are unable to fathom their

own limits, should not prevent us from thinking of them as sharing in that infinity and of being a part of it. Therefore, man contains God within his soul, because his soul is at one with the soul of God: the creature in this way owns and is owned by its Creator.

The pyramidal structure of both Augustinian argumentation and his theory of the soul partly depend, as Heidegger recognizes, on a speculative neo-Platonic context of reference. Now, it is exactly this hierarchy of entities that Heidegger rejects. Instead, he seeks to shift Augustine's intuitions back to the realm of existence, that is, to the bottom of the pyramid. In doing so, he not only rejects the argumentative order and the epistemological dimension of Augustine's argument, but he affirms an existential dimension, which appears, on closer inspection (although not exactly in this form) to be not so extraneous to the *Confessions*.⁵ Man's experience of the inscrutability of memory and of not being able to be completely present to himself (completely conscious of himself) is, for Heidegger, irreducible and definitive. Once the hierarchical-pyramidal order of Augustinian Neoplatonism is abolished, there is no more God or eternity or highest Good to guarantee the inclusion and justification of the lower degrees of being. In this way, Heidegger invalidates Augustine's whole argumentation, which is based on surmounting the difficulties raised at the start by moving the discussion to a higher speculative level wherein they become inconsistent (from individuals to the One, from time to eternity, from human knowledge to God's wisdom). The game is now entirely played according to the rules of the lowest degree of the pyramid, at the level of existence, where all difficulties remain unsolved.

Conclusions

The two case studies reveal much about how Heidegger structures his commentary to Augustine's text. What might at first appear as a faithful and literal reading of the Augustinian text reveals, on the contrary, substantial differences that are not immediately explicit. The first deviations we encounter concern formal elements that seem not to have a major impact on the interpretation of the text; for instance, the slight semantic shift concerning the concept of memory and the inversion of Augustine's argumentative structure. Things get more interesting when we discover that these formal differences are indicative of what

⁵ See Esposito (1993: 229-59).

we might consider to be Heidegger's deliberately partial reading of Augustine's text. By virtue of these slight formal shifts, Heidegger is able to focus solely on certain aspects of Augustine's thought and to ignore other equally important ones. Having decontextualized and obscured its epistemological framework, Heidegger's partial reading brings to the fore a specific interpretation of the text, ultimately disrupting the Augustinian argument and causing it to stumble on constant aporias.

What is the purpose of Heidegger's reading? What does he seek in offering such an openly partial reading of Augustine's work, a reading that deliberately creates more problems than it solves? Certainly, his intent is not philological, according to our contemporary understanding of the term, that is, the reconstitution of lost meaning or the elucidation of hidden meaning within a text. This is clear from the very beginning of Heidegger's lecture of 1921:

The exposition (*Referat*) is not meant to supplant or improve upon the original, but to surrender it to a genuine explication, to articulate it in a special way. This requires a detour through an ordering putting-away, so that a thing is more easily accessible to us at the outset. A pure exposition, as description, does not exist. That could be, at most, a bad interpretation which is unclear about itself, which takes itself to be absolute. "Exposition" is still the primarily "objectively" oriented point of departure for the actually intended explication, one which also articulates itself in a falling manner (*abfallend*). Only this gives it its meaning. (Heidegger: 2010).

Heidegger's reading, therefore, closely follows Saint Augustine's text before shifting dangerously away from it. Paradoxically, however, he considers his interpretation to be more faithful to the text and to offer a fairer reading of Augustine. Freeing Augustine from the shackles of his historical context and the neo-Platonic frame of reference that limits his philosophical impulse, Heidegger claims to identify the key points hinted at by Augustine himself, which are capable of further development.

The *cul de sac* of aporias into which Heidegger drives the Augustinian text is also not an end in itself: when he constructs an ontological aporia

from a logical paradox, which could be explained on an epistemological level, this does not mean that he claims to have reached a stable endpoint in his speculations. Quite the contrary: the construction of an ontological aporia, which is not legitimated by the Augustinian context, would not be justifiable even in Heidegger's interpretive system. Heidegger uses it to divert attention from the purely descriptive level, which would be the consequence of a mere phenomenological reading of this Augustinian chapter on memory, to the existential level, which is at the heart of his personal philosophical interests. Augustine's query, highlighting as it does the incommensurability of the relationship between Creator/creature, memory/consciousness, reveals, according to Heidegger, a conflict that is inherent to the dimension of human existence and to the fact of being a man in the world. This conflict must have already been perceived by Augustine, though his philosophy remains under the conciliatory hood of Christian theology.

It could therefore be said of Heidegger's interpretative system that, although it is somewhat dishonest on a philological level and dismissive of Augustine's frames of reference, it does not claim to be unfaithful to the Augustinian text. As an interpreter of Augustine's thought, Heidegger approaches the text by deviating precariously from it, but he ultimately draws conclusions that may well have fallen within the realm of possible and legitimate interpretations of Augustine. What can we learn from such a decontextualized and non-confessional reading of Augustine? What does Augustine teach us beyond the concerns relating to the theological consistency of his philosophical discourse? Heidegger, as a reader and admirer of Augustine's work, wishes to reaffirm the depth and strength of the Augustinian philosophical discourse that fully emerges only if the interpreter is willing to make some philological sacrifices. In doing so, Heidegger claims to interpret Augustine in the most genuine way, discounting all that relates to his historical context and conserving only that which is worth addressing in any time. This more liberal approach to Augustinian philosophy, which gives free reign to the critical intelligence of the interpreter, has the ability to isolate and highlight some of the central cores of Augustine's thought and to reveal its universal value. On the other hand, Heidegger's decision to proceed in the manner we have just seen, literally and, apparently, philologically, cannot but expose him to the charge of having deliberately misinterpreted or misunderstood the actual content of Augustinian thought.

DISCUSSION

André Laks

Thank you for drawing attention to this little known material and describing the way in which Heidegger gets ontological aporias out of a procedure which can be described as methodological; somewhat paradoxically given the nature of Augustine's text. The topic is certainly worthwhile pursuing, the more so since there are good reasons to think that Socratic aporias, as presented by Plato, are from the very start only apparent aporias, definite steps leading to definite solutions. But what I would like to know is whether you think there is some kind of connection between Heidegger's early commentary on memory and oblivion in Augustine and his own later talk about the very specific form of forgetting which consists in forgetting Being.

Carlotta Santini

Regarding the term "aporia", I agree with you that it is not Augustine who used it in his text. Heidegger does not find aporias in his argument; rather, it is a notion he uses for some statements in the argument present in the tenth chapter of the *Confessions*. Asking about how the term "memoria" works and about how the spiritual life of men develops is for Augustine a way to ask for something that indeed happens: it is a bare fact, so to speak. It is true that one can put into the work of trying to understand and explain how this faculty works, but there is no doubt that the faculty is there and that it works. In the argumentative structure of Augustine when a question is posed, he answers it. The reader awaits this answer to come, and Augustine is aware of this answer during the entire development of his argument. For Augustine we always have to presuppose a very specific answer, namely, that God is present. Augustine certainly uses a neo-Platonic structure, but any expert on this author would say that it is necessary to be careful when one is trying to claim that Christianity is a sort of Neoplatonism.

Heidegger, on the contrary, uses a strategy of rejecting any pre-determined answer, rejecting even the trust in the possibility of this answer. In doing so, he reveals some weaknesses in Augustine argumentation: if the answer is always given or presupposed, this does not mean that it is strong enough to avoid the questioning. In this sense, we could even say that Heidegger's questioning is closer to the

Platonic method than to Augustine's argument. Here is one example: when Augustine says that *memoria* is able to comprehend the entire human experience and that one can find God in his memory, he is not yet claiming that *memoria* is God. The affirmation of a factual identity between God and memory, God and human soul, would not be justified in any frame of reference. Nevertheless, Augustine's text is very close to this unsustainable position, because he identifies God with life, and memory is defined as *vita* too. This is, for example, one of the sensitive points on which Heidegger insists on forcing Augustine's argument towards an interpretation, one that is philologically and historically false, but, from the point of view of philosophical interpretation, perfectly legitimate and even highly interesting.

As for the relation between Heidegger's interest in the structure of memory and oblivion in Augustine, and his own thought about memory and oblivion in an historical sense, my guess is that there is not a direct relation among them. On the other hand, it is interesting that Augustine, while stressing how difficult it is to conceive that such an insignificant entity as man can comprehend the entire world through the capacities of his memory, finds an answer to this difficulty in the fact that man is part of God, so that he can never be really lost, because he is lost in Him. For Heidegger, this is not a valid option: men are for him definitely unaware of themselves or, in other words, un-available to themselves. This is their way of being as men in the world, and this confers on their existence a dramatic tonality.

Alejandro Vigo

It is interesting that the framework you presented today is quite different from the one I drew from Heidegger's interpretation of Kant in the *Kantbuch*. Perhaps this is because Heidegger is looking for structures in Augustine's text which he can utilize in a phenomenological sense without assuming the framework in which Augustine used these structures. But what I would like to understand more precisely is the distinction between the Greek terms "ἡ ἀνάμνησις" and "ἡ μνήμη". Perhaps I did not understand you properly. Did you state that Heidegger ignores the tradition related to this distinction?

Carlotta Santini

What I meant is that he pretends to ignore this tradition in order to give a reading of Augustine which generates aporias.

Alejandro Vigo

In this state of affairs, then we understand the term “ἡ μνήμη” as a passive form of memory, and “ἡ ἀνάμνησις” as a kind of accomplishment: *Vollzug*. Now, according to Heidegger, this *Vollzug* implies a passive moment because it is not a decision one makes *in vacuo*: one has to have an occasion that triggers it; God or anything else could be the occasion that pushes a subject to make such decision. The latter is the phenomenological structure that Heidegger tried to use in a way that avoids Augustine’s theological presuppositions. Would you agree with this?

Carlotta Santini

Concerning the premise of your question, I am not sure I agree with you. The aporia between μνήμη and ἀνάμνησις, and even between Augustine’s and Heidegger’s interpretations of *memor*, starts exactly when we consider the recalling into memory as *Vollzug*, which is nothing but the result of the fixation of the processes of recalling into memory in their intentional objects. We are facing here a static vision of memory, in which both μνήμη (repository) and ἀνάμνησις (search) are considered results, and not movement, intentions. This is perhaps also the answer to the second part of your question: the decisional moment at the origin of the recalling into memory is linked to the problem of intentionality and how to interpret it. In Heidegger’s commentary to Augustine, even intentionality is conceived in a static way, in the same way as the intentional object. This is the origin of the aporias in his interpretation of Augustine.

Peter Trawny

I am not well-informed about the relationship between Heidegger and Saint Augustine. What interests me most is a question that might seem naive. One can find in Augustine a strong difference between

the inner and the outer, the external and the internal, which probably derives from the neo-Platonic tradition. Another interesting fact is that in Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* one can find a quotation of Augustine's *De vera religione*. From these facts one might be drawn to conclude that Augustine is very interested in something like a transcendental subjectivity. My question is: does Heidegger ever take this sort of differentiation between inner and outer into account?

Carlotta Santini

I am not sure I can answer your question. At the beginning of book X, Augustine asks about how man receives information from the external world and how he orders this information within his consciousness. At the same time, there is some hint of innatism in his thought —knowing always presupposes a formal precognition—, for one has to know already what one is looking for and every knowledge comes definitively from God, given from the very beginning in our souls. Nevertheless, later on this issue of how information enters the soul by means of the external senses is left aside, and Augustine concentrates only on interiority, because for him all the *facta* are already there. In this sense, Augustine is in some sense close to Heidegger, I think, but I would not go as far as identifying the concept of interiority or interior life in Augustine and Heidegger.

Steven Crowell

My remark does not concern any specific hermeneutical problem raised by Heidegger's interpretation of "*memoria*". The general point that his discussion raises is whether there is any connection between Heidegger's reading of Augustine on this point and the phenomenology of oblivion and forgetting. One way of reading Augustine's *Confessions* is as an inquiry into what it means to be called back to oneself. This is likewise the move that Husserl performs and that also runs throughout the whole structure of *Being and Time*. So, the issue is the following: how do I come back to myself when I am not even looking for myself? Personally, I do not see myself as being lost in the They (*das Man*). However, for both Augustine and Heidegger, there is a sense in which one must always be already searching for oneself.

In Heidegger's philosophy one might speak of a "conversion experience" when, thanks to the breakdown of my everyday identities

in *Angst*, I am recalled to myself, to my ontological possibility of authenticity. There seems to be an obvious parallelism between Augustine's and Heidegger's texts here, and I wonder whether you agree with it. If that is the case, can the hermeneutic problem that you are finding in Heidegger's approach to "*memoria*" be related to the differences in the phenomenon of self-recovery that are implicated according to Heidegger's ontology, on one hand, and to Augustine's ontology, on the other? I do not have an answer to that, and I was wondering if you might share your thoughts on it.

Carlotta Santini

The problem with the text from 1921 is that it is quite isolated, and it is not fully developed; but those who have commented it, for example Marion, have always pointed out that Heidegger remains critical of Augustine's way of inquiring into the process memory⁶. This is the reason why I wonder whether this phenomenological reading of the tenth book of the *Confessions* had ever been carried out. Or, on the contrary, did Heidegger simply stop with the criticism of the neo-Platonic framework without escaping the Augustinian model itself? I do not think Heidegger is here advancing the same position that one can find in *Being and Time*. He limits himself to discuss the difficulties provided by this attempt to reach oneself by inquiring into one's consciousness.

Steven Crowell

Then the question your response provokes in me concerns the temporal distance between Heidegger's two texts: in 1921, Heidegger had no clue about the phenomenological, ontological structure of selfhood that he would develop in *Being and Time*. Thus, it cannot be the case that he had criticized Augustine in 1921 on the basis of a full worked-out ontology of the self, and so there must be another reason why he would have stopped with the ontological aporias, and maybe even artificially intensified them. My suggestion would be that it is because those problems were genuine philosophical problems for him at the time and he had by no means worked them out.

⁶ Marion (2008).

Peter Trawny

Earlier Steven Crowell declared that one could see the parallel between *Sein und Zeit* and Augustine's *Confessions* related to this search for the self; and this is true. However, if we organized a conference on both authors we would find many differences in this investigation regarding the self. For instance, Heidegger was committed to an investigation of the self as being-in-the-world. For Saint Augustine, on the contrary, that is not possible. For Augustine, the search for the self cannot be carried out in an entirely this-worldly manner, since being in the world is already a form of losing oneself.

Steven Crowell

I agree with Peter Trawny's position: there would be great many differences, because there would be a clash of two different ontologies. That would be one reason why, from a phenomenological point of view, Heidegger would have a tendency to emphasize what look like aporias in the trans-worldly-way-of-self-finding, which could not be aporias from the perspective of Saint Augustine's ontology.

Alejandro Vigo

I would like to make two remarks. I think Steven Crowell is right in mentioning the temporal distance between Heidegger's two texts. In 1921, indeed, Heidegger did not possess the whole picture that would later emerge. Hence, he focused on what he called *Ruinanz*, a term that is expressed in *Being and Time* by the German word "*Verfallen*", which appeared in the lecture-courses on Aristotle, but also in his reading on Saint Augustine as "*tentatio*".

Regarding the connection with the world: the crucial problem is not what Heidegger thinks about the proper way of being in the world, but rather that we can be lost in the world (*Selbstverlorenheit*). This structure appears in *Being and Time* as the fundamental moment in the theory of the self, which should depart from the possibility that one is himself in *modus* of *Selbstverlorenheit*, of losing oneself. Methodologically one has to show the path that goes from *Selbstverlorenheit* to a possibility of being oneself in a proper way. Heidegger would say that the model should not start from a property, because that is methodologically

wrong; that is the reason why the tradition of philosophy was not able to do justice to the structure of the self, considered as a substance. One has to take care of oneself, which means that one can also be himself in *Selbstverlorenheit*. In my opinion, this is the crucial step in the connection between Heidegger's first *Vorlesungen* and *Being and Time*.

Another element which is relevant to the present analysis is Paulus, since the apostle stated that we (Christians) are in the world, but not of it. This is another structure that must be taken into consideration. If one affirms that we are in the world it is impossible not to be in it; but what Paulus means is that we are in the world but not lost in it. I think this could contribute to the problem that Carlotta Santini raised in her text.

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SESSION 5

PROPOSITIONS ON HEIDEGGER'S 'BEING-HISTORICAL THINKING'

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1. "Hermeneutics of facticity" (GA 58) was one of the first projects of Heidegger as an authentic philosopher, a period of Heidegger's work that highlights the importance of history in Heideggerian philosophy. In effect, factual life is necessarily located in history. The German word "*Geschichte*" like the English word "history" is characterized by the ambiguity of the thing itself and its science. "*Geschichte*"/"history" is the sequence of events in time and space, and the scientific approach to those events.

2. The problem is whether history is an element of factual life. History as science must be a thematization and an objectification of something, what in factual life is not thematized and, thus, objectified. For if in factual life history as such is thematized, life would not be factual anymore. A presupposition and feature of factual life is that it is lived. A discourse about this life is already an interruption of it.

3. For Heidegger philosophy is not a science. Philosophy must be hermeneutics of factual life in factual life. Thinking, then, is not an objectification, but a certain performance (*Vollzug*) of factual life. Even if philosophical thinking is thinking about history, it is thinking in history.

4. The non-objectified relation to history is what Heidegger (like Hegel and Dilthey) calls "historicality" (*Geschichtlichkeit*). When Heidegger found his main philosophical project, namely, the question for the meaning of Being, he perceived the following: if all thinking is thinking in history, the question of the meaning of Being itself is historical (*Geschichtlich*) (GA 2, 28).

5. This is the case, because the Being of the *Dasein* as temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) is the “condition of the possibility of historicity” (GA 2, 27). The hermeneutical circle, namely, *Dasein*’s question of the meaning of Being is “historical, because the Being of *Dasein* is the condition of the possibility of historicity, is a transcendental circle. History unfolds itself from the historicity of *Dasein*.”

6. History is experienced as fate (*Schicksal*) if *Dasein* projects itself as anticipation of death.¹ History can also become a collective experience of a community, of a people (*Volk*), as destiny (*Geschick*). One could make a difference between these two kinds of historical experiences, but it seems that *Dasein* will have the destiny of its people as its own fate if it decides to or let itself become the member of a collective historicity.

7. Here a question can be marked: When does a people performs its anticipation of death? When something happens, what is usually called an “event.” Certainly the happening of an event is barely recognized in the event itself. When on July 14th, 1789, in Paris a crowd of citizens gathered to take the Bastille, nobody thought that the French Revolution was taken placed, particularly because the Bastille was never taken in the course of a violent turmoil, it was just delivered to the violent citizens. A historical event is always emerging retrospectively, monumentally, so to speak. In this sense, a collective performance of the anticipation of death can be called a “future monument”, “a date to come”. Here, the history of a factual life is on the threshold to its own objectification.

8. Therefore it cannot be amazing that Heidegger was so much attracted by the *Machtergreifung* of the national-socialist party in 1933. This event, the *Machtergreifung*, was the performance of the destiny of a people. But in this attraction something became clearer and clearer: the monumental dimension of the historical event shattered the idea that history must be understood as an epiphenomenon of *Dasein*’s historicity. If history manifests itself in a monument to come, *Dasein* becomes the epiphenomenon. It is not that history is transformed by *Dasein*, but *Dasein* by history. It may be not an accident that the turning

¹ See GA 2, 349 and 508.

(*Kehre*) of the relation between Being and beings had taken place in times of the national revolution.

9. Historicity is not the presupposition, as well as *Dasein* is not the source of history. Being is the source of history. Or, better: history is of Being, emerges from Being, it is "Being" itself.

10. History is emerging from Being. This emergence is a feature of Being itself. What is shown and hidden becomes an element of history. Heidegger locates this element at first in the early thinking of the Greeks. In Heraclitus' and Parmenides' fragments he interprets ἀλήθεια as "unconcealment" (*Unverborgenheit*). The Greek term "ἀλήθεια" should be a certain understanding of truth, in which revealement and concealment is not a quality of the λόγος and the νοεῖν, but an event in itself. Later, when Heidegger writes Ἀ-Λήθεια, he works within the being-historical thinking. Ἀ-Λήθεια is now the revealing and concealing axis of a history, which challenged new non-objectifying forms of emergence.

11. Being reveals and conceals not in but as history. This particular way of emergence can not be expressed in forms of the objectifying history as one of beings. Here, a difficulty becomes significant, which is at stake since the first proposition: the representation of history is always a narrative; it does not matter whether this narrative represents real or unreal events. History has a special relation to language: it finds its objects throughout language. Where the science of history tells the sequence of and thus refers to certain events in time and space, the being-historical thinking narrates and refers to what? With the new understanding of "history" Heidegger had to find a new way to represent it.

12. The first response to this problem was the attempt to declare poetry as the true access to history. "How can one know, what is history, if one does not know, what is poetry" (GA 76, 233). In a certain sense, Heidegger tried to refresh a German tradition of philosophy. It stepped to poetry, myth, and mythology, if it came to define the "historical consciousness." Hölderlin, Schelling, and Nietzsche explained the poetical power of myths, but later Heidegger gave up this attempt.

13. The being-historical thinking had to find its own narrative. This being-historical narrative tells the tale of a beginning, of a nearly complete loss of this beginning, of a crisis, of an eschatological end; as a possibility of another beginning or the complete loss of it. It tells the tale of a metaphysical thinking finding its peak in the will to will, and another way of thinking finding its own character in forms of self-reservation. The significations and interpretations of this narrative are not fixed, because for Heidegger “being-historical thinking” means to move in this narrative through always opening up other fields of significations.

14. The organizing center of this narrative is the event of appropriation (*das Ereignis*). This event of appropriation is organizing all significations of the history of Being, because it is the center. Every narrative needs this specific location, where the signifying decisions are done. In the usual theory of narration one could call this institution the narrator. In the history of Being there cannot be a narrator in the form of a subject or a person. No one tells the tale of the history of Being. It must tell its tale itself. Therefore, the narrator of the history of Being is the event of appropriation. Even the Α-Λήθεια is one of its tales.

15. The event of appropriation is the perfect center of the narrative of Being, because it transforms the concept of the concept, the signification of the signification. It does so because of the concept of the event. An “event” signifies something happening in time and space. If I use the term “event, I necessarily refer to. It is true that events can happen in a novel or a movie, but even a fictional event refers to something happening in time and space. The question is, whether I can refer to time and space of Heidegger’s “event of appropriation”? Is there a non-objectifiable reality of “the event of appropriation”?

16. A thread of the history of Being is what I called and still call “being-historical anti-Semitism”: “it would be to ask, in what the peculiar predetermination of the Jewish community for the planetary criminality is based”, which in German it is said as follows: “*Zu fragen wäre, worin die eigentümliche Vorbestimmung der Judenschaft für das planetarische*

Verbrechertum begründet liegt".² The keywords of "*eigentümliche Vorbestimmung*" unfold a significant connection with the "history of Being". The adjective "*eigentümlich*" is the character of what Heidegger calls the "*Eigentum*". The "*Eigentum*" belongs to the character of the "*Ereignis*" and its movement of the "*Ereignen*". In all these significations what is own, what belongs to the event of appropriation, is at stake. The predetermination mentioned before cannot be caused by (a) God or a substance, but belongs to (is owned by) the organizing center of the history of Being.

17. The last consequence of Heidegger's being-historical thinking is the abandonment of every objectifiable signification. Thinking does not anymore refer to something beyond itself. It becomes its mere performance by opening up more and more ways to move in new and different significations. The being-historical thinking is the tale of itself. But was philosophy –by all claims to transcend its discourses– ever something else than the tale of itself?

DISCUSSION

Jimena Clavel

You say that Heidegger's project failed when history became meta-history: a tale of itself, an, thus, an a-critical project. It accomplishes a definitive and radical division between the ontical and the ontological: the latter needs not to refer to something beyond itself. But, then, what makes philosophy as the thinking of Being different from poetry? As you claim, it is different in that it has its own narrative and one important aspect of this narrative is that it should be referential in a very particular way: it must have "an objectifiable signification". This is lost in Heidegger's notion of history, thus, becoming myth.

However, poetry and myth are narratives that are referential as well. Poetry might not be factual, but it is factual. Is not the case that Heidegger's notion of history remains factual? Is not still a tale of and within human experience? And if it is, should not we judge propositions such as "agriculture and the extermination of corpses are the same"

² Trawny (2015: 63).

as propositions within human experience? In that sense, Heidegger's project and account of history could not escape from a critical lens.

You also indicated that in historical thinking, thinking refers only to itself, in that there is no "objectifiable signification" anymore. Although I can see how this is the case for Being-historical thinking, I was wondering whether this was the case of its thematization or whether such a thematization becomes impossible. Is it possible to say anything about the history of Being at all? Or, in other words, does anything one says about the history of Being make sense if it has no objectifiable signification anymore?

Peter Trawny

In my "Propositions on Heidegger's 'Being-Historical Thinking'" I do not speak of "failure". However, the tale of the history of Being is a provocation for every rational discourse. What could be the argument for such a tale?

Poetry is, in my view, *per se* the text of a peculiar human being. Poetry speaks with a specific voice. Philosophy cannot claim this voice. But it may be that Heidegger's later thinking is not philosophy any more; at least he himself is emphasizing this. Nevertheless, this thinking refers to what is also the origin of philosophy.

Human experience is, if it is a specific one, not as such a content of philosophy. It is a philosophical problem in asking, how it is possible, what it means. A philosopher expressing his experience is a self-misunderstanding.

Carlotta Santini

Another way of asking Jimena Clavel's question would be to consider Nietzsche's *Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben*. As is well known, Nietzsche distinguishes there the concept of *Geschichte* from its scientific aspect. In Nietzsche's case, *Geschichte* has to do with men's action in time and space, mostly in the past, but present action and its perspective in the future are included too. *Historie*, on the other hand, is the conscious reflection on of the past and its knowledge, which can be defined, to some extent, as a danger, an obstacle to life. The tension that arises here between *Geschichte* and *Historie* are similar in Nietzsche and Heidegger. But there is a difference. In his essay, Nietzsche does not go beyond a critical analysis of the *Geschichte* and its differentiation from

Historie. In the *Genealogy of Moral*, by contrast, understanding history becomes an important factor for acting in real life: being aware of the past becomes important in order to act in the present and to construct the future. Do you think that the confrontation between Nietzsche's argument in the second *Untimely meditation* and the *Genealogy of Moral* can help us understand what is at stake in Heidegger's analysis of historical thinking?

Peter Trawny

The second "Untimely Consideration" is without a doubt a starting point for Heidegger's own reflection on the problem of history. *Genealogy* is in a way indeed an intention of the history of Being. But what would be real life for the later Heidegger?

I do not see a possible access to Heidegger's philosophical problem through Nietzsche, and I see no possible access to Nietzsche's philosophical problem by Heidegger.

Steven Crowell

I largely agree with the account Peter Trawny gives of the development and import of Heidegger's Being-historical thinking. It is an altogether different question of whether we should endorse Heidegger's ideas here. Let me comment on a few aspects of Trawny's account and raise a few questions. As usual, I tend to think with Heidegger, against Heidegger, in the sense that I approach his vast output with the question of what he says is phenomenologically attestable or not. I will not go into what that means, but it should be remembered that my reading is quite selective in that regard.

Trawny raises an important point early on: Heidegger's project of hermeneutics of factic life stumbled onto the methodological problem regarding life. As Trawny puts it, a discourse about this life is always an interruption of it. Philosophy, then, is both something that takes place in life, a *Vollzug* of life, and an interruption of that life. What sort of interruption? For Trawny's story, the important point is that philosophy is a thinking in history, and so the question of Being is historical.

Now, in *Sein und Zeit* thinking about history is grounded in *Dasein's* historicity, a concretization of its fundamental temporality. It seems to me that it is important that *Dasein* is not life. It is a term of art which expresses the condition for the possibility of meaning or intentionality.

Thus, in regard to the question of science, namely, the methodological thematization of a topic, Heidegger wavered: even in the earliest texts, philosophy was sometimes called the *Urwissenschaft*, and in *Basic Problems* Heidegger called his own efforts a “science of Being”. What this means is that the grounding of history in *Dasein*’s historicity is an attempt to express the interruption I mentioned above.

The first question I have for Professor Trawny is thus this: given that individual *Dasein*, as anticipation of death, can have a fate which I interpret to mean that in resoluteness it takes over the heritage in the sense of assuming responsibility for the norms that come down to it and acting either by following them or revising them; does it make sense to talk about the “destiny of a people”? This raises questions about collective intentionality: who says “We”? Can we import the structures of individual responsibility to the collective, or does the first-person plural have a different structure? Can a we decide?

Trawny ties this collectivity to the idea of an event such as the storming of the Bastille and emphasizes that the meaning of that event is always emerging retrospectively. But I would ask for more clarification about how this is an anticipation of death. But perhaps this is not important, since Trawny goes on to point out that the *Machtergreifung* in 1933 forced Heidegger to change his position: he now sees that history is not grounded in *Dasein*’s historicity but rather *Dasein* is an “epiphenomenon” of history, and it is just here that my main worries about Heidegger’s story emerge, since I think this view is in total error. In a sense, I am attracted by Habermas’s view that Heidegger’s history of Being is a way for Heidegger to indemnify himself from responsibility: it is not I who erred, but Being itself.

Perhaps we should recall that after *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger toyed with the idea of a metaphysics of *Dasein*, a metontology which situated *Dasein* within *das Seiende im Ganzen*. On this view, both history and nature were conceived as powers that held *Dasein* in their grip (GA 27). He later abandoned this metaphysics in favor of the history of Being. What happened to nature in this transformation?

Trawny expresses the primacy of history this way: truth is an event and Being reveals itself not in history but as history. This requires, as he says, that Heidegger faces the fact that the representation of history is always a narrative, and so we must figure out a way to tell that story, to gain access to Being as history. Here I lose my way: on one hand, the organizing center of this history is *Ereignis*, the event of appropriation.

This would be the center of the narrative, that which explains, so to speak, the development of the story. It would not be the narrator, but that which gets narrated; and, on the other hand, Trawny claims that no one tells the tale of the history of Being. It must tell the tale itself; it is its own narrator. I find this extremely confusing. My question is, then: what does it mean? I might imagine that it is connected somehow to Heidegger's later remarks on the saying of language, in which our discourses are only responses to this original saying. Is that what Heidegger has in mind here?

Finally, I wonder about the notion of thinking that emerges from this account. I do not quite follow the idea that thinking must abandon every objectifiable signification and become mere performance which opens up ever-new ways of moving about in such significations. What governs the direction in which thinking moves? Once, Heidegger referred to the *sanfte Gesetz* or tender law (Hölderlin) of the heart. I think that that is a nice idea to follow up, but I do not see its relation to Being-historical thinking. Trawny suggests that this latter is the tale of itself and suggests that philosophy has always been the tale of itself; I might be seeing the point; but in contrast I would say that, at least at certain moments, philosophy has thought of itself differently: as Plato remarked somewhere, philosophy is not telling a story. Rather, it is a way of calling such stories into question. It is this, I am afraid, that we lose if we follow Heidegger into the history of Being.

Peter Trawny

Firstly, let me make a methodological remark: my "Propositions on Heidegger's 'Being-Historical Thinking'" are not apologetic; they are an immanent-critical attempt to explain the extreme consequences of such way of thinking. I am, like Steven Crowell, not interested in a dogmatic reproduction.

Steven Crowell is right: "*Dasein*" is not synonym of "life". Of course, for Heidegger "life" is not "life". I think that you can show in an interpretation of the lecture course "*Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/20)*" structural problems of a hermeneutics of factual life, which are returning in Heidegger's later philosophy, namely, if you look, what Heidegger writes in this course about "objectification" ("*Verdinglichung*," p. 127, 187sq., 232).

I agree with Steven Crowell that the relation between the “self” and the “we”, especially in a political context, is still a philosophical problem, a problem for political philosophy.³ When Heidegger says that “the issue is then neither to describe nor to explain, neither to promulgate nor to teach. Here the speaking is not something over an against what is to be said but is the latter itself as the essential occurrence of being”.⁴ This stems from the beginning of the “Contributions to Philosophy”. Heidegger is erasing the “subject” as origin of language and, finally, of thinking too: what the philosopher says is not a work of the philosopher, but of being; the philosopher is its medium. It is unnecessary to say that I do not support this idea.

Steven Crowell is also right in not agreeing with the idea that philosophy is not dealing with objectifiable significations. I only said that Heidegger is struggling with this problem since 1919, and that he tried to avoid objectified significations. The whole discourse about being and keeping silent (*Schweigen, Erschweigen*) is circling around this problem. Of course, we lose if we follow Heidegger into the History of Being. To put it differently: there is no possible way to follow him into this tale. But I would say that we can win, if we see, what we lose.

Enno Rudolph⁵

1. La historia del ser terminó en un fracaso. Las teorías científicas pueden fallar, por ejemplo, cuando se logra demostrar que son falsas a través de un proceso exitoso de falsificación o falibilidad. ¿Cómo puede fallar un mito? Si fuera correcta la tesis de que el pensar de Heidegger sobre la historia se transforma en un mito, entonces no podría fallar la *Seinsgeschichte*, puesto que en tanto que mito no podría estar sujeta a ningún criterio de falsificación. Si por el contrario, la meta-historia de Heidegger aspira a sostener algún criterio de validez como explicación filosófica de la génesis de la historia, entonces no puede ser un mito; ni siquiera los mitos fundacionales ofrecen explicaciones, más bien son un sustituto de esas explicaciones. Aunado a esto se puede decir que

³ Butler (2015).

⁴ GA 65: “Hier wird nicht beschrieben und nicht erklärt, nicht verkündet und nicht gelehrt; hier ist das Sagen nicht im Gegenüber zu dem zu Sagenen, sondern ist dieses selbst als die Wesung des Seyns”.

⁵ Enno Rudolph’s questions, written in German, were translated into Spanish by Fernando Galindo.

los mitos son historias con imágenes. La *Seinsgeschichte*, al margen de como sea comprendida, no es por supuesto una historia contada a través de ilustraciones. La filosofía de la *Seinsgeschichte* no es por tanto ni un mito ni un relato: los relatos tratan de acciones. La *Seinsgeschichte* se reproduce a sí misma y determina la historia concreta, pero en ella no actúa nadie, a lo más condiciona la *Seinsgeschichte*, las acciones de los actores en la historia concreta.

Por el contrario, ha fracasado de facto el intento de otorgarle una determinación ontológica a aquella dimensión óptica de la historia a través de la tesis de la *Seinsgeschichte*, para lograr así hacer responsable al Ser mismo (*Sein selbst*) de la historia concreta. Aquí, sin embargo, debe distinguirse entre un fracaso filosófico y un fracaso político:

a. El fracaso filosófico es, en contraste con el político, inofensivo y, en última instancia, trivial: la contradicción entre, por una parte, la absoluta indiferencia del ser y su historia y, por otra parte, la pretensión de determinar la historia concreta, permanece sin resolverse: o bien es la *Seinsgeschichte* absolutamente independiente o bien ésta ejerce su efecto sobre la realidad histórica de una forma específica y propia (*kryptocausal*) que tendría que explicarse. El filósofo se niega a la racionalidad filosófica permaneciendo callado o, lo que equivale a lo mismo, diciendo señalamientos enigmáticos. Mientras no se encuentre una mejor explicación para ello en Heidegger, el cuento será tan banal como un cuento de fantasmas. *Nota bene*: Heidegger no puede recurrir precisamente a Parménides con la alusión a una verdad que se escapa al logos: la diosa ἀλήθεια le exige.

b. Es oportunista el uso que hace Heidegger del discurso del ser y respectivamente de la *Seinsgeschichte*: cuando en el contexto de la historia concreta Heidegger quiere desembarazarse de la responsabilidad por sus acciones, posicionamientos y decisiones, alude a la responsabilidad excluyente del Ser puro: "*Being itself is responsible*": la frase tiene más de una pizca de ironía. Pero no es atinente para una exculpación. Antes de permitirse llegar a tal punto que esté obligado a justificarse, se escapa Heidegger a la compulsión de "mirar a lo más profundo".

3. Si la frase "*he has no way of seeing the concrete consequences of national socialism*" fuera correcta, Heidegger se vería forzado a abolir cualquier interdependencia de la *Seinsgeschichte* con la historia concreta, lo cual

es contradictorio si se tienen en cuenta el significado determinista de la *Seinsgeschichte* para la historia. Esta política dudosa de trascender toda responsabilidad y la negativa a reconocer la participación personal debe enfrentarse en primera instancia políticamente.

Está documentado qué y cómo Heidegger se interesó claramente y de manera sostenida por el movimiento nacionalsocialista: los *Cuadernos Negros* están llenos de reclamos por fallas concretas del movimiento.

Que Heidegger se involucró y comprometió con una consistencia radical en pro del éxito de la tarea histórica del Nacionalsocialismo: Heidegger denunció, combatió enemigos declarados y supuestos del movimiento, y persiguió de manera consecuente a aquellos contemporáneos, entre ellos a sus colegas, en quienes veía un peligro para el Estado, la doctrina nazi y la ciencia: el documento de las *Evaluaciones sobre Richard Höningwald* (*Gutachten über Richard Höningwald*) sigue siendo tan impresionante como macabro para establecer este compromiso de Heidegger.

4. "Heidegger wasn't interested in good and evil". ¿En verdad no? En la *Carta sobre el humanismo* reclama para sí Heidegger una competencia fundamental o por principio de la analítica existencial para la ética original. La ética entendida como ciencia del correcto uso de la libertad es por ello mismo una disciplina, un saber, que otorga la distinción entre lo bueno y lo malo, entre el bien y el mal. Esta convicción de poseer un reclamo legítimo respecto a la competencia fundamental de la analítica existencial eleva a *Sein und Zeit* de manera implícita una ética ontológica. Hasta donde yo sé, no ha sido formulada aún la pregunta de si esta convicción de reclamo legítimo lleva a justificar moralmente acciones que, de acuerdo a los parámetros de otras éticas, tendrían que evaluarse como crímenes.

Denis Thouard

Let me add this to Enno Rudolph's last point: in your Propositions, you gave us a critical account of Heidegger's moral position. But I do not understand how it fits with your booklet *Irrnissfuge*, where you assume the right to err, so to speak. There are references in which Heidegger claims not to be interested in differences between good and evil. Do you think we tend to look for a guilty person because it gives us some peace? What is your position on this topic?

Peter Trawny

1. The problem with Enno Rudolph's remarks is that they refer to my oral intervention during the colloquium, whose transcript is lost; nonetheless, I will respond to them. A myth as such cannot fail. But myth and mythology were after the disenchantment of the world impossible and, thus, were impossible already in Heidegger's days. In his sense, the project to tell a myth as the truth of being failed before it began. Heidegger himself speaks of the "mytho-logy of the event of appropriation" (GA 73.2), but this is maybe not important. The history of being tells the tale of actions – of "being." For instance it begins and ends or begins for the second time, it chooses the Greeks and the Germans and predetermines the destiny of the Jews.

2. In his self-interpretation, the history of being has already left the difference between the ontic and the ontological. But it is true that there is no relation between the history of being and the concrete historical events, there shall not be one.

3. I do not know whether a ghost story is necessarily banal, but one could ask whether the history of being is a very German fairy tale. An other thing is Parmenides' *κρίνειν* concerning the alternative of being or non-being. This seems to be exactly Heidegger's *κρίνειν*.

The responsibility of the intellectual is a difficult topic. Where does it begin; where does it end? What does it mean to be responsible of one's thinking? Do thoughts murder? Heidegger has its own understanding as a response to being. To be more exact: Heidegger was not interested in responsibility as a personal moral one. This responsibility belongs to a transcendental approach, which he interpreted as an approach of the will to power and thus as a will of revenge.

4. The concrete engagement of Heidegger into National-Socialism stood in the shadow of his thinking. Compare for instance what he tried to explain as "knowledge" (*Wissen*) to replace "science" (*Wissenschaft*) after 1933. The project of the replacement of modern science (*neuzeitliche Wissenschaft*) was doomed right up from the origin of this idea. In this sense, his activities, his concrete deeds, were oriented from a thinking

without any chance to be successful in the real political sphere. In effect: Heidegger tried to make real politics, but the philosophical background of this politics (metapolitics) was not able to convince. This of course cannot legitimize reports like the one for Hoenigswald; but he believed in the philosophical framework of this report, namely, the struggle against universal Neo-Kantianism. All his concrete engagement into National-Socialism was based already in the tale of the history of being.

Finally, it should be said more correctly that Heidegger is not interested in a moral understanding of good and evil, but in good and evil as significations of being itself. The original ethics is actually not dealing with the question of good and evil, but with ethos as a way of dwelling (*wohnen*).

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SESSION 6

NEW ESSENTIALISM AND METHODOLOGICAL ENMITY. THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN CASSIRER AND HEIDEGGER IN AND AFTER DAVOS¹

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Preliminary Remarks

The legendary encounter between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer during the German-French university weeks in the Swiss town of Davos in 1929 was not only a turning point of epochal significance for German philosophy within the international context, but it was also a seizure of power: the participants evaluated the encounter as a fight, which would have ended with Heidegger's victory.

Until today it remains unclear how this verdict was reached. One can assume that the great majority of the participants decided it that way. On the basis of the scarce material and the distance we meanwhile have gained, we nevertheless are able to evaluate that event in a different manner: it was far away from a show down for one of both discussants: it was more over a clash between two cultural paradigms with a non-conclusive outcome, even with a slight advantage on the side of Cassirer. This result underscores the reading of these developments as a philosophical seizure of power: the future of philosophy from now on was Heidegger's. At the beginning of the discussion, he tried to dethrone Cassirer with a surprise attack asking what he thought about the famous and important stream of Neo-Kantianism Cassirer was often counted to. The explicit subjects of this chilly and rather laborious dialogue between

¹ Enno Rudolph was unable to attend the workshop, but the contribution he sent was read and discussed in his absence. The global written answer he gave to the interventions has been integrated in the discussion reproduced below.

these extremely different and distrustful to each other opponents are well-known and have been often discussed.²

As far as the small basis of sources allows, one might wonder about the fact that Heidegger's lack of response to Cassirer's arguments was neglected for decades; for example, Cassirer fixed Heidegger's position much closer to the paradigm of Neo-Kantianism with which he critically engaged than Cassirer's himself insofar as the emphasis on the basic condition of the finitude of human reason and human existence belonged to the essential characteristics of Neo-Kantianism. Cassirer's argument that Heidegger was in fact much more a candidate for a philosophy of finitude, whilst his own perspective was that of the infinitude linked to practical philosophy of open history which has become a paradigm since the enlightenment.³

Consequently, Cassirer was stressing the indispensable interdependence between theoretical philosophy of finitude and practical philosophy of infinitude that Heidegger silently passed over. Naturally, it was not noticed at the time that Cassirer took distance in a loyal, yet definite way from Neo-Kantianism.⁴ In a certain manner, Heidegger even confirmed implicitly Cassirer's objections: the philosophy of infinitude, referred to the sphere of historical agency which Cassirer designates as "culture", understood as an open process of practical reason and of productive imagination, offers, according to Heidegger's offending polemic, a legitimization of laziness, for it neglects the original task of philosophy, namely, the confrontation with the hardness of destiny (*Härte des Schicksals*): this denunciation of the philosophy of culture is made possible by Heidegger's general elimination of practical philosophy from the tasks pertaining to philosophy and makes the door wide open for an attitude of fatalism.

The programmatic motives of this opposition constituted the framework of the antagonist positions of both adversaries: on one corner, Heidegger, the philosopher of the fate of being and of the bond that determines our language to fulfill its function as home of being; on the other corner, Cassirer, the philosopher of freedom towards culture and of the development of language towards a historical medium of

² Friedman (2000); Kaegi and Rudolph (2002).

³ *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*; Cassirer (2003).

⁴ See Cassirer (1993: 201).

symbolic understanding, which transcends the epochs and the national orders.

However, behind this rivalry a deeper and much more virulent opposition remained hidden, whose acuteness and radicality cannot be overestimated. I will demonstrate this elementary contradiction in three steps:

1. Cassirer's critics of Heidegger's New Essentialism;
2. The ambiguity of Tradition; and,
3. Politics of Philosophy.

1. Heidegger's New Essentialism

Cassirer's standpoint was determined, as it were, by the framework of his first great systematic work: *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* (*Substance and Function*), from the year 1910. Systematically, building upon the philosophy of Leibniz, which he had lavishly reconstructed in his famous book *Leibniz' System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen*, from 1902, and to which he remained obliged more faithful throughout his life than to Kant, and orienting himself competently in the history of sciences, both past and contemporary. Cassirer laid the basis for overcoming substantialism both in philosophy and in science: neither the substantiality of the leading paradigm of all modern concepts of matter nor its mathematical equivalents can be plausibly grounded: extension is a predicate, not a substance. Consequently, one could conceive an infinite number of different extensional magnitudes, related to one another like points within a line, whose coordinates can be established by a functional equation and which behaved in interrelation to one another. Cassirer's concept of culture cannot be detached from this scientific-philosophical fundamental decision: culture is the sum of all the products of free human actions, insofar as the latter can be interpreted as signs of the increasing complexity of the entire human sphere of action. In effect, Cassirer is a "universalist" and, in this regard at least, an authentic Kantian. Neither culture nor freedom, of which the former is a function, can be understood as if they were first principles. All kinds of philosophical substantialism and ideological dedication to principle (*Prinzipialismus*) are strange to Cassirer. From his point of view, Heidegger's program of an *Analytik des Daseins* seems to be an anachronistic and restorative regression. Of course, Heidegger conceives

human existence as originally dynamic and engaged in a process, that is to say, temporal in the specific meaning of “temporality” (*Zeitlichkeit*). On the other hand, however, he explicitly and above all conceives existence in the concrete tension between thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) and death, as a “entirety”, and these characteristics are included in the first formula of the Heideggerian doctrine: “existence” the “essence” of the *Dasein* (“*Das ‘Wesen’ des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz*”).⁵ The formula indicates the definite transformation of existence into essence; a basic categorial decision which was underestimated in mainstream Heideggerian scholarship until today.

2. The Ambiguity of Tradition

Now that Cassirer’s *corpus* is almost entirely published and that the criteria of his approach and concerns with the philosophical and scientific tradition have become clearer, one can easily show that he was not a traditionalist, that is to say, that he did not act as a guardian of tradition understood as a normative fundament of our culture, but much more as a leading mediator between decisive formative opposites of our history; for instance, between the cultural profiles of epochs and their important sources such as the Renaissance and the Modern Age, or between eminent rivals such as Leibniz and Kant, or between opposite scientific paradigms such as classical physics and quantum physics. In Davos, however, Cassirer was considered a backward-looking encyclopaedist, and consequently as a conservative, whose philosophy seemed to be obsolete and even boring.

Heidegger gladly assumed the role of the revolutionary attributed to him, a revolutionary whose combative reductionism was connected to the gesture of an innovator and of a radical without commitments. Perhaps, this monomaniac radicalism is one of the reasons why the discussion between these disputants never explicitly picked up their own relationship with the tradition, although there was already a provocative background for this in the programmatic context of §6 of *Sein und Zeit*, which has to do with the question of the adequate methodological approaches to our tradition and, so to speak, the criteria for select between good tradition and bad tradition. The opposition between Cassirer and Heidegger regarding this issue is pretty clear and sharply

⁵ See *Sein und Zeit*, §9.

to mark, since both of them –not only Heidegger– had an appropriative attitude with respect to tradition, understanding tradition here as matter from the past in order to create the future. But whereas Cassirer approach to tradition was done as a pacifist, Heidegger's one was rather as polemist; Cassirer was acting as a conciliator, whereas Heidegger as a destructor. While Cassirer maintained a mediating attitude which is at all characteristic for his harmonizing historiography, Heidegger was the one who with the open view of a polemist implemented some methodic premises which he discussed in the context of the above mentioned paragraph of *Being and Time*: Heidegger does not conceive tradition as form or content for a normative heritage, but rather as a process of occultation (*Verbergung*). The history of philosophy resembles a collage of *occultations*, a collage to which neo-Kantian philosophy contributed decisively for its expansion through its tendency of making philosophy scientific. Against this tendency, the fundamental pre-scientific access of philosophy to its own questions has to affirm itself with resolution. In his dissecting exegeses of selected philosophies of the tradition and in the context of his methodological instructions, Heidegger implements polemically and uncompromisingly his demands addressed to his colleagues-philosophers. Tradition conceals, whereas destruction discovers; while tradition hides, destruction reveals; tradition binds, destruction releases. Retrospectively, from a more contemporary perspective, it is easy to understand why Heidegger caused fascination in and after Davos: he seemed to offer a philosophy of liberation, one that, in opposition to Cassirer, did not interpret the culture retrospectively as a process of the human self-liberation, but rather deployed philosophy as a force that liberated us from the oppressiveness of normative occultations, from the complexity of cumulative knowledge in the sciences and from the dictatorship of the one.⁶ This attractive message of liberation was modified by Heidegger in the following years, and this development changed the reception of Davos' statement more and more transforming it into a sort of program. No doubt that Heidegger's philosophy remained attractive during and after the Third Reich and the Holocaust. The following reasons might have been responsible for this:

⁶ See *Versuch über den Menschen* (1990: 345).

1. Like every revolutionary promise, this philosophy was seen as a release from the commitment to tradition, and it did so by shaping its specific outlook into the direction of a decisionist ontology. So, this philosophy definitively replaced the normative figure of legitimation by the incorruptible authenticity of decision; the decision of the *Dasein* for himself. This disposition is still today inherent in every form of primitive fascism. The analogy between Heidegger's genuinely existing *Dasein* and Carl Schmitt's sovereign is evident.

2. This philosophy promised a release from anxiety, not simply by removing it, but by making it nobler: the state of anxiety is both a filter and an indicator of the achieved authenticity of existence. A philosophy that points towards this direction replaces every form of ethics; in the *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger speaks of the implicit ethics underlying the transcendental analytic of *Dasein*, which should be the "original ethics".

3. This philosophy offered the chance of becoming a member of the elite of those who are on the right side in the renewed dualism of good and evil, in analogy to which Heidegger is constructing a dualism of authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) and inauthenticity (*Uneigentlichkeit*) of the derivative vulgar and the noble origins (*Ursprünglichkeit*) of *Mitsein* and *Dasein*.

4. This philosophy promoted resentments because it presented in itself a war cry, inviting thus people to partake in this battle; a gesture which was already present since the beginnings of Heidegger's career, and which became a *cantus firmus* in the *Black Notebooks*.

5. Heidegger's philosophy developed an original dialectic through linking the break with tradition to the appropriation of it under the name of destruction. Through this move, it solved the predicament between the continuity with that origin, which can never be eliminated, and the discontinuity of the authentic existence that only accounts to itself. This dialectic is reflected in the tensions between Parmenides, Heraclitus and Anaximander, and the plea for a new beginning.

6. This philosophy emancipates itself from the scientific pressure to succeed; "Science does not think" ("*Die Wissenschaft denkt nicht*") was one

of the phrases Heidegger used to say. The emancipation of Heidegger's philosophy had more implications: the truth of knowledge depends on a language that does not characterize itself through the exhaustive production of objectivity and inter-subjectivity; it is actually the other way around: just as we cannot escape from being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-sein*) in order to confront the world thanks to an alleged autonomy, we cannot escape either from language even if we make it the object of our investigations. As Heidegger writes in *On the Way to Language* (*Unterwegs zur Sprache*): "in order to be who we are, we human beings remain committed to and within the being of language, and can never step out of it and look at it from somewhere else. Thus we always see the nature of language only to the extent to which language itself has us in view, has appropriated us to itself. That we cannot know the nature of language [...] is not a defect, however, but rather an advantage by which we are favored with a special realm, that realm where we, we, who are needed and used to speak language, dwell as mortals" (*On the Way to Language*: 134).

3. Politics of Philosophy

In analogy to the well known category of the "politics of history" (*Geschichtspolitik*), the title 'Politics of philosophy' (*Politikphilosophie*) should be understood as the use of philosophy for ideological ends of political nature. Texts such as Heidegger's Rectorial encompass the so called *Letter on Humanism* and the texts collected in the *Black Notebooks* belong to this genre. In opposition to the Enlightenment, Heidegger presents himself as a philosopher of history, or rather, as an apologist of our dependence on history, a dependence shown in history itself. Against history, however, he presents himself as the champion of resolution (*Entschluss*), as the destroyer of tradition, as an agitator who pleads for diminishing the power of tradition. In virtue of its distinctive double-sidedness, this dialectic can be implemented in one way or another; for instance, it can be employed, like in the rectorial address, against the objectionable escapades of the unduly glorified 'academic freedom'. Whatever this attack entails, it targets both the autonomy of human knowledge as well as the autonomy of the free will, both of them unduly glorified since the Enlightenment, and it is a critique of the principle of the "value-neutrality of science" (Max Weber's "*Wertfreiheit der Wissenschaft*"), which had acquired the status of an ideal only a

few years before. An annihilative move is thereby carried out: not “destruction” in the sense of “appropriation” (*Aneignung*) as discussed in the first chapter, but rather “annihilation” (*Vernichtung*) in the sense of the *Black Notebooks*. Within this context, “annihilation” means something like disempowerment or making something ineffective or meaningless forever, whereas “destruction” is something to be used in a new context. On the other side, the implementation of this dialectic serves a restoration of the Original of which we are guilty to have forgotten.

This complementation is subject in Heidegger to different variations and modifications: it structures his whole work and moulds its attitude to other philosophies, both past and present. Perhaps, the diverse versions of this complementation could have outlived Heidegger –the Meta-National Socialist, the enemy of the Jews, the fanatical fundamentalist– for a couple of decades since the end of the Second World War without having carried over Heidegger’s biographical stigma. But now the ‘Black Notebooks’ might definitely have caught him up, and there is no place to play the game “Heidegger against Heidegger” as Jürgen Habermas recommended years ago. Cassirer would not be surprised about this development, either before Davos or after it.

Epilogue

No one excluding Heidegger’s philosophy will also survive this new scandal provoked by the publication of the *Black Notes*. If there is to discover any relevant philosophical content which some day might be discussed beyond being poisoned by the political implications of Heidegger’s work it could be the following series.

1. The methodical complementation between violence and the production of evidence: this complementation becomes, in fact, demonstratively effective in the multiple violent hermeneutic readings that Heidegger develops against diverse texts. He does this in order to appropriate or, even better, to absorb, often enough with the effect of presenting also fascinating evidence. This happens, for instance, in the case of his prominent interpretation of Heraclitus’ concept of φύσις, or in the metaphor of imagination as the root of both trunks of knowledge in Kant. This careless care (*rücksichtslose Rücksichtnahme*) regarding an intention that remains unknown to the author himself has been radicalized in Derrida’s deconstructionism. At the same time, it offers

a plausible application of the principle according to which one should “interpret the author better than himself” as was formulated by Kant and Schleiermacher.

2. The semantic complementation between form and content of language: language speaks and always says something; the house of being is never uninhabited, being is never homeless. Through speaking, language expresses being and also expresses itself. Necessarily, the a priori of language comes into existence through the actualization of the Parmenidean identity between εἶναι and νοεῖν. Therein lays Heidegger’s contribution to the linguistic turn.

3. The disciplinary complementation between ontological reductionism and reductionist ontology: the so called “fundamental ontology” is the ultimate foundation of all philosophy. It is an ontology that presents itself as its own fundament. In this sense, one can find in Heidegger a new answer to the ancient problem of the ultimate grounding.

4. The ideological complementation between tradition and authenticity: the above mentioned § 6 from *Being and Time* demonstrates that authenticity can only be achieved against tradition, but never without it.

Already in Davos, Cassirer should have been able to notice this ambiguity in the relationship to what is called “tradition”, and he could have plausibly demonstrating how a philosophy of cultural symbols provocatively competes with Heidegger’s philosophy in the following aspects corresponding to the above mentioned four points:

- a. Methodically through the identification of history and culture;
- b. Semantically, on one hand, through the individuation of language as a symbolical form among others; and, on the other hand, through its integrating function of all symbolical forms: for the latter are all cases of verbalizing the world, and for this reason, they also validates Wittgenstein’s premise according to which “the world is everything that is the case”;

c. Disciplinarily through the inclusive claim of the “critique of culture”, insofar as it understands itself explicitly as a comprehensive philosophy in the wake of the critique of reason; and,

d. Ideologically through privileging humanism as the substratum of the only tradition that confers authenticity to the animal symbolicum.

Except for the contemptuous review of the volume on myth of the *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (1932), Heidegger avoided the challenge of this contest thanks to the fatal protection he had already received in 1929 from the majority of the academic elites. Later on, he will allow the Nazis to help him to leave this contest aside without thanking them, however, for his own lasting influence.

DISCUSSION

André Laks

It is, of course, difficult to discuss as we should in Enno Rudolph’s absence. Nevertheless, I would like that we share our impressions and reactions, so that we can submit them to him and he can react. This is very important because he insists in the epochal significance of the Davos debate between Heidegger and Cassirer and because he stands on the side of those who think, contrary to our first two exponents, that even the so-called first Heidegger is engaged in a problematical philosophical enterprise.

Denis Thouard

Personally, I would like to discuss the part of the text in which Enno Rudolph explains the new essentialism that Cassirer criticizes in Heidegger’s thought. I found it very interesting the way in which Enno Rudolph recalls the alternative substance or function as something that opposes both authors, since Heidegger refuses both terms. This opposition and the evolution from substance to function is also found in the philosophy of Georg Simmel in his analysis of calculability and other aspects of modernity, and it is one of Heidegger’s targets. Even if he rejects this modern functionalism, it remains provocative to identify Heidegger with a new kind of essentialism. I have always heard and it

was usually repeated as I work on the concept of subjectivity that the subject was something substantial since it comes from substance, which is the analysis that Heidegger presents. I have also heard that with the conception of *Dasein* we could escape from this old-fashioned conception of subjectivity in order to provoke a pure movement that could be called "ipseity" or "selfhood". On the contrary, all representatives of transcendental philosophy, Cassirer included, were suspected to act and think on the basis of this already outdated conception of subjectivity. Enno Rudolph's succeeds to prove the contrary, namely, that the *Dasein* without substance leads toward a new kind of essentialism which integrates *Dasein* into a greater whole. By the same token, Cassirer's conception of subjectivity is ordered to a conception of functionality. In addition, there are many ways to consider a relation to myth, politics and science, a fact that Cassirer tried to take into account pleading for a kind of polyglotism of the symbolical functions and betting on plurality and not on the attempt to turn back to a pure and authentic origin.⁷

I think that the demonstration in this first part of Enno Rudolph's talk is very convincing, and for me it would be a good start for our discussion.

Steven Crowell

Returning to Denis Thouard's impression, I must say that I also was struck by this early section of the text, which I do not quite understand. First, I would like to address some of the points Denis Thouard raised but from the other way around. In general, the text that we have just heard seems to follow a new pattern of reading the Davos disputation, originally pioneered by Peter Gordon in his *Continental divide*. This book was quite illuminating in terms of digging out the context and texts that were not familiar to earlier commentators on this debate. What seemed clear to me in Gordon's presentation of this material, and in my opinion is confirmed in Enno Rudolph's interpretation, is the complete lack on the part of these interpreters of any understanding of, or concern for, the phenomenological context of Heidegger's thinking, the phenomenological character of that thinking through *Being and Time* and, I would argue, through 1929. The absence of any consideration of phenomenology makes discussion of essentialism and everything that

⁷ See Cassirer (1993: 303).

goes with it, namely, the discussions on authenticity, the categories and decision, ambiguous and equivocal. I cannot go through all of these matters, but maybe later on we could discuss them.

We have talked about how to understand the categories of *Being and Time*, for which we used Heidegger's own term "formal" and there is no doubt that there is a kind of essentialism in Heidegger. There is a structure of *Dasein*, an essential structure for entities of this sort, and there is also a transcendental philosophy that goes along with this. Both notions, however, must be understood phenomenologically. So, the question is whether this kind of essentialism locks us into a certain interpretation of terms like "fundamental", which in this text and in other contemporaneous ones seem, to some people, to have proto-fascist connotations. The latter is a very delicate matter. What does it mean to attribute essential structures to *Dasein*? It does not mean that *Dasein* is locked into some eternal radicalism, being incapable of fulfilling the roles that would belong to a philosophy of culture. This supposed opposition is itself politically motivated on the basis of subsequent events, but it is also fueled by what, admittedly, was Heidegger's insulting attitude at Davos itself. He may have had his reasons, but that cannot be allowed to serve as a blanket condemnation of the work from beginning to end. The discussion at Davos was, of course, a controversial performance. But interpreting works from the beginning to the end of Heidegger's thinking on the basis of the perception of how he occupied the role of a radical in the dispute with Cassirer, seems to me hermeneutically suspicious.

Finally, if the idea is that Cassirer was the road not taken, and that philosophy as such was poisoned by Heidegger's victory at Davos – which seems to be both Rudolph's and Gordon's position –, then one has to say that with or without Heidegger a position like Cassirer's would have had a hard time against the onslaught of contemporary analytic philosophy. For all its reasonableness, that position has the wrong form to gain much traction in contemporary discussions of subjectivity or selfhood. It would be yet another avenue that one might take, but it is not as if the philosophical landscape was destroyed by the fact that Cassirer did not stand up for himself a little bit more vigorously in this encounter. In my opinion, this is not plausible: Cassirer is a very interesting thinker, but Heidegger is perhaps deeper despite his flaws. Who can say what is ultimately good for philosophy?

Concerning the praise given to substance-and-function description or approach to subjectivity, I can only say that a phenomenological critic of this proposal would point out that this is just a basic form of cybernetic reduction of subjectivity to a function in one system or another, something that Heidegger did to a certain extent. That is what I would like to have a discussion about. What does it mean to say that all concepts of “being” are now turned into functional concepts? The latter is to me what goes on in a lot of cognitive science and computer modelling discussions. Such approaches can be useful, perhaps, and they certainly seem to have the air of scientificity upon them, but to me they leave many important philosophical questions about what we call “subjectivity” very open. I would like to say that to engage in this kind of discussion about Heidegger without recognizing the phenomenological background of his thinking during the period in question is an irresponsible move.

Denis Thouard

We should maybe add concerning the points that Steven Crowell just raised that at this stage of Cassirer’s thought he proposed the symbolic forms as an attempt to provide a more complex design of this group of functions, so that his aim was not to develop an abstract functionalism, but to attempt to think them together. Cassirer admitted, on one hand, substantialist ways to find the self through art or language, as well as he considered, on the other hand, the discoveries of contemporary sciences. So, in my opinion, it is not a matter of choosing the one and excluding the other, that is to say, it is not a matter of deciding either in favor of a substantialist subject or in favor of the dissolution of subjectivity into functions. I think Cassirer tries to bring a multi-synthesis of the diverse ways in which the subject can be related to different objects. I see very substantialist ways to find the self through art or language, and I also think that it is important to consider the discoveries of the contemporary sciences. So, in my opinion, it is not a matter of choosing one and excluding the other, that is to say, it is not a matter of deciding either in favor of a substantialist subject or in favor of the dissolution of subjectivity into functions. I think Cassirer tries to bring multi-synthesis of the diverse ways in which the subject can be related to different objects.

André Laks

What Denis Thouard said may alleviate the debate to some extent. On one hand, Heidegger's way of writing and using words is ambiguous and can lead onto various paths. This raises an interesting and, I would say, a fundamental hermeneutical problem. Steven Crowell is of course right when he says that "*Entschluss*" is not by itself a fascist word; and surely if one takes this word and other ones as referring to formal or transcendental features, all doors remain open, one can choose to be fascist, democrat or marxist, these are all ontic decisions. Nevertheless, in the cultural settings in which Heidegger was speaking, the terms "*Entschlossenheit*" and "*Entschluss*" are loaded, and that cannot be set aside, as if phenomenology could be immune to it. So, the question amounts to whether we recognize or not an ambiguity, and what we can make of it. Saying that Heidegger is victim of misunderstanding or retrospective reading does not seem to me to be quite enough. This is not to say that Steven Crowell or for that matter Alejandro Vigo are wrong to say that we must interpret formally these words and concepts, because of the methodological and philosophical project of Heidegger; this boils down to the very respectable recommendation to read Heidegger on his own terms. Nonetheless, in my opinion, the other side, in this case Enno Rudolph, is correct too. How to get responsibly out of this difficulty is an important question beyond Heidegger, because it has to do with the general question of how to read.

Steven Crowell

The formal approach that I am recommending does not imply that I cannot see the ambiguity of Heidegger's language. Actually, I would insist on it. I agree with Rudolph, Gordon and others, who point out that Heidegger himself, having made his choice for Hitler, so to speak, was in some way using his language to support a certain political stance. The ambiguity of notions of terms like "destruction of the tradition" is deliberate. Husserl, who was engaged in much the same project, did not use that language, and one can wonder why not. Pierre Bourdieu and others have done a good job explaining why Heidegger might have used that kind of language. I do not condone it; I am not interested in this hyperventilating crisis talk. If one thinks that there is something

methodologically and philosophically honest about what Heidegger is doing, then one is obliged to understand these terms in light of that philosophical project. Afterwards, one must ask whether, and if so, where, Heidegger himself may have done an injustice to his philosophical position or used it for *philosophish-politische* purposes. In my opinion, this is a matter of judgment, namely, philosophical φρόνησις, which has to be guided by something. What normally guides discussions on Heidegger, or at least seems to guide interpretations like Gordon's and Rudolph's, is hostility toward the entire post-Heideggerian state of philosophy. However, I would prefer to judge these things by what I take to be phenomenological evidence. I know that this is a complex matter, and I am certainly open to discussion about what it means or whether it is even possible. But too many discussions of Heidegger, especially now, seem to be intent on either unthinking acceptance or vicious rejection.

What I am objecting to in both Gordon's and Rudolph's text is that there is not the least recognition that Heidegger is employing a well thought out philosophical method; this is typical of contemporary philosophy, which overlooks and ignores the phenomenological tradition.

One further point that I found astonishing was the cavalier way in which the relationship between Heidegger and the tradition was presented as one of a radical overthrow of the normative claims of tradition. As we have seen in our own discussions here, this is an extremely reductive way of reading Heidegger's complicated attitudes towards what we inherit. What would be a proper attitude? Are we supposed to say that tradition is ultimately and absolutely normative whatever that tradition might be? Heidegger's fundamental question is what it is to be a norm-responsive being, and *Being and Time* presents us with a very nuanced analysis of how we are bound, in a distinctive and complicated way, by tradition. These are fundamental questions, and the discussion runs in circles if we reduce this to the idea that Heidegger throws out the tradition in favor of some blind authenticity. This sort of decisionism charge has been around a long time, but that does not make it any more convincing. If anything, Heidegger's discussion of the heritage and of destiny in *Being and Time* section 74 does not leave enough room for critical decision. But I cannot pursue that here. Rudolph's reading of the idea of the destruction of the tradition completely dismisses Heidegger's complex phenomenology of the human condition that underlies this

notion. Even if we are Gadamerians, and hold that one cannot fully abandon the norms of a tradition, nevertheless, being in a tradition and responding to what appears as a claim is a fraught and complicated matter that needs to be described, rather than simply being dismissed polemically when someone like Heidegger tries to characterize being in a tradition in a more nuanced way. I certainly think that Heidegger took care to think about the tradition, maybe in a radical way, but although he involves himself in violent interpretations, I think very few would say that he makes completely irresponsible interpretations.

Peter Trawny

I have three remarks in relation to Rudolph's text and to what Crowell and Laks just argued. First of all, I still think that Rudolph's text is actually too soft; I assume that the text was written before the publication of the *Black Notebooks*, since the problem of anti-semitism has always been at stake in interpreting the encounter between Cassirer and Heidegger, for he shows in some of his commentaries, even though it is veiled, his anti-Semite position. Therefore, I think the critique that Enno Rudolph makes of Heidegger could have been harsher. Cassirer, in this situation, lost the discussion, but now that we know what befell afterwards, we would support the idea that the world should have read more of Cassirer's philosophy than Heidegger's. But what Enno Rudolph says in his intervention about *Being and Time* is not the correct way of reading Heidegger's text, since it links the book directly to National-Socialism. I would say that one can clearly see in the discussion between Cassirer and Heidegger the clash of these two philosophical projects in a methodological sense, but that one cannot show the problems evolving from each view. For example, the problem of universalism and infinity—Heidegger claims sharply that there is no infinity. In my opinion, it would be a very interesting philosophical problem to analyze in this discourse itself, even though it is oblique.

My second point would be that there is another aspect that interests me from Heidegger's and Cassirer's confrontation, namely, the part in which Enno Rudolph says: "this contemptuous review of the volume on myth". This review is quite astonishing, since Heidegger will come back to the problem of myth a few years later (around 1935). One could really show that this reading of Cassirer's book is very important, for though

one can observe that Heidegger is worried about this topic, he asked himself what mythical thinking actually is.

Regarding the last point I think we already discussed it when we argued about the problem of universalism, which is also mentioned in Rudolph's text, for it is at stake in Davos discourse.

André Laks

In an interesting note to chapter 3 of the third volume of *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, which bears as its subtitle "The phenomenology of knowledge", Cassirer writes: "what distinguishes our own undertaking from that of Heidegger is above all that it does not stop at this stage of the at-hand and its mode of spatiality, but without challenging Heidegger's position goes beyond it; for we wish to follow the road leading from spatiality as a factor in the at-hand to space as the form of existence, and furthermore to show how this road leads right through the domain of symbolic formation –in the twofold sense of 'representation' and 'signification'" (*The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, 149, n. 4). And in a parallel note to the next chapter on Time, he adds the following: "in regard to time as to space, this μετάβασις [metabasis, passage] from the meaning of Being for *Dasein* to the objective meaning of Logos constitutes the proper theme and problem [of Cassirer's inquiry]. Heidegger remains at the fundamentals, there is no confrontation with what follows and really matters, it amounts to an ascent or anabasis without further progression or metabasis". Is not this an illuminating way of dealing with the question about what one can do with Heidegger?

Steven Crowell

I agree with the point that André Laks has just made about what we should do with Heidegger, which is after all the main aim of this workshop. One possible answer is that we cannot do much with it; and this, according to Laks, was Cassirer's conclusion. *Being and Time* may well just represent an anabasis, but it may also invite us to analyze some aspects presented in that book as a way of moving forward. For instance, I have recently been considering the question of whether the basis for ethics and metaphysics is presented in *Being and Time*, and this seems to lead in the direction of regional ontologies, metontology and philosophical anthropology. This may seem unsatisfactory for various reasons; but if one takes my point that Heidegger's text is

phenomenological, then the problem is not just Heidegger's: it is for anyone who adopts a phenomenological approach. Perhaps, such person can provide a better phenomenological basis for ethics than Heidegger does, or show how one could indeed move from the ontology of *Being and Time* to an ethics in a way other than the one Heidegger himself pursued.

I take André Laks' point to be that it seems that there is nothing to do with that text. In my view, that is a consequence of the text's one-track focus on replacing the ontology of the rational animal with an ontology of care. But if one sees this under the light of the phenomenological project, which is not owned by Husserl, Scheler or anyone else, then there are places in *Being and Time* where it is obvious that the questions that concern Cassirer would find a place. For instance, if one is interested in culture, one can pursue a regional ontology of culture. How one does that is not specified in Heidegger's text, but that is irrelevant. Perhaps, something like Cassirer's own view provides clues to this, despite the differences in ontological grounding between him and Heidegger. Thus ultimately it is not really a matter of what Heidegger's own text appears to let us do or not do. Rather, it is a matter of how philosophically clever we are at carrying out these things; perhaps revising Heidegger in the process. Heidegger was obviously a good reader of philosophical texts, and maybe Cassirer was a better interpreter of the scientific developments of his time, and he tried to get to the bottom of the conceptual and categorial frameworks that are operative in this work. If one affirms that we should start with regional ontologies, work in close association with sciences, and hope to someday to develop a concept of subjectivity on that basis, this might be a sensible way to respond critically to the Heideggerian view that we first have to start from the fundamentals and understand what are the conditions for the possibility of somebody being able to even have culture or confront something called nature by science.

I accept that Heidegger's text is not inviting us to do much with it. Nevertheless, I think that every reading of Heidegger should be, in some sense, a revisionary reading, that is to say, that the path must be discerned by each investigator's own way of taking it up.

The major issue at stake at Davos was the relation between freedom and reason; and I agree with Enno Rudolph that Heidegger never tried to address, in his own terms, Cassirer's fundamental point, namely, the connection between practical philosophy and reason. I too regret

very much that Heidegger just refused to discuss this; he refused Cassirer's invitation to say something constructive about it. Despite this strategic and irritating aspect of Heidegger's performance, it is not, in my opinion, impossible to say something about this matter. It does take some work, however. Actually, Heidegger has already said a great deal about the connection between practice, care, freedom and reason, in works from 1928 and 1929, and I think he could have answered Cassirer in very compelling ways on the basis of those writings. The fact that he did not do so means that those who care about this project should try to connect the dots. How does reason fit into the structure of care? This is very important, since most of the discussion in the history of Heidegger interpretation has simply taken reason as something derivative, something almost irrelevant. I think this is not an implication of the phenomenology he presents us with, even if it might have been an implication of what Heidegger himself thought. At this point, I am thinking, as Habermas would say, "with Heidegger against Heidegger", and I would like to devote more of the discussion to such philosophical matters rather than on polemics about the obvious failings of Heidegger.

The texts that I just mentioned in which Heidegger links freedom, reason, and the care-structure, are discussed in my book *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger*, as belonging to an analysis of the concept *Gründsein-übernehmen* (taking over being a ground), which plays a key role in Division II. Most interpretations treat the passages in which this notion figures as entailing decisionism: taking a stand in the absence of all normative grounding, a mere leap in the dark. My argument is that if one reads these passages with a proper appreciation of their grounding in the analyses of the unitary phenomenon *Angst-Tod-Gewissen*, they entail the following: while reason cannot ground authentic *Dasein's* choice in the way advocated by Kant and Cassirer, authentic *Dasein* stands nevertheless under a (moral) obligation to engage in the game of giving and asking for reasons. I argue that Heidegger's rejection of an ontology of the rational animal in favor of an ontology of care is not a rejection of reason, but an answer to the question of the origin of reason. What makes reason possible? I can imagine many philosophers worrying that if one thinks that reason itself has a (necessarily non-rational) "ground," this will lead to relativism. That is a reasonable thing to worry about, but such fears are not dispositive on their own: the proof of the pudding is in the eating. We have to see how such grounding works; we need to discuss it. I can imagine that

many Heideggerians will deny that the passages I focus on have this implication, because concerns about reason seem foreign to Heidegger; but this does not bother me at all. In my view, it is not at all odd that Heidegger's phenomenology uncovers a set of conditions that were not explored by him further, for whatever reason. As phenomenological, his text does not, in fact, leave us with nothing else to do.

Peter Trawny

My guess is that there are two dimensions of this encounter; one dimension is purely philosophical. One has to admit that *Being and Time* is one of the most crucial texts of the 20th century, and to read it carefully is still our task. On the other hand, one can find another aspect, which Enno Rudolph spoke about, namely, the politics of philosophy, that is the second dimension of the encounter. All the things Cassirer symbolized were all the aspects that Heidegger rejected; the word "culture" is already something that repulsed his reason; another word is "science", for Cassirer was a representative of science, he was a "walking library", which Heidegger thought had nothing to do with philosophy; Cassirer represented for him something totally different from philosophy. There is a difference in this sense between science and philosophy, and I would argue for it. These both dimensions are here: the politics of philosophy and the books themselves, and we have to consider them.

Alejandro Vigo

Peter Trawny mentioned again the term "anabasis", and I would like to make a brief remark on the problem which is involved at a methodic level. There is this beautiful place in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* where he states that philosophy is about principles, but that there are two ways to deal with principles: either we start from the principles or we go to the principles (*EN*, 1095a30ff). And then Aristotle affirms that we must select the second path. I think in this aspect Heidegger — and Kant — are Aristotelian thinkers. One has to go from the facts that he is trying to explain to the principles which explain them, but it is impossible to derive the facts from the principles. *Being and Time* and the writings from the time present a very special kind of transcendental philosophy, in particular on the methodic level. Such transcendental philosophy deals with formal principles and explains facts by referring

them to their formal conditions of possibility. From here derives the question of what can one undertake when starting from such principles. I think the answer is: at the practical level, not a big deal. General and formal principles allow for the possibility of being right or wrong, when coping with particular situations at the level of praxis, and they even explain such possibility. But the gap between general conditions and particular cases cannot be filled by means of philosophical reflection dealing with formal principles. Consequently, at the level of praxis, one has to make a decision in each concrete situation, even if one can count on general principles which are relevant for the situation. Of course, marking this gap puts forward a problem, but at the same time it can be seen as a sign of philosophical modesty and lucidity about the real possibilities of philosophy. Aristotle also talks about this problem in his discussion of φρόνησις in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He develops there a very compelling theory of φρόνησις. Nevertheless, he is always aware of the fact that the theory itself does not contain φρόνησις. For sure, with his brilliant phenomenological description of φρόνησις Aristotle is inviting us to use φρόνησις, but at the same time, at the theoretical level, he is marking also the empty places that cannot be filled just by means of philosophical reflection concerning general principles or typical descriptions of actions and situations.

Peter Trawny

In this sense, I would wonder if Heidegger would say that there are no formal principles as formal principles; there are no theoretical principles without any practical meaning.

Alejandro Vigo

In any case, from the methodological point of view, the very important fact, I think, is that one cannot get from the principles alone particular facts or particular decisions. A model where one tries to derive in a deductive way facts from general or formal principles, which are not facts, would be a bad case of *Ableitungsmetaphysik*.

On the other hand, I agree in some aspects with Enno Rudolph's position. The fact that Heidegger is denying the possibility of practical philosophy is very important. Heidegger says in many places that theory is also praxis, but the difference between Aristotle and Heidegger, and this was pointed out correctly by Otto Pöggeler, is that for Aristotle

even though there are empty places or a gap between theory and praxis, principles and facts, at methodological level, we have tools to make the transition from one and another in a smoother way, not as violent as in the case of Heidegger. The tool that Aristotle chose for that transition is the phenomenology of virtues, using typological descriptions of actions, situations and emotions, connected with them. At the level of theory, typological descriptions of virtues do not represent the concrete situations that one can encounter in praxis, but they do provide the agent with a kind of guideline he can use in coping with particular situations. Of course, such a guideline is not a replacement for individual φρόνησις, but only a support for it.

Peter Trawny

Nonetheless, the last point you made is already a dianoetical virtue, so it is not only a practical virtue.

Alejandro Vigo

In effect: φρόνησις is not an ethical virtue, but both a dianoetical and a practical virtue. In addition, the theory of φρόνησις is different from φρόνησις itself. Still, my point is that in the theory of ethical virtues in the *Nicomachean Ethics* one cannot find this term, since it is explained separately. One finds the theory of virtues of character and then the theory of φρόνησις, and both theories work together. However, this theory of virtues is completely absent in Heidegger, even if the model of Aristotelian practical philosophy is so important for *Being and Time*.

Enno Rudolph

I am sorry that I could not attend the meeting, but I hope that the following *meta-comments* to some selected votes that the participants to the event gave to my paper will help to clarify a couple of misunderstandings.

1. Ad Steven Crowell

First, it would have been very helpful for me –and may be also for the other participants– to find in Steven Crowell’s comments an argument to the effect that the phenomenological context is as important for an adequate understanding of the Davos debate as he claims. From my point of view, one must distinguish between the fact

that Heidegger comes from phenomenology and the demonstration that his phenomenological background is an indispensable condition for understanding the arguments he directed against Cassirer. In the same year, when the Davos debate happened, Cassirer published the third volume of his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* under the title *Phenomenology of Knowledge*. Thus, Cassirer presented himself as a phenomenologist. We know from the notes added to this volume that Cassirer had studied Heidegger's *Being and Time*, so that he was familiar with his phenomenological background. In case one of the parties had been interested in this subject, he would have mentioned it. On the other hand, there is the famous text in *Being and Time* § 7c where Heidegger describes explicitly and pretty clearly his own position towards phenomenology: "*Sachhaltig genommen ist die Phänomenologie die Wissenschaft vom Sein des Seienden - Ontologie. In der gegebenen Erläuterung der Aufgaben der Ontologie entsprang die Notwendigkeit einer Fundamentalontologie, die das ontologisch ausgezeichnete Seiende zum Thema hat, das Dasein, so zwar, dass sie sich vor das Kardinalproblem, die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein überhaupt, bringt*". It seems obvious to me that the project of a *Fundamentalontologie* is by no means an overrated phenomenology. On the contrary, phenomenology is reduced to the project of *Fundamentalontologie*. Let me call this "*deconstruction avant la lettre*". That is my starting point, which might be subject to some objections, but I cannot see why it should be irresponsible not to mention the phenomenological roots of Heidegger as a participant in the Davos debate.

Let me add that I did not know Peter Gordon's book when I wrote my paper. In the meantime, I have read it and I must confess that I am unable to find those convergences between his position and mine that Steven Crowell mentions: my relationship and Gordon's one with Heidegger cannot be correctly characterized by hostility; neither does Gordon nor do I argue that there is a red thread leading from *Fundamentalontologie* to proto-fascism; neither does Gordon nor do I conclude our discussion about Heidegger's texts with a blanket condemnation of Heidegger's work from beginning to end. In fact, I list at the end of my paper some examples of topics, problems and ideas, coming from Heidegger which perhaps should remain and survive the loss of respect for Heidegger which has dramatically increased in the last two years; neither is Gordon nor am I writing that "philosophy as such was poisoned by Heidegger's victory at Davos".

As far as hostility is concerned, I am impressed by the hostility that Heidegger himself implements into his own philosophy in the *Black Notebooks*: hostility against modernity, against *Machenschaft*, against the Jews, against the Nazi-party and against culture. I confess that I see the same hostility against culture running through the protocol of Davos long before the publication of the *Black Notebooks*.

As to fundamentalism: it is not the concept of *Fundamentalontologie*, it is the exclusivity and the claim to offer an ultimate foundation for the whole of philosophy of *Dasein* and of existence what raises the question why a philosopher of Heidegger's dimension could act as a warrant for the idea of the historical mission of the Nazis.

There is no condemnation of the whole work of Heidegger from my side; there is rather an attempt to conceive and to explain Heidegger's original motivations for his political engagement by the most important witness we have in this respect, namely his work.

Finally, I am happy that Heidegger did not succeed in poisoning philosophy as such, so that we are able to compare him with others and deal with other philosophical alternatives.

2. *Ad Peter Trawny*

I am not sure what Peter Trawny really means when he criticizes my text as being "too soft", but I guess he tries to provoke me by encouraging me to simply conclude that now, after the *Black Notebooks* have been published and since we know from Heidegger himself that he was an anti-Semite from the very beginning of his intellectual life, I should dare to identify a latent anti-Semitism in his argumentation in Davos. But I do not belong to those who practice this kind of hermeneutical approach. Of course, I have written my essay after reading (and having published my critics of) the *Black Notebooks*.⁸ But I prefer to explore what is explicitly written instead of being aggressive and imputing something to an author that is found, whereas in a given text or in its subtext. Of course, I agree with Peter Trawny's thesis that Davos also demonstrates the clash of two philosophical methodologies: the method of implementing the *Dasein* into the *Seinsgeschichte* and the method of reconstructing the history of problems (*Problemgeschichte*) as morphology of culture.

⁸ See Rudolph (2015: 141-174).

3. *New essentialism*

Denis Thouard had already given in his first comments a wonderful interpretation of my statement about Heidegger's new essentialism by mentioning what Cassirer as the author of *Substance and Function* should have had in mind when examining Heidegger's *Time and being*. I hope that I have clarified this point sufficiently in the last version of my essay. Therefore, I can restrict myself here to add only one quote: "Das 'Wesen' des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz" (*Being and Time*, § 9). This sentence may comfort the suspicion that Heidegger was presenting old wine in new skins.

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SESSION 7

THE DARK POETRY OF THE 'BLACK NOTEBOOKS'. ON THE USE OF POETRY BY HEIDEGGER DURING THE 30s AND AFTER

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I chose the topic of poetry in Heidegger, since I have the impression that it is one of the things that lasts and remains as part of Heidegger's legacy. The manner in which Heidegger engages poetry seems to me to take its essential determination at the beginning of the 1930s, a period that is documented in the *Black Notebooks*. I will read a short English version of my text, and afterwards we can discuss the topic.

The *Black Notebooks* illuminate the considerable focus of Heidegger on poetry (*Dichtung*) in the 1930s and afterwards. Poetry stopped being a pre-ontological document to become a relationship to being itself (*Dichtung des Seins*), and constructed a new beginning. More than reviving scandal the publication of the *Black Notebooks* is an opportunity to understand better Heidegger's philosophical and political project as a whole. Critics have often risen opposite interpretations of his Nazi commitment, claiming either that his political adventure had nothing to do with his philosophical thought or that his thought was only a speculative translation of the Nazi program. Both interpretations are wrong, for Heidegger was primarily a philosopher and not an ideologist. Nevertheless, as a philosopher he thought that he would find in Nazism a key support to overcome the metaphysical tradition that he criticized and aimed to fully destroy. "Metaphysics as Metapolitics" (GA 94, 116) was his creed and is clearly exposed in the *Black Notebooks*. These notebooks require us to consider in new lights his attempt toward a turn or *Kehre*. His aim was not to cautiously hide his political dark purposed, even if sometimes it was the case, rather he was in search for a new language for philosophy, trying to escape the fatal terminology inherited from the Western thought that eventually lead to the nihilism of

his time. His own and sometimes strange style, and his poetical attempts belong to this strategy. His interest in Hölderlin's poetry does as well: he hoped to find in it a way to escape tradition and enter a new German era. The critical role Heidegger gave to poetry lasted even after the Third Reich was defeated, when he shuttled the political conditions for the fulfillment of his view. He then succeeded in redirecting his speculative turn from subject to being, toward a more or less mystical discourse. It was still the quest to escape nihilism, but under new conditions. The nihilism was now everywhere, and so his attempts to overcome were more passive: the wait for the return of the forgotten God and poetry had a key role to play. Heidegger's take on poetry gives us a more broadly insight into the philosophical discussion on art and poetry that took place after the war. Heidegger's *Wozu Dichter* became the lighthouse for generations who searched in poetry for the renewal of philosophy a long and complex story that would lead us toward France and the case of Paul Celan misread in the light of the Heideggerian construction.

1. Reading the *Black Notebooks*

It is not weird that when facing Heidegger's thought in the 1930s and 1940s his anti-Semitism was already well known and is only confirmed by the *Black Notebooks* that make explicit the radicalism of his Nazi commitment. What should we do with such overwhelming evidence? Besides an ideological attraction to certain parts of Nazism, it is clear that Heidegger had an ambitious philosophical goal. In order to form the realm of metaphysics that lead to the present nihilism, he bet on a new beginning, a new, radically cut off from the past. His metaphysical dream was also meta-political, so the destruction of metaphysics was to be followed by a new beginning with German roots replacing the failed Greek beginning that led to metaphysics. Hölderlin's poems already brought to view this new beginning, and Heidegger expected from Nazism to be his instrument of this revolution. He relentlessly supported the *Gleichschaltung*, that is to say, the complete destruction of the former world that would give path to the historical mission of the German people. In that sense, he can be thought as a revolutionary thinker. His actions in the rectorat at Freiburg went in the same direction and were in no way to preserve whatever was left of the traditional university, *Selbstbehauptung* is rather self-surrendering than self-assertion.

After 1934 his disappointment with the Nazi State mainly regarded to bureaucratic aspects, he despised the lower middle class evolution of

the party, notwithstanding that he remained loyal as a supporter of it in its historical purpose. It would be incorrect to think that Heidegger tried to translate Nazism ideas into philosophy. His encounter with Nazism stands for a clear meta-political intention and historical openings that would confirm his own philosophical project. Anti-Semitism was fully part of it: it was not a special obsession but a constant piece of his broader critic of modernity, rationality and calculative thinking, in his own words *Gestell* and *Machenschaft*. For Heidegger these aspects of modernity take on a Jewish face. Heidegger started *Sein und Zeit* seeing as a way out of metaphysics by focusing in the finiteness of *Dasein* and time in the place of Being. Two new philosophical directions in the 1930s and in the early 1940s framed his Nazi commitment. His lectures on Nietzsche deeply explore what he takes to be the end of metaphysics. Nietzsche, through overturning Platonism and his diagnostic of nihilism, exhausted the last resources of metaphysics. In parallel, he tried to engage in a new beginning grounded in a conception of language as essentially poetry: language is *Dichtung*, poetry or even open, in an essential sense.

In 1934 and 1935, Heidegger engaged in a systematic reading of Hölderlin in the hope of finding in Hölderlin's poems the way out from nihilism to a truly new German beginning. The high level of his expectations for the History of Being and even for the World history may look disproportionate, but they make sense in connection to his regards of the historical mission of the German people, a mission Nazism is supposed to be an instrument of.

Now, I will concentrate on the poetry encompassed in the *Black Notebooks*. The first notebooks of 1931 already speak of the philosophy to come as *Zuspruch* (consolations and encouragement), for it will be a *Dichtung des Seins*, that is to say, a poetry of self. Heidegger said: "Being becomes a poem, therefore finite" (GA 94, 15). The difficult part of understanding that statement is to determine the relation between the subject and the act of becoming a poem. The only true subject is Being itself, yet in its becoming poem, Heidegger affirms, it is "our" German being. For Heidegger defends that only Germans can express being through poetry. Thus, Germans will actualize the inner move of Being in his historicalization.

During his rectorate, Heidegger assigned several meta-political tasks to himself: (1) contribute to the making of people's community as a people's self; (2) let the people become itself through its rooting and the State carry out its mission; and, (3) a long term task, see the greatness of

the people in “the development and figuration of the powers of Being” (GA 94, 136).

Language as poetry binds together the historical destiny of the German people, truth as it happens and finites itself in the poem. This bound is at the bottom of Heidegger’s studies on Hölderlin, started with the lecture on *Hymns Germania* and *der Rhein*. In the speech of 1935 on *The origin of the work of art*, his interest in Hölderlin has nothing to do with the poetical escapism from everyday politics. It was a political project with other means as Clausewitz quote in the *Rectorate speech* would have said. Heidegger, indeed, tried to find in Hölderlin’s poems a new German mythology. Poetry returns the solitary *Dasein* back to the community, every people finds its own origin in its poetry, Heidegger used to think. Language speaks: we do not have a language. Rather, language has us. Accordingly, poetry is an ancient language (*Ursprache*) of all peoples (GA 94, 64). Hölderlin as “the poet of the poets” (GA 39, 214) offers an insight beyond nihilism: it would be a mistake to try to read his work through the tools of philology, for this science belongs to the metaphysical *Gestell* of nihilism. Heidegger tried to grasp in Hölderlin’s text indications of another dimension beyond metaphysics.

Heidegger’s intensive reading of Hölderlin is matched only by his reading of Nietzsche. While Nietzsche, as an endpoint of metaphysics and even of religion and morals, provides weapons of destruction, Hölderlin offers a path to revival through a new understanding of language. As it is said in the *Black Notebooks* say: “destruction heralds hidden beginnings, devastation is the other side of the ending that is already started [or decided]” (GA 96, 3).

Between the summer 1942 and the spring 1945, the *Black notebooks* remained mostly silent. Then, another era began, although not the expected one. The name of Hölderlin faded away and people returned to bourgeoisie, culture, nihilism and Goethe. Nevertheless, Heidegger gives us a key to his meta-political reading of Hölderlin, tied to his philosophical reversal of the *Kehre* it expresses the hope of a solution stemming of Being itself. As Heidegger himself made clear, his activism during the rectorate period was far from being “a political error from the stand point of World history” (GA 97, 148). His dialog with Hölderlin was an attempt “to historically ontologically experience this poet and think the hidden but essential relationship between *dichten* and thinking” (GA 97, 178).

In an essay published the same year *What are poets for?* (1946), Heidegger distanced himself from a too immediate political reading of Hölderlin, and gave another meaning to his own attempt to escape from metaphysical nihilism. Rationality as a fate of metaphysics remains the bad thing that we have to escape, but it now indifferently includes Soviet organization of society, American productivism, as well as the Nazi regime. There are mere variants of the same wrong model of development. The hard times (*dürftige Zeit*) exposed by Hölderlin have now extended to the whole present. Only a God could save us from it, a God that some poetical texts foreshadowed.

Heidegger tried to overcome the language inherited from philosophy and to listen to the myth of being itself. The question "what are poets for?" gives expression to this new stance. He repeats his assessment of modernity as the nihilism ending of metaphysics and suggested a way out through poetry. He wants his readers to pay attention to the traces of departed Gods and claims that: "Poetry tells are sacred when night has set others a word" (17:00). The reader is able to understand that the time has come to go beyond the violence of war and cut short any desire of power in order to engage in a new beginning reconciled with Being, Nature whose exploitation he rejects as a pathology of modern nihilism.

"What are poets for?" adds to the critic of modernity a new, nearly mystical, religiosity. However, careful readers will notice that the violent anti-Semitism of the 30s has not at all disappeared and remains implicit in the denunciation of money and calculative thinking. Heidegger claims about a short poem by Rilke where inversion is opposed to angels (17:50): "*cuando la mano del vendedor se pasa la báscula, aquel ángel que en el cielo la detiene y la silencia con el equivalente del espacio*". To what Heidegger comments: "ordinary life of the contemporary man is the usual self-taxation or self-impositions on the homeless market of money changers". Poetry is supposed to give us hope of escaping this fallen world of calculability, the angel, in Rilke, as openness is a figure that allows one to think of the totality of beings from the standpoint of being itself. Poetry may allow one to reverse the differentiations created by modernity and to restore us to an unbroken ontological experience. In the last pages of his lecture, Heidegger sees in poetry a reversal to the nihilist order. He still expresses a refusal to the world as it is, even though this refusal no longer takes the form of a desire of a violent revolution. If the poetical song can be the mean through which one can overcome the reign of calculative thinking, then the parallelism with Celan's poetical

project may seem obvious. Does not Celan set as a goal for his poetry a reversal, in his own words a “turn of breath” (*Atemwende*)? The many misunderstandings caused by the parallel make it necessary to briefly treat, as a conclusion, the Celan-Heidegger case.

Celan’s turn of breath can be roughly characterized as an attempt to write in German against German. His poetry writes itself against the lyric tradition and the cult of culture that let the barbarism occur. To write in German brings into question the very possibility of saying. Every word, every syllable of his poems is a confrontation with the crimes committed, and it shapes poetry as an attempt to face it.

The possibility to say something again and, at the same time, to remember what happened might lie in the very contradiction of the language used; the contrast with Heidegger is obvious. Nevertheless, there are remarkable affinities between Celan’s and Heidegger’s work on language: in his search for a renewed language for philosophy, that is to say, a philosophical language free from any metaphysical assumption, Heidegger looked toward poets, because they overturn the way modernity subjects Being to beings. Heidegger thought poets could become the spokespersons of Being. Although Celan’s poetical work denied the premises of Heidegger’s meta-politics, we now know that he read several of Heidegger’s texts. The importance given to poetry, the renewal of language, the work on German language, as well as the curiosity of what philosophy could say, may have suggested him to this reading. Besides, after the war Heidegger presented himself successfully as apolitical and was introduced in France by unquestionable members of the French resistance, such as René Char. However, the meeting in Heidegger’s cottage in 1967 revealed the gap caused by the misunderstanding between his and Celan’s conception of language: while Heidegger intended to escape the historical present invaded by nihilism with the help of poetry, Celan worked toward a language remade in order to incorporate the memory of past crimes. For neither of them language could evoke or refer to anything in an ontological manner. Rather, language was ordered to time and finitude, yet both meant it in opposite senses. The poem *Todtnauberg* written by Celan after the encounter makes the latter perfectly clear. While Heidegger finds in poetry an escape from the reign of beings, Celan’s poem recaptures the historical event of the extermination attempting to give both a grave and a new voice to the dead. While Heidegger thought he met in Celan a reminder of the great Hölderlinian lyric tradition, he

admired his poetry without being able to see his critical resources. His own followers continued his admiration in an academic form writing critics on Celan's poetry. Despite the total opposition of the premises, a post-war Heideggerian tradition of reading poetry expanded among French left liberal scholars... But that is a story for another time.

DISCUSSION

Peter Trawny

Did you state that Heidegger and Celan have a similar conception of language?

Denis Thouard

No, their conception is not similar. Nonetheless, we can find a common ground between them, because they both worked against the language they inherited. But again: while Heidegger efforts are directed against language to make a future new language freed from tradition, Celan fights against the inherited language in order to make place to the memory of the past crimes. So, one can see that they both fight against language which is opposite to one another. The fact that both are interested in escaping the given language is something that makes them close.

Peter Trawny

I would say that *The Meridian*, a poetological text of Celan, is thought as a dialogue, it is directed to a "you", to "the other". The other is, referring to Levinas' reading of Celan, the *addressee* of his language. If one analyses what were the sources which Paul Celan used for writing this text, one of them was Martin Buber's *Ich und Du*, where he sees language as the beginning of a contact or touching with the other. It is obvious, I think, that the other is not a figure present in Heidegger's thought.

Denis Thouard

In *The Meridian*, I would rather say that "I" and "you" are two instances that help Celan construct a distance in the poetical language in order to analyze and judge the environment he is talking about in this text. It is, in other worlds, a poetological invention that ensures the proper reflexion of the poem, as Bollack convincingly put it. So, "you" is

not immediately a figure of “the other”. It is more a critical instance that helps the poet to establish a distance between his poem and the outside. I think the reading of Levinas is naive, because he applies directly his conception of the other and, in fact, there is no proof that Celan used the same conception in his text. *The Meridian* is a difficult text to read, because it is a poetological text, but also a poetical text. So, one has to interpret it for itself.

André Laks

I have two remarks: the first one is related to Celan’s and Heidegger’s attitude towards language. Of course, they both want to overcome one form of language. Heidegger wants to escape the language of metaphysics and its consequences. In the case of Celan, it is not only finding the language able to speak adequately about what happened, namely, the extermination of the Jews; it is also an attempt to escape the language that led to this very extermination and a construction of language confronting the language, which was part of that event. I think Denis Thouard would agree on that.

My second remark is about the topic of the use of “you”. I am familiar with the debate around the reference of ‘I’ and ‘You’ in Celan’s poetry (and in the *Meridian*) and I think, like Denis, that the interpretation Bollack gave of it is very persuasive. Nevertheless, I am inclined to support Peter Trawny or, for that matter, Levinas’s reading, perhaps at another level. For Heidegger words speak for themselves, his take on language is etymological. Celan’s language seems to address somebody else, whether that is under Buber influence is another subject, one would also have to mention, and probably more prominently, Mandelstam. There is an interesting hermeneutical question here: there is this inner split between the lyrical “I” and the individual “You” in Celan’s poetry; but the *Mensch* is also there in Celan’s poetry; not so in Heidegger. In this respect, “the other” in a non poetical sense is present, and perhaps even is at the core, of Celan’s poetry.

Denis Thouard

Celan tries to confront the world of culture and the lyrical tradition; he cannot fight against the language itself as grammar and structure. So, what I meant was not to understand his *Gegenwort* as a desire for destructing language, as *gegen Sprache* in this sense. Rather, it is a critical

examination of all the past culture under the light of its willingness to make this event possible or thinkable. So, for Celan it is an ἀνάμνησις of the cultural inheritance. He even compares his attempt to Dante's project: he tries to write a comedy where he would examine and judge to condemn or save what happened, and the factors that made this event possible. It is for him the poetical answer to the violence of history. So, his aim is not the destruction of language itself. On the contrary, he intends to construct a new language using the structure of the former one but following other principles. He re-determines all the words and all the complements with the intention of creating a proper tool that allowed him to say more precisely what he wanted to transmit, independently of the tradition language.

Even if Celan's project sounds like Rilke's and other poets, he always intends to re-construct language, and to re-construct what the tradition of lyric had established before.

To your second remark, the opposition between Heidegger's and Celan's conception of language, and etymology is not so simple to determine and judge. We know that Heidegger fixed his attention in etymology, but he also played with words; in fact, he tried to invent new ways to say, according to event and temporality. Celan makes etymologies of his own: sometimes he uses terms that are present in Heidegger, but he gives them another sense (like the play on *Denken/Danken*, thinking and thanking). In other instances, he uses terms as poetical figures, for example, as Jean Bollack's reading of *Todtnauberg* put it where even the name of the place (*Todtnauberg*) takes a celanian meaning and becomes the "mountain of the dead" (*Toten-au-berg*). This is a kind of poetical and significant etymology. So, we can observe that both Heidegger and Celan are not totally different and, within this framework, I think we can draw more nuances in this perspective.

Steven Crowell

I just wanted to ask a simple-minded question to hear what you think about it. The initial question is: what does it mean "to speak Being"? I am thinking about the poet as a mouthpiece of Being. Somehow, some poets are distinguished because they are mouthpieces of Being; presumably, not everyone who writes poetry is such a mouthpiece. So, I have never been clear about how to get a grip on the distinction. In contrast, there are a number of apparently similar ideas: in the English tradition there is Shelley's idea that poets are the unacknowledged

legislators of humankind; then there are Herder and Vico, who affirmed that the original human language is poetry. In which way is Heidegger's conception of Being different from that sort of tradition? Is there a significant difference?

Denis Thouard

One of the main differences is that someone like Herder, for example, has in view a great diversity of cultures and languages; this is not the case for Heidegger. For he thinks of only one people and only one language: first there were the Greeks; then came the Germans. The other question does not have a definitive answer. If we think about a philosopher's work and his context, taking Heidegger as an example, we must wonder what makes him search in poetry a solution to the issues he finds impossible to unravel in another way.

Steven Crowell

As you mentioned in your intervention, when Heidegger turns to poetry for inspiration, he is facing an epoch of nihilism, that is to say, the collapse of meaning. And what makes meaning collapse is the absence of a normative framework –what Heidegger calls the last God, among other things.

In his essay on *Dichterisch wohnet der Mensch* (1951, published 1954), he presents a very different structure of how the language of a poem is supposed to address the situation; he seems to talk about the poem, the poetical language, as taking the measure (*Mass nehmen*), according to which we co-respond (*ent-sprechen*) to the claim (*Anspruch*) of language. This partly recalls Heidegger's position in the text *The origin of the work of art* where art puts the struggle between earth and world up for the "decision" of an historical *Volk*. However, the measure-taking that happens in poetical language, spanning the dimension between *Himmel und Erde* gathers the mortals and does not seem tied to the earlier claim that only Germans can speak Being. I find the position of this essay extremely compelling for the topic poetic language and the relationship between *Denken* and *Dichten*; it seems to preserve the most interesting aspects of the *Kunst* (art) essay, while leaving out the parochial *Volk* vocabulary.

Denis Thouard

In my essay, I just wanted to reconstruct the first part of this story with the interesting continuity between all the work of the 1930s on Hölderlin and the text *Wozu Dichter* where he seems to reorient his theory of poetry. In effect, he leaves out the *völkisch* aspects, and the most fascinating fact is that it worked, since it was inspiring for people who needed another beginning after the war. Maybe what you said about this latter text is correct, but I would have to revise your comments in depth. My argument here was only to point out that what he begins in the *Black Notebooks* continues after the war with little variants.

Carlotta Santini

I have a question regarding Hölderlin. I have always had problems to understand how Heidegger uses Hölderlin's poetry in favour of the cause of the Germans. I remember that there is a comment about Hölderlin's most famous poem *Heimkehr* which tells the story of someone coming back home and looks at the village conscious that that place is his home. Heidegger commented that the place we are looking forward is the place in which we are at home by ourselves. Still both Heidegger and Hölderlin explain that the person still has to travel a big distance, for he is not yet at home by himself; hence, he remains out. This was, in fact, Hölderlin's lifelong circumstances. And even though Hölderlin had points in which he connects with the Greeks and the Indo-Europeans, he always writes about the possibility for these cultures to relate with each other, but never about those possibilities transforming into reality. Certainly, the poet never reached any of those stages, for he remains outside them. My question is: how can one do of Hölderlin the poet of German identity if he was all of his life searching for an identity?

Denis Thouard

There are many ways to answer your questions. One is the contextual form: most of the German classics were forced into a role in the formation of the ideological movement; and like many others, it was not easy to use Hölderlin for this purpose, even if he spoke of the Germans. But the main reason why Heidegger utilized Hölderlin is because he desired it: he saw in Hölderlin a possibility for his philosophy. For that

purpose he used a non philological approach, and this allowed him to underline what he wanted or what he needed to make a stand out. Meanwhile, he could make some philological points, since he was a great reader. So, I think we should not despise his work on Hölderlin's. He does not claim to have any respect for the integrity of the texts.

Peter Trawny

I wanted to come back to Steven Crowell's remarks. We have a masterpiece created by Heidegger: *Being and Time* was published in 1927 and it marked the history of philosophy, and then he gave the lecture on Hölderlin in 1944. I cannot find a link between these two texts, where does it come from? There is no trace of Heidegger's interest in this poet before. Later on, there is an enormous influence of Hölderlin's reading by Stefan George where Hölderlin is the poet of the Germans. There is also a very important conference by Norbert von Hellingrath entitled *Hölderlin und die Deutschen*. One can observe that Heidegger mentions von Hellingrath all the time, so it is evident that his interpretation comes from these sources. Nowadays, both interpretations are rejected by Hölderlin's research; of course, no modern researcher accepts the interpretation put forward in George's and Heidegger's circles; as it happens with other interpretations of other authors. What I think is that it is important to remark that Heidegger did not only take Hölderlin as someone he interprets, for in the *Contributions* he says that the history of all philosophy finds its end in Hölderlin's poetry. Actually, we should talk about the madness of such a declaration, I guess. It is very singular that a philosopher states philosophy should stop and let poetry take its place.

My last remark is that Heidegger is aware that the beginning of philosophy is a confrontation with the poets. For example, in the *Politeia* Plato says that poets must not be allowed to enter the πόλις. For metaphysics, poetry is only poetry. In this sense, Heidegger gives a hint that poetry, at the other beginning, should have to return to the meaning it had in the time of tragedies.

Denis Thouard

Heidegger repeats what Nietzsche attempted a little bit earlier, the difference is that Nietzsche tried to write himself, and proposed a new language; but he failed. On the contrary, Heidegger reflected more and

discovered that he had to look for another source for this new language, and he takes poetry he likes the most at this time. I think he fulfils the task Nietzsche proposed in *Thus spoke to Zarathustra*, and he even got further.

Peter Trawny

Talking about *Thus spoke to Zarathustra*: in my opinion Nietzsche was cleverer than Heidegger, since he interrupts his speech all the time and claims that the reader should not trust him; *Thus spoke to Zarathustra* is not a message.

Federica González

I believe that there is an issue that has not been brought up to the discussion, and it is the question of why is Hölderlin considered to be so important? In the case of Heidegger, in my opinion, it is not only because he is considered to be the poet of the Germans, but because of Hölderlin's interest and knowledge of the Greeks. I think that is the feature that makes Hölderlin the poet of the poets, since the identity of Germans cannot be thought without recurring to the Greeks, according to Hölderlin. So, I would like to know what you think of the place the Greeks have in the understanding of the German identity.

Denis Thouard

The sources of the great rivers in Germany, the geopolitical dimension is important to him; and also, surely, the relation with the Greeks.

Alejandro Vigo

A very important fact to stress is that Heidegger considered Hölderlin to be the poet of the poets, the poet of poetry: the meta-poet. There are three elements: the Greeks, Germany and meta-poetry. I would like to make a suggestion to Peter Trawny's commentary. I think we should make here two different questions: first, what is the role of poetry in the philosophy of Heidegger? And, then, what are the reasons that made Heidegger choose Hölderlin? As a matter of fact, the role of poetry in Heidegger's thought was given from the beginning, even if it was not deployed. In the courses collected from 1919 in *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie* (GA 56/57), Heidegger compares the way astronomy

explains the Sun, and the way in which the first chorus of *Antigone* by Sofocles sings to the Sun. The potential of the poetic word is that it lets the Sun be the Sun, and does not consider it as an astronomical object. This motivation is present from the beginning of his project. As for the connection between predicating and naming, the different potentials of discovering that we find in predication and in naming, this motive is also present from the beginning. In *Being and Time* there is a beautiful place where Heidegger states that the task of philosophy is, ultimately, to recover the force or power (*Kraft*) of the most elementary words in which *das Dasein* expresses itself (*Being and Time* § 44 b) p. 220). And this problem is, certainly, that of poetry. The naming in a poem is an unusual of using words in order to let things appear.

Denis Thouard

The questions concern the beginning of Heidegger's interest in poetry. You say that that interest is there from the very beginning, but that in *Being and Time* it is not yet deployed. Nevertheless, I think that what we find there is a more conditional approach, and that we have to wait the beginning of the 30s to find this new idea. Then, the discussion on Hölderlin is a specific and political part of the whole. It is clear in the *Black Notebooks* that Heidegger believes that not all poets are as great as Goethe; but Rilke, for instance, seems to be a good poet for Heidegger's eyes.

Alejandro Vigo

That is exactly the reason of my proposal, namely, separating both aspects: the decision to use Hölderlin's poetry and the role of poetry in his philosophy as a whole.

Peter Trawny

My guess is that there is another difference that we have to be aware of: certainly, Heidegger dealt with poetry before he gave the lecture course on Hölderlin. Nevertheless, and I think this is the point of the impossibility of Heidegger's project, he did not want to show that poetry is also a certain world-relation; but he suddenly desired that poetry takes the place as the first world-relation and, in fact, the only one, after 1934. He proposes, from a radical view, to live on the basis of poetry: it is a question of power. In order for this to happen, one must forget

about science, forget about rationality and read Hölderlin. And this is the radicality of this decision.

In this respect, Hölderlin is a very interesting figure, since he began doing philosophy and then left it. For Hölderlin poetry was not a possibility beneath philosophy: poetry was the possibility. This is a very important aspect to consider, because at this point we find a competition between philosophy and poetry.

Alejandro Vigo

I would say that I agree with you partially, because there is here, in my view, an important difference. Poetry, and in general art (*Kunst*), is a kind of human access to the world enabling not only things but also the context of things to appear. Therefore, it is the grounding or foundation of a world. This certainly speaks of ontic activities that have a greater potential of world-disclosing than other activities. In this sense, there is a kind of priority of these ways of being in the world, but only in this respect. Philosophy cannot name things as poetry does, but can reflect or think about these things. And the way Heidegger is trying to understand what poetry is, it is not poetry, but philosophy. What poetry can do and actually does is not the same as what philosophy can do in regard to poetry. One needs both things, things that we have, as a matter of fact: we have Hölderlin who describes new worlds and Heidegger who invites to read Hölderlin, if it is the case that one wants to understand what is the function of poetical world-foundation.

The second remark is that I do not agree with the view that to read Hölderlin one must forget rationality. Poetry is a λόγος, but as you say, it is not an explanation, but it is a way to give a sense to things. We are not making explanations, but we are making sense of things.

Peter Trawny

That is in fact the main difference between poetry and philosophy. Poetry is bound to mythological explanation. But one is obligated to ask for the reasons and causes of something; therefore, one cannot ask a poet to give scientific or rational explanations.

Alejandro Vigo

Exactly: that is why we need both things. Poetry is giving a meaning to things, and philosophy explaining what is poetry.

André Laks

In fact, the idea of poetry's primacy over philosophy has a tradition within the history of philosophy. There are a number of Neoplatonists that put Homer and Hesiod above Plato; reason and dialectic are derivative. This tradition occupies a very important place in the intellectual history.

I think differentiating between poetry as such and Hölderlin's poetry, as Alejandro Vigo proposed, is important. But I would add the following. Certainly, poetry as such does not play a central role in the period before the rediscovery of Hölderlin's poetry in the 30s. But I think you are right in stating that the possibility of reevaluating poetry as such is there, because poetry seems to offer a way to say something about the ante-predicative –in a quasi-predicative way, of course. Now, the possibility of poetry as a phenomenological resource is there, and this is the function of the reference to the *Antigone's* chorus. But when Heidegger refers to Hölderlin (and a few other poets), what he draws from Hölderlin amounts to a confirmation of what are in fact his philosophical views. What one reads in Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin is Heidegger's thought. This is a crucial point, because it is the negation of the idea that one finds in poetry some specific language that escapes philosophy; as if the autonomy of poetry was denied in the very moment Heidegger was pleading in its favour. This leaves us with a contradiction, and re-opens the question of what it is to read.

Denis Thouard

I think your point is that Heidegger has particular strategy when he utilized Hölderlin: he uses him as the best support for developing his own ideas. And, after the war, we can find other philosophers that employ the same strategy. When one reads Derrida it is evident that he implements his ideas in the authors he interprets.

Peter Trawny

Nonetheless, the difference is the meta-political aspect that Alejandro Vigo mentioned. It is not only that Hölderlin is the best poet; rather, he is considered by Heidegger to be unique, because he has a metaphysical access to the world-relation. The meta-political aspect is that Heidegger speaks from *die Rückbindung des Deutschen Volkes an einen Gott den der Dichter gibt*. The word "Rückbindung" is interesting, because is, in a certain way, "Religion". The meta-political aspect is present in the sense that Heidegger tries to realize that a people needs a God and a God is only given by a poet. Heidegger represents this figure as somebody who tries to invent it, to found the German people by this, a task impossible to fulfil. So, what Heidegger calls "meta-politics of the German people" coming from the German people to the German people is rather a strange project.

Denis Thouard

A very important aspect is that for Heidegger there can be only one true poet if we want it to work out. We are in a deep night, and there is only one who has the light, and that is the one we have to follow.

Steven Crowell

I think it was already mentioned by Peter Trawny, but I believe that there is a passage in Heidegger's work where he claims that the reason Hölderlin is special is because he has a very particular position in the *Seinsgeschichte*. He was part of the *Vollendung* of metaphysics in Hegel, in this moment of German idealism when the relation between poetry and philosophy was especially at issue. And Hölderlin is the one who goes in the direction of poetry. Heidegger sees in this a unique moment, the fact that Hölderlin was there at the completion, and made the move to avoid the nihilism that Heidegger thinks is inherent in metaphysics.

The other point is something that has also been mentioned before in our discussion. Again, it is not as though Heidegger states directly that Hölderlin is doing precisely what the new Heideggerian thinkers ought to be doing, since in fact he says that poets name the Holy while philosophers think Being. So, on the basis of that difference, Heidegger proposes that he is saying the same as Hölderlin, but this is not identical.

I think it would be worthwhile to try to figure out what the expression “naming the Holy” means, and how that fits into the founding metaphor.

Finally, regarding the meaning of “thinking being”: I am very sympathetic to what Alejandro Vigo said about the relation between philosophy and poetry, but that does not seem to be exactly what Heidegger is doing when he substitutes *Denken* for philosophizing. It seems as though in the *Black Notebooks* the whole discussion results in a double access to the first beginning, which then can be redone in another beginning. When one goes back to Heidegger’s reading of Heraclitus or Anaximander, it seems as if this movement is being performed, that is to say, that thinking in another beginning is trying to take place. Maybe there is a distinction, at this point, that might be worth discussing further in terms of the question of the relation between poetry and philosophy.

Denis Thouard

On the philosophical *Seinsgeschichte* importance of Hölderlin: for sure, he writes poetry at the same time that some philosophers like Schelling or Hegel are making philosophy. At this time, philosophy takes the shape of a system, and all of the thinkers occupied themselves in the issue of community. I think it is important to underline that Heidegger retains these aspects in his work, and recalls in his *Nietzsche* that Schelling and Hegel brought the evil into the absolute. Finally, they could understand that they did not have to reject evil outside and put it in the margins of reason. It belonged to it. Philosophy had to assume negativity: evil and sin.

The function of Hölderlin seems clear when we notice a philological feature in his texts. Many of the Heideggerian texts in the decade of 1930s end with a quote of Hölderlin; he does it quite systematically. At the end of the philosophical, apophantical, discourse he gives a space to this poet; that is very impressive to me, because he is not able to name better what we are reaching for.

Steven Crowell

To follow one of Alejandro Vigo’s ideas: Heidegger celebrated Hölderlin as the poet of poets: a meta-poet. In this way, Hölderlin’s poetry might be thought not to accomplish what Heidegger needs, since his poetry does not in fact name the Holy, but rather shows us, somehow, that poets name the Holy. I know that Heidegger appropriated some

of Hölderlin's poetic terms and utilized them in his own attempt at thinking; but in reference to the problem of nihilism, it strikes me that Heidegger leaves everything open in the sense that the question of which poetry names the Holy for the *Volk* remains unsolved. Heidegger leaves the meta-level open, for he does not define the word that will help the *Volk* escape nihilism. So, following this line, humans are in a state of waiting, and the only thing they can do is to clear their mind from all the traditional language of metaphysics. The fact that there is not an answer to what humans are waiting for is a recurrent problem in Heidegger's thinking. There is the suggestion that poetry might be the answer, as if it will give humans the mean to take the measure of other things. It strikes me that this aspect of Heidegger's philosophy is a complete expression of helplessness. But if one ignores the *Seinsgeschichte* mythology, Heidegger's helplessness is a pretty good description of where we are: *Gestell und Gelassenheit*.

SESSION 8

USING HEIDEGGER: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE ANALYTIC OF *DASEIN*

Maria Jimena Clavel Vázquez

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As an introduction to my intervention I would like to remark the fact that there are two researchers, Michael Wheeler and Hubert Dreyfus, who explore the possibility of a Heideggerian project on cognitive sciences. The aim of my talk is to indicate that, to accomplish this project, it is necessary to take a critical stance towards Heidegger, instead of taking this project as continuous with Heidegger's phenomenology.

The question concerning the pertinence of using Heidegger's analytic of *Dasein* as a guide for empirical research arises from the attempts to bring Heideggerian phenomenology and cognitive science together. Hubert Dreyfus and Michael Wheeler are two of the main figures behind these attempts. Throughout this presentation I will do the following: firstly, I will show that Dreyfus and Wheeler share the following two ideas: a) taking the analytic of *Dasein* as a regional ontology; and b) a weak kind of naturalism that holds that empirical science is continuous with philosophy (something that I will call the continuity thesis). Then I will analyse the passages of *Being and Time* that might serve as a basis for holding the continuity thesis. I will show that to hold something like that, it is necessary to argue not only for the interpretation of the analytic of *Dasein* as a regional ontology, but also for an epistemological relation between phenomenology and science. I believe that the nature of phenomenological concepts that is clarified by the distinction between certain human sciences (such as anthropology, psychology, and biology) and the analytic of *Dasein* do not allow the interpretation of the latter as a regional ontology, at least not in strict Heideggerian terms. However, I will show that the project of a Heideggerian cognitive science does raise an important and valid concern regarding the possibility of taking ontology back to its relation with ontic sciences, and its consequent impact of scientific research.

In the 60s the American philosopher Hubert Dreyfus intended to show that research on Artificial Intelligence was misguided. One of their mistakes was to take human rationality as a matter of computation. On the basis of the analytic of *Dasein*, Dreyfus (1992: p. ix) argued that human intelligence and our everyday behaviour is not a kind of know-what, but rather a know-how. In his commentary to *Being and Time*, he emphasizes the distinction between natural and human sciences. According to him, the objects of natural sciences are deworlde, even when scientific practice is not. Put otherwise: although the natural scientist dwells in the world of his discipline, he is detached from his everyday context, and so he is able to objectify his object of study (1991: 82). Human sciences, on the other hand, cannot be detached in that same way. Dreyfus (1991: 207–208) claims that “interpretive circularity” is “definitive of the social and human sciences”. For Dreyfus, these sciences, and among them Artificial Intelligence, require a proper understanding of the being of human beings. In consequence, the analytic of *Dasein* is crucial for them (Dreyfus 1991: 1).

Although Dreyfus does not say it explicitly, I believe that one of his underlying premises is that the analytic of *Dasein* gives an account of a determinate region of being, and that this account is a necessary ontological work for scientific research. He claims that “[i]f this description of human reality turns out to be superficial, all that hard work will have been in vain” (Dreyfus 1992: 1). He affirms the latter in reference to all scientific research. Dreyfus’ argument in “What computers still can’t do?” also supports this idea. He claims that Artificial Intelligence is a non-progressive research programme because it has been conceptually misguided. For Dreyfus, scientific research requires ontological work in order to progress.

Michael Wheeler (2012: 178), on the other hand, claims that he is taking a naturalistic stance. For him, naturalism can be defined as the thought that “philosophy should be *continuous with empirical science*”. Not only that, for Wheeler, it is possible to read Heidegger as claiming that there should be some kind of interplay between philosophy and empirical science. Wheeler follows McDowell’s notion of the interplay between philosophy and science. For him, it is not only that philosophy is able to provide scientific research with a clear and systematic description of the phenomenon under study, but it is also that the results of science can lead us to revise our philosophical conceptions (Wheeler 2012: 185).

Wheeler holds a stronger naturalism than Dreyfus does in the sense that scientific research can have an impact on philosophy.

According to Wheeler (2012: 183), Heidegger's phenomenological analysis is an "account of the conditions that determine what it means to live a human life". For that reason, the task of a Heideggerian cognitive science would be to develop a causal understanding of the existential structures that result from the phenomenological analysis. For Wheeler, phenomenology and cognitive science give different but complementary accounts of the same phenomenon.

Wheeler's interpretation is grounded on two passages of *Being and Time* in which Heidegger claims that a) "the ontological foundations" of positive sciences are not disclosed from empirical material, but rather "are always 'there' already" (Heidegger 1927: 75, as cited in Wheeler 2012: 187) and that b) positive sciences should not have to wait for philosophy because "the further course of research [...] will be accomplished by recapitulating what has already been ontically discovered, and by purifying it in a way which is ontologically more transparent" (Heidegger 1927: 76, as cited in Wheeler 2012: 187). From these passages, Wheeler concludes that, for Heidegger, positive sciences assume basic ontological concepts which are not empirically articulated but nonetheless determine the character of scientific phenomena. It is in this sense that I take Wheeler to argue, just as Dreyfus does, that, for Heidegger, sciences such as cognitive science require a regional ontology.

For Wheeler, the former passages should be considered in conjunction with Heidegger's idea that scientific movement "takes place in the revision of" scientific basic concepts (Heidegger 1996: 9).¹ Whenever a scientific research program does not progress it is necessary to question its basic ontological concepts. In consequence, just as philosophy serves as the basis for scientific research, the empirical results of science can force the philosopher to revise his ontological concepts (Wheeler 2012: 188–189).

As I have tried to show so far, both Dreyfus and Wheeler hold that it is possible to argue for the continuity thesis on the basis of *Being and Time* because the analytic of *Dasein* works as a regional ontology. In what

¹ *SuZ*, p. 9, GA 2, p. 13.

follows I will analyse Heidegger's remarks that seem to be in favour of this continuity thesis.

In paragraph 3 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues for the ontological primacy of the question of Being. In this context, he claims that the region under study by scientific research and its fundamental concepts (*Grudbegriffe*) are determined in our pre-scientific experience. The movement of science is a result of the crises of these concepts (*SuZ*: 9–10, *GA* 2, 13–14). An investigation of this ontical region precedes scientific research and, in that sense, serves as a foundation for science. Heidegger claims that this investigation, which can be called ontology in its broadest sense, also requires the question of Being as a guideline. The latter would be some kind of ontology of ontologies. Heidegger says that “[t]he question of being thus aims at an a priori condition of the possibility not only of the sciences which investigate beings of such and such a type and are thereby already involved in an understanding of being; but it aims also at the condition of the possibility of the ontologies which precede the ontic sciences and found them. *All ontology, no matter how rich and tightly knit a system of categories it has at its disposal remains fundamentally blind and perverts its innermost intent if it has not previously clarified the meaning of being sufficiently and grasped this clarification as its fundamental task*”² (Heidegger 1996: 9).

In the following paragraph, Heidegger argues instead for the ontical primacy of the question of Being. Regional ontologies require a fundamental ontology to enlighten their task. However, fundamental ontology must be looked for in the existential analysis of *Dasein*, the being of which science is a way of being (*SuZ*: 13, *GA* 2, 18).

Now, it is true that fundamental ontology must precede all regional ontologies because, without it, regional ontologies are left blind and going against their purposes of disclosing the ontical region that concerns

² “Die Seinsfrage zielt daher auf eine apriorische Bedingung der Möglichkeit nicht nur der Wissenschaften, die Seiendes als so und so Seiendes durchforschen und sich dabei je schon in einem Seinsverständnis bewegen, sondern auf die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der vor den ontischen Wissenschaften liegenden und sie fundierenden Ontologien selbst. *Alle Ontologie, mag sie über ein noch so reiches und festverklammertes Kategoriensystem verfügen, bleibt im Grunde blind und eine Verkehrung ihrer eigensten Absicht, wenn sie nicht zuvor den Sinn von Sein zureichend geklärt und diese Klärung als ihre Fundamentalaufgabe begriffen hat.*” (*SuZ*: 11, *GA* 2, 15)

them. Nonetheless, without fundamental ontology they can still execute their task. The priority of fundamental ontology does not have a direct impact on the execution of regional ontologies and, in consequence, on scientific research. On the other hand, regional ontologies depend on the analytic of *Dasein* only because it is where the question of Being takes place. It is also worth recalling that the analytic is an incomplete and preliminary analysis because it is only made for the sake of fundamental ontology (*SuZ*: 17, 200, *GA* 2 23, 265).

At this point, one may ask, if the intention was to develop a complete analysis of *Dasein*, would this count as a regional ontology? For instance, regarding ethnology, Heidegger claims that: “ethnology itself [just like anthropology, psychology, and biology] already presupposes an adequate analytic of *Dasein* as its guideline” (Heidegger 1996: 47). Since Heidegger adds that: “the continuation of research will not be accomplished as ‘progress’; but, rather, as the repetition and the ontologically more transparent purification of what has been ontically discovered” (Heidegger 1996: 48),³ the relation between sciences and phenomenology is not epistemological, in the sense that scientific research does not require ontology as a precondition. What kind of relation is it, then?

One possibility to understand this relation is to turn to Heidegger’s distinction between the analytic of *Dasein* and anthropology, biology, and psychology.⁴ The analytic shares with these disciplines the intention

³ “Ethnologie setzt selbst schon eine zureichende Analytik des *Daseins* als Leitfaden voraus. Da aber die positiven Wissenschaften auf die ontologische Arbeit der Philosophie weder warten »können« noch sollen, wird sich der Fortgang der Forschung nicht vollziehen als »Fortschritt«, sondern als *Wiederholung* und ontologisch durchsichtigere Reinigung des ontisch Entdeckten“. (*SuZ*: 51, *GA* 2, 69).

⁴ Heidegger also claims that “philosophical psychology, anthropology, ethics, ‘politics’, poetry, biography, and historiography pursue in different ways and to varying extents the behaviour, faculties, powers, possibilities, and destinies of *Da-sein*. But the question remains whether these interpretations were carried out in as original an existential manner as their existentiell originality perhaps merited” [“Philosophische Psychologie, Anthropologie, Ethik, »Politik«, Dichtung, Biographie und Geschichtsschreibung sind auf je verschiedenen Wegen und in wechselndem Ausmaß den Verhaltungen, Vermögen, Kräften, Möglichkeiten und Geschicken des *Daseins* nachgegangen. Die Frage bleibt aber, ob diese Auslegungen ebenso ursprünglich existenzial

of answering the question regarding our own being. By distinguishing them, he is not looking to establish a theory of sciences,⁵ which cannot be established because the scientific structure of these disciplines is questionable. Their structure needs new impulses that come from the ontological questioning. It is possible to argue for science's necessity of philosophy. However, for Heidegger, this is not an epistemological priority nor is philosophy a logical analysis of the propositional structure of science. The problem faced by these disciplines is not whether they are a progressive research program, or in Heidegger's words, whether they reach "objective efficiency". Rather, it is that they all fail to give an ontologically adequate answer because ontological foundations cannot be derived from empirical material; he also adds that he is not judging their positive work (*SuZ*: 50, *GA* 2, 67). When these disciplines are at work, their ontological foundation is already there, and these ontological foundations can only be made more transparent by an analysis such as the analytic of *Dasein*, which aims at the question of the being of human being, but from an adequate phenomenological perspective.

In a foot note to his analysis of ethnology, Heidegger wonders whether the foundations of Cassirer's analysis of mythical *Dasein* were sufficiently transparent and if Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* can provide an outline for the task required (*SuZ*: 51, *GA* 2, 69). In the same direction, in his review of Cassirer's *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, he indicates that

durchgeführt wurden, wie sie vielleicht existenziell ursprünglich waren“] (*SuZ*: 16, *GA* 2, 22).

⁵ For Heidegger, the approach of a theory of science is inadequate when asking about the foundations of science. In the *Phenomenology of religious Life*, he claims the following: "the idea that philosophy and science are objective formations of sense, separated propositions, and propositional complexes must be eliminated. When the sciences in general are taken to be philosophically problematic, they are investigated according to a theory of science as to their extricated propositional truth complex. One has to grasp the concrete sciences themselves in their enactment, and the scientific process must be laid out in its foundations as historical." [Die Auffassung, als seien Philosophie und Wissenschaft objektive Sinngebilde, abgelöste Sätze und Satzzusammenhänge, muß beseitigt werden. Werden die Wissenschaften im allgemeinen philosophisch problematisch genommen, so werden sie wissenschaftstheoretisch auf ihren abgeEösten Wahrheits- und Satzzusammenhang hin untersucht. Man muß die konkreten Wissenschaften selbst in ihrem Vollzug erfassen; der Wissenschaftsprozess als historischer muß selbst zugrunde gelegt werden] (*GA* 60, 9).

the question is not whether Cassirer's analysis can provide guidance for an empirical task, but rather it is a question about its philosophical content (GA 3, 264). Cassirer's analysis of mythical *Dasein* needs to be grounded on an ontology of *Dasein* (GA 3, 266). In the same way, when analysing Jaspers' psychology, Heidegger indicates that Jaspers' approach is not suitable for its own purposes, that is, the analysis of existence (GA 9, 36). Heidegger adds something crucial to understand why Cassirer's anthropology and Jaspers' psychology are flawed. He says that: "this orientation toward a region puts us at a remove from the phenomenon of existence, which, according to its sense, cannot be formulated and classified in regional terms" (Heidegger 1998: 32).⁶

According to Heidegger, what Jaspers intended to analyse was that which the formal indication "existence" points to. Formal indications (*Formale Anzeige*), unlike categories, indicate always a who and not a what (*SuZ*: 44-45, GA 2, 59-60). They constitute, for Heidegger, "the fundamental methodological sense of all philosophical concepts and their relationships" (Heidegger 1998: 9).⁷ The referent of the term "existence" or of the personal pronoun "I" cannot be identified with the empirical subject of psychology or with the human being studied by anthropology. They force upon this entity categories which are inadequate for existence and, therefore, go against their intentions of grasping human being.

These concepts are not supposed to indicate a material content, because what is essential for factual existence is our experience itself of "the whole active and passive pose of the human being toward the world" (Heidegger 2010: 8).⁸ In other words, formal indications allow us to grasp the way *Dasein* dwells in the world. Instead of forcing certain determinate content into the notion of our existence, it indicates the way we relate to our existence and to the world (GA 60, 60-64).

⁶ "sofern die regionale Abzweckung hinsichtlich des intentionalen Bezugssinnes des Erfassens von dem, seinem Sinne nach nicht regional ausformbaren und einordenbaren Existenzphänomen abdrängt" (GA 9, 37). See also GA 9, 30.

⁷ "der formalen Anzeige (worin ein methodischer [...] Grundsinn aller philosophischen Begriffe und Begriffszusammenhänge zu sehen ist)" (GA 9, 10-11).

⁸ "sie bedeutet die ganze aktive und passive Stellung des Menschen zur Welt." (GA 60, 11).

While regional ontologies depend on categories, existence can only be grasped as that which is lived or performed. For this reason, the concepts of the analytic of *Dasein* can only be taken as indicating how our existence is given. So, from this methodological point of view, it seems difficult to argue that Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* is a regional ontology. However, the question that remains is how this notion of philosophical concepts (and in consequence, of philosophy) can relate to scientific research. For Heidegger, philosophy has received a different task regarding the one it traditionally had, that is: "Philosophy is ever again given the task of classifying the whole of Being into regions. Philosophy has long been moved in this ontological direction" (Heidegger 2010: 41).⁹

Does this amount to an absolute gap between philosophy and science? I believe that it rather indicates the inadequacy of certain considerations of human being, which are common to both scientific research and traditional philosophy; it is to that extent that it amounts to rethinking what science is from a phenomenological point of view. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger suggests the latter when he claims that: "in accord with the types of 'ontologies' proper to the different 'realms' (nature, history), does there not yet remain at least a provisional way of creating a horizon for the projection according to being, whereby those realms might be experienceable in a new manner?" (Heidegger 2012: 216).¹⁰ I believe this is a question Heidegger is interested in since *Being and Time*. Despite rejecting the thought of the analytic of *Dasein* as a regional ontology, Heideggerian phenomenology allows a new way of thinking about scientific research. In that sense, Wheeler's and Dreyfus' analysis is interesting because they are trying to move Heideggerian ontology back to the ontic realm of sciences. The latter should be done despite Heidegger's remarks on the intractable difference between science and phenomenology; in a way, despite Heidegger himself.

⁹ "Als Aufgabe der Philosophie wurde immer wieder angesprochen, das gesamte Sein in Regionen einzuteilen. Lange bewegte sich die Philosophie in dieser ontologischen Richtung" (GA 60, 60). See also GA 61, 15.

¹⁰ "Bleibt aber nicht trotzdem ein Weg, mindestens vorläufig, nach Art von 'Ontologien' der verschiedenen 'Bereiche' (Natur, Geschichte) einen Gesichtskreis des seinsmässigen Entwurfs zu schaffen und so die Bereiche neu erfahrbar?" (GA 65, 274).

DISCUSSION

Steven Crowell

I agree with your main thesis, and I also agree that the problem Dreyfus has is that he wants the passage from fundamental ontology to neuroscience to be seamless. This has never been a convincing strategy. At the end of your text, I think you quoted the *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, and it was clear that you have in mind a particular sort of relation between science and philosophy or fundamental ontology that Heidegger pointed out in that text. It would be interesting if you could say more on this topic. However, my questions lead to another argument. There is in *Being and Time* a discussion about the possibility of philosophical anthropology, and it seems that we can understand philosophical anthropology as a regional ontology in a very broad sense, which will then include philosophy of mind and anything that has to do with the ontological region of human being. If this is true, do you think there is some way to capture something of Dreyfus's initial project in these terms? When Dreyfus talks about *Dasein* he also has Maurice Merleau-Ponty in mind, for his descriptions make extensive use of analyses of the body. So, in approaching Dreyfus' work one must move on both a philosophical and philological dimension. Do you think there is no hope for that project, or might it be that if we could figure out the relation between fundamental ontology and philosophical anthropology, something of Dreyfus' project could be preserved?

Jimena Clavel

Regarding the *Beiträge zur Philosophie*: in my opinion there is a minor radicalization in this sense between this text and *Being and Time*. Heidegger tried to claim that in this new horizon which has been discovered one has to rethink the structure of science. It is a project which involves reconstructing the structure of science and not just to introduce philosophical notions to it, which I think is Dreyfus and Wheeler objective. The quote I used from the *Beiträge zur Philosophie* might serve to emphasize this idea in *Being and Time*.

On the other hand, I actually believe that Dreyfus' and Wheeler's project is possible. Firstly, I agree with Wheeler and Dreyfus in that its possibility lies on the interpretation of the analytic of *Dasein* as a regional ontology. However, as I discussed with Federica recently, for

Heidegger, phenomenological concepts stand in an opposite side to the categories which would be necessary for any regional ontology. So, if the project of a Heideggerian Cognitive Science is possible, then one path to follow would be finding a way to conciliate both tasks as Heidegger's defines them. Yet another path is to criticise Heidegger's notion of phenomenological concepts. I believe that the correct strategy to choose is to criticize Heidegger's notion of formal indicator. I think that there is a dual sense in the notion of phenomenon that sometimes Heidegger might overlook and it could assist as a bridge between ontological and ontic.

Steven Crowell

In the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, it seems that Heidegger decides to go the other way. He appears to want to retain formal indication or categories of *Dasein*: he talks about the *Dasein* in us, which is the topic of fundamental ontology or ontology of existence. Then he moves to a discussion of the human being, is a completely different topic that does not require formal indication, since the human being is a natural kind, an animal with its own *Umring*. As a result, the reader finds the odd dualism between *Dasein* and the human being, an aspect that I find quite fascinating.

Alejandro Vigo

I have a couple of remarks concerning what is the problem of Heidegger's philosophy itself. If your main objective is to find a middle term between science and ontology, I think, we should ask ourselves what this middle term in Heidegger's thought could be. My guess is that you criticise Dreyfus for overlooking this middle term, but, as I understand your intervention, you tend to claim that Heidegger does not have a middle term. I would recommend another kind of approach in this point. Ontology is itself factually grounded in a *vorontologisches Seinsverständnis*; the natural understanding of Being is a presupposition for ontology that develops this understanding in one direction, and sciences have also this presupposition at the level of natural understanding of Being.

At this point it is important to take into consideration the Husserlian problem of the so called "*lebensweltliche Fundierung der Wissenschaft*" the foundation of science starting from the *Lebenswelt*. The common ground

is the *Lebenswelt*, and one has to take two different paths in order to obtain from there philosophy and science. Nonetheless, there is a connection at this basic level, which is the natural understanding. For example, matter is a concept of physics, but it is originally disclosed at the level of the natural experience of *Lebenswelt*. One can then formalize the natural understanding of matter with the intention of producing the scientific concept of matter, and again the philosophical reflection on matter follows a different path of formalization. At the end of the day, one needs some communication between both discourses, namely, the scientific and the philosophical one. From the phenomenological point of view, the only way to explain the possibility of communication is to assume that we have a common ground at the level of the experience of *Lebenswelt*, which is therefore methodologically basic not only for science, but also for philosophy. What do you think about the line that I propose?

Jimena Clavel

In my opinion, this approach is highly plausible. I tried to affirm something of that sort. In my master thesis, I intended to figure whether there could be an influence the other way around, from science to phenomenology. What I found is that there must be some influence precisely in our comprehension of our factual experience, since before we thematise it phenomenologically there is dialogue and communication between the two realms.

Federica González

I think that the main point of your intervention is something that has been present in many of the talks of this workshop, namely, the breach between ontology and ontological region, transcendental region, and even the idea of anabasis without metabasis. In my opinion, Dreyfus oversees this problem, since the middle term that is a crucial theme of your intervention is not mentioned by him. The use of this analytic of *Dasein* cannot be as immediate as Wheeler and Dreyfus propose, because of the language that Heidegger uses and the nature of Heidegger's thinking. I am sceptical about using Heidegger in order to achieve the objective you and both other authors propose.

Jimena Clavel

Actually, Wheeler states that precisely referring to the language of phenomenology. He affirms that one cannot simply utilize the phenomenological concepts, for they refer to something else, something that is not what science tries to express. So, he recaptures MacDowell's approach, according to which one must differentiate from a constitutive approach and a causal approach. Science provides a causal approach, while phenomenology provides a constitutive approach. One cannot unify both concepts, but only state that there is some relation between them. Indeed, there is a gap between both views. However, I think it is illuminating to have these phenomenological views or to have a deeper approach to sciences precisely because, from Dreyfus opinion, it is a neutral critical outlook. From phenomenology one can criticise cognitive sciences from a non-theoretical point of view.

Peter Trawny

I lack knowledge regarding cognitive sciences. Nevertheless, I would like to make a point out of what Alejandro Vigo stated earlier about matter, and it is a question that concerns all the participants of this workshop. You used the term "intelligence" and you quoted Dreyfus who affirms that it is not about knowing what, but about knowing how. But even though intelligence seems to have a naturalistic background, it can be a naturalistic concept. Likewise, one could affirm that one subject is more intelligent than another. This thought is something that is present in our daily life. What does Heidegger say to this kind of concept of nature? More precisely: what would a Heideggerian say about the naturalistic access of intelligence? Can Heideggerian philosophy adopt this phenomenon? In German, we find the distinction between the terms "*Leib*" and "*Körper*". Heidegger seems to be more interested in the term "*Leib*", not in the nature of the body; he does not want to deal with bodies to objectify them. Coming back to intelligence, what would a Heideggerian state about such an approach?

Jimena Clavel

First of all, I would like to attend the distinction between those terms: there is a passage in the *Zollikon Seminars* that made a big impression on me, because Heidegger says there that he is discussing with the psychologists, and at that time computer science and intelligence based on the former was developing. Heidegger claims that there is a gap, that he cannot explain how “*Körper*” and “*Leib*” are connected. Finally, he accepts a thesis which could be taken as the gap between the phenomenological experience of our mind and the cognitive capacities that can be measured. However, Dreyfus affirms that human intelligence never implies representation, and many investigators criticize this approach as incorrect. A correct phenomenological approach could be that the most basic relation we establish with the world does not imply representations, but in a derivative way there are representations; moreover, there are theoretical representations although we do not utilize them on a daily basis. That is one of the issues I am very interested in, because there seems to be a huge gap between the aspects I mentioned before, and contemporary philosophy of mind not only recognizes that gap, but the impossibility of solving it.

Alejandro Vigo

When there is a gap, one can consider it as a given gap or consider it, at the methodical level, as an imaginative gap. If one have the concepts of the cognitive science or any science, and other philosophical concepts, and also a philosophical theory explaining the origin of both types of concepts, that is a way to disclose a common ground for those concepts. Then, one has a strategy that does not close the gap, but it specifies why there is such gap. I guess that the program of the constitutive theory of the sciences tries to do that. For instance, Peter Janich explains the way geometry can derive its concepts from the natural, namely, the pre-reflexive experience of space. On the other hand, one can pose the problem concerning how can philosophers argue about space; not only the space that one experiences, but also that in which scientist are interested in. If one has the possibility to explain the gap at the methodical level, then there is no need to close it. One gives the reasons why the gap is present, one is aware of it and recognizes the fact that different types of concepts

are functionally connected with what the scholastic philosophy would call “formal objects”.

André Laks

These are all interesting questions, but I wonder whether they involve Heidegger as such. It seems to me that what Alejandro Vigo said, for instance, puts into jeopardy the matters here discussed from a Husserlian point of view. Of course, one can read Heidegger’s works presenting a special kind of phenomenology, as Steven Crowell does. But in Heidegger’s thought, the “*Lebenswelt*” takes a new turn and brings us back to the question of Being, which is a specifically Heideggerian project. It seems that two different discussions have emerged here.

There is a second question that I would like to pose. Can the whole problem Jimena Clavel proposes be traced back to the following two sub-questions, so to speak: (1) what does it mean when Heidegger affirms that regional ontologies are grounded in fundamental ontology? And, (2) what does it mean to ground something in something else? There are two interpretations that can be defended here: the conditions of possibility for the regional ontology in question can be situated at two different levels.

Jimena Clavel

Regarding André Laks’ first question “Where is Heidegger?”: I believe that Heidegger seems indifferent to the problem you raised; he seems not to be moving from scientific research onwards, but backwards. He appears slightly indifferent to whether his project can be taken in that way. So, he opens the possibility in all his textual suggestions where he affirms that maybe sciences need an analytic of *Dasein*. Yet, the question that remains concerns the meaning of this, and that amounts to your second question regarding what it means to ground something. My guess is that for Heidegger grounding is not a matter of defining the set of essential concepts of a science in particular. Instead, I believe that Heidegger intends to rethink science as a human task.

Steven Crowell

The problem of the grounding is very complex in Heidegger. He gives us at least three senses of this notion in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*. One sense is *Begründung*, that is to say, giving reasons for things. I like

the distinction Jimena Clavel made there, which takes its roots from McDowell: appealing to causes is one thing, and appealing to conditions of constitution is another. They are not the same thing at all. One has a certain form, as McDowell affirms: thus causes are what they are because they are formulated as exact laws. In contrast, constitutive conditions are motivations as Husserl would say, or transcendental conditions. Transcendental grounding pertains only to the task of philosophy; this is the so called “discontinuity thesis”, which is also reflected in Alejandro Vigo’s discussion of the gap that is generated purely at the methodological level.

This discussion recalls the question of what truly motivated Dreyfus, which is, as you pointed out earlier in your presentation, that from the beginning: the Artificial Intelligence program simply assumed that what we call intelligence is computation, the so called “GOFAI”: “Good old-fashioned A.I.” Dreyfus’s original question was just the one Peter Trawny raised: what is intelligence supposed to be here?

I think the debate about cognitive structure or intelligence has now developed to the point that it makes sense to try to integrate phenomenology, since it has moved beyond pure computational models to a discussion of intentional content and, in general, questions of intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. Here we find the target of Dreyfus’ phenomenological criticism, namely, the role that the concept of representation plays: intelligence is taken to be the manipulation of representations of the world that are then classified in terms of correct or incorrect.

Dreyfus argued that a certain kind of phenomenology, the Husserlian model, bought into this misguided representationalist presupposition. But this just papers over the problem: scientific investigation in cognitive science appeals to causal laws, and then, in order to generate meaning or intentional content out of this causal system, one appeals to imaginary entities like representations, which already have intentional properties. But how do they get them? This is the phenomenological question that Dreyfus hopes Heidegger can answer, or rather, help us to avoid.

Dreyfus claims that phenomenology must take a Heideggerian form, in conjunction with the more naturalistic elements of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body. Together, these authors show how intelligence belongs first of all to our mindless coping, our everyday practices, and requires no appeal to representations or νοήματα. What implications does this have for the debates in cognitive science itself? If our concept

of intelligence no longer requires representationalism or internalism, Dreyfus holds that the task is to find a neurological basis that mirrors the sort of practical coping that structures the kind of intentionality we possess, our ability to be oriented towards things as something. Do you think there is any future in looking for such neurological correlates? I am not convinced. Appealing to brain architecture always seems rather *ad hoc* to me. But this all leads back to the question of what sorts of regional ontologies come into play if we pursue this kind of phenomenology?

It seems to me that one very valuable approach is suggested by Joseph Rouse in his book *How Scientific Practices Matter*: instead of merely looking at the categorial schemes or logic of the sciences, as both Husserl and Heidegger did, Rouse suggests that the philosophical presuppositions of the sciences must be sought in scientific practices themselves. We have to see the function of scientific theories as integrated with a whole set of ways of being engaged with things in the world, yielding a holistic account of theory and practice. Neither Husserl nor Heidegger really got this far. In Rouse's terms, the way that intelligibility, and therefore intelligence, is manifested lies not merely in the theories themselves but in the negotiations that go on in the gap between instrumentation and discursive formulations. Following Alejandro Vigo, it seems to me that we can just accept these gaps in modes of explanation, but we integrate them in terms of phenomenological account on how they show up in interactions whose borders do not lie within any particular disciplinary matrix.

Finally, I want to thank you for bringing up the *Zollikon Seminars*. I find this text fascinating because in these exchanges –despite being separated from *Being and Time* by many decades and many changes in Heidegger's thinking– Heidegger appeals to the categories of *Being and Time* as though all the intervening years, and their supposed rejection of transcendental phenomenology, had never happened.

Alejandro Vigo

In order to complete this suggestion, it is important to take into account that these practices lead to the formation of scientific concepts. One can find in *Being and Time* a couple of places where Heidegger mentions it, but there is also this beautiful lesson *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (GA 27) which is a very important text for Jimena Clavel program. There, *Wissenschaft*, science, is taken as a basic attitude

(*Grundhaltung*) of *Dasein* and as a peculiar case of being in the truth and sharing in the truth with others. The crucial point is not what the set of scientific theories we have right now are, but the way in which we are able to start from our common life experience to get such strange things as scientific concepts, namely, the basic scientific concepts in which those theories are formulated; this is a special form of ideal genesis that must be analysed from a phenomenological viewpoint. Of course, we need practices to be able to do what we do, when we produce scientific concepts, and these practices essentially respond to the model of praxis that Heidegger is trying to develop in his phenomenology.

Peter Trawny

I would like to add a story. I am the editor of the not published *Zollikon Seminars* material, and it includes all the correspondence between Boss and Heidegger. The amusing aspect in this context is the dynamic of the seminars; ten years is a long time (1955 to 1965). So, the strategy that Heidegger employs is that he deals with physicians, who are also psychologists, but he thinks that they are natural scientists. Then, in this extra material from the seminars it is evident that he read many Freudian texts –more than we know– and other texts about cybernetics; and he always says that the concept of psychology is naturalistic, because Freud is a natural scientist, and I have to show you that everything that is measurable has to be left aside. The funny thing is that the members of the seminars accepted that they are no natural scientist, they wanted to know more about this, they did not want Heidegger just to show that there is an existing gap, but to show the how to deal with that. At the end, he persisted in his critic of natural sciences and the seminar was a failure; he and Boss were conscious of that. The problem was, I think, that he remained in the same position: he did not move forward; he just stated that there was a gap that could not be closed, and should not be closed. In my opinion, it is disappointing how the whole affair ended.

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