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Thirty Years of Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Studies on the Work of Daniel Dennett. Introduction by the Issue’s Editors
Hay filósofos que construyen sistemas, hay filósofos que los derriban. Daniel Dennett (1942-2024) fue, con notable destreza, ambas cosas a la vez. Su influencia se extendió más allá de los límites disciplinarios: hizo borroso el límite entre una investigación “propiamente” científica y una “propiamente” filosófica. Content and Consciousness (1969) inauguró una carrera que pasaría por hitos como Brainstorms (1978), Elbow Room (1984), The Intentional Stance (1987), Consciousness Explained (1991), Freedom Evolves (2003) y From Bacteria to Bach and Back (2017), entre muchos otros. Cada uno de estos libros desafió consensos establecidos, provocó polémicas fértiles y, sobre todo, amplió el horizonte de lo que la filosofía podía preguntar y de las herramientas con las que podía responder. Durante más de medio siglo, su obra recorrió los territorios más disputados de la filosofía contemporánea —la consciencia, la intencionalidad, la evolución biológica, el libre albedrío, la religión— sin perder jamás ni el rigor argumentativo ni una vocación contagiosa por hacer de la filosofía una empresa pública, accesible y urgente. Este número especial se inspira en un libro en particular del filósofo: Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995). Treinta años después de su publicación, es una obra que sigue ocupando un lugar central en las discusiones contemporáneas sobre la mente, la evolución y el alcance explicativo de la ciencia.
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Liberalism as Religion and Its Global Repercussion: A Comparative Perspective on the Critical Interpretations of John Gray and John Milbank
This paper makes a comparative analysis of the thought of the philosopher John Gray and the Christian socialist theologian John Milbank—both contemporary English authors—on the relationship between liberalism, religion, and international order. Although they come from different intellectual backgrounds, both agree that this relationship does not consist simply of the interaction between political and religious actors, but above all of a convergence in which ideology and religion merge to give rise to specific forms of political religion and theology that define the ways in which human life is conducted on a global scale. Despite this similarity, this paper ends by highlighting the differences that exist between Gray and Milbank regarding their conceptions of the post-liberal world derived from their assessments of liberalism and religion.
Koch, K. (2023). Denken in Zwecken. Bedeutung und Status der Teleologie in der theoretischen Philosophie Kants und Hegels. Felix Meiner Verlag. 310 pp.
The “Strange Inversion of Reasoning” about Language in Dennett’s Work
In this paper, I aim to show how, according to Dennett, Darwin’s “dangerous idea” also extends to language and its distinctive properties. According to Dennett, by Darwin’s “strange inversion of reasoning,” all “intelligent design” follows the principle of competence without comprehension: the former precedes and is presupposed by the latter, so that, sometimes, it is possible to explain it without comprehension taking place. As will be seen, the reconfiguration that results from that “inversion of reasoning” about the relationship between humans and language—how it emerged, how it is learned, how it is used, what its cognitive and cultural effects are—as well as language itself as a set of communicative and cognitive tools, is contrary to that offered by many contemporary philosophical and linguistic conceptions, rooted in the opposite principle: the primacy of comprehension over competence.
Aouad, M., Di Vincenzo, S. y Fadlallah, H. (2023). Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Critical Edition of the Arabic Version, French Translation and English Introduction. Brill. 632 pp.
On Dennett’s Path: A Genealogy of Morality
In this paper I discuss the final two chapters of Darwin’s Dangerous Idea devoted to the evolution of morality and offer a summarized version of the genealogy of morality that I have developed in recent work, in part as a response to the shortcomings identified in Dennett’s proposal. Regarding chapter 16 of Dennet’s book, I argue that one can go beyond his approach and offer an evolutionary explanation of the origin and evolution of morality. Regarding chapter 17, I point out the moral non-specificity of his proposal for a “moral first aid manual”, which leads to the necessary characterization of the scope of morality. In the third section it is argued that this genealogy of morality offers a way to fulfill Dennett’s basic goal of an evolutionary account of morality. This proposal does not create a gap between biological evolution and cultural evolution as two alternative processes, as Dennett and memetics assumed, but rather integrates them through the process of individual development, by which each new human biological individual is culturally constituted.
Gerlach, S. (2023). Schellings Philosophie der Potenz 1798-1854. Mohr Siebeck. 300 pp.
Is There Design in Nature? Daniel Dennett and the Problem of Teleology: Epistemological and Didactic Issues
This paper discusses some of Daniel Dennett’s analyses (associated with the notions of “intentional stance,” “reverse engineering”, and “design”) of the problem of teleology in biology. On the basis of this discussion, a possible way in which these notions can be articulated within a general perspective on the role and legitimacy of teleology in biology is proposed. Finally, some didactic implications of such analyses are discussed in relation to the problem of teleology in the teaching of evolutionary biology. More specifically, it is argued that Dennett’s analyses constitute an adequate epistemological foundation for a didactic approach focused on fostering students’ “metacognitive vigilance” over their teleological intuitions.
When Darwin’s “Universal Acid” Comes into Contact with Human Creativity
Dennett has argued that a thorough reception of Darwinian evolutionary theory must modify our conception of mental phenomena, which traditionally includes human creativity. In this article, I aim to systematize and develop some guidelines that a Darwinian approach to human creativity should adopt, following Dennett’s ideas. I argue that Dennett’s Darwinian approach to creativity is pluralistic in nature—since it incorporates processes of different kinds which operate at different levels—it includes explanations that account for the cumulative nature of design, and it considers that creative processes are largely collaborative and do not necessarily involve understanding. Thus, it is an approach that maintains that the human mind, acting individually, does not possess the power assigned to it by pre-Darwinian approaches to creativity.
Human Free Will and Determinism: Critical Considerations on Daniel Dennett’s Philosophy and the Dangerous Idea of Freedom in Evolutionary Epistemology
This paper proposes some critical considerations on Daniel Dennett’s philosophy, particularly on his notion of human free will in relation to determinism. To this effect, it analyses the four types of possibility studied by Dennett and their relationship with causality and chance in the context of the philosophy of biology. In addition, it also critically evaluates the distinction made by Dennett between deterministic, indeterministic, and nihilistic universes, with special attention to the treatment conferred in physics to the idea of causality in classical, relativistic, and quantum mechanics. Finally, it explains how the compatibility between human free will and deterministic natural laws defended by Dennett could be developed and explained in evolutionary epistemology.
Dennett, Gould and the Controversy over Adaptationism Four Decades Later
The aim of this paper is to provide a general reconstruction of the agreements and divergences between Daniel Dennett and Stephen Jay Gould that underlay the discussion between them during the last quarter of the 20th century. I show that Gould’s initial theoretical and methodological critiques of radical adaptationism already outline the reasons that led to the crisis of both sociobiology and Evolutionary Psychology, and that Dennett’s inability to understand the motivations behind Gould’s attacks on radical adaptationism stems from his decision to approach the controversy surrounding the epistemological credentials of Evolutionary Psychology from an exclusively theoretical perspective.
Dysfunction, Mismatch, and Empirical Underdetermination
Are psychiatric disorders caused by a malfunction in the mind’s mechanisms? Or can they be explained as the result of a mismatch between our psychological mechanisms and an environment different from the one in which these systems evolved? In this paper, we draw on central elements of Daniel Dennett’s conception of proper function to address a specific version of the debate between theories of dysfunction and theories of mismatch, focusing on cases of substance addiction. Following Dennett’s idea that there is no decisive fact determining the proper function of biological systems, we argue that the decision regarding the dysfunction of the reward system in addiction is underdetermined by the evidence. Our argument calls for a reorientation of the discussion, suggesting a new focus on the pragmatic considerations that can be invoked to choose between two empirically equivalent theories.
In this paper, I contrast Dennett’s materialism with post-cognitive enactivism. Although both are naturalist and eliminativist approaches concerning the Cartesian Theater, Dennett’s functionalism remains limited by its adherence to representationalism regarding the mind’s internal workings. The main difference observed between these two forms of materialism concerns the place of experience and phenomenology, a central position accepted by enactivism as a hallmark of life, at the cost of abandoning the idea of representation and content.
Simulation and Justification in the Age of Deep Learning: AlphaFold as a Paradigmatic Case of Opaque Models
This paper examines the epistemic status of contemporary computational models based on deep learning through the case of AlphaFold, with the aim of assessing to what extent such systems can be understood within the traditional framework of computational simulations or whether they require distinct epistemic categories. Drawing on Paul Humphreys’ analytical framework—particularly the notions of computational templates and computational models—the paper explores the possibility of a formal and epistemic continuity between classical simulations and deep learning systems, while critically addressing issues of opacity, pragmatic validation, and the constitutive role of visual representation. The analysis shows that, although classical representationalist accounts are insufficient to capture the internal functioning of models such as AlphaFold, these systems cannot be straightforwardly reduced to mere algorithmic devices. In this sense, it is argued that AlphaFold confronts philosophy of science with the need to rethink both the criteria of epistemic justification and the scope of the notion of simulation in the era of deep learning.
epistemically opaque deep-learning simulations
Analysis of Some Contemporary Criticisms of Alasdair Macintyre’s Eventual Political Proposal
Alasdair MacIntyre’s political philosophy has proven to be highly influential in current debates concerning modern political institutions and their relationship to ethics. However, it has also been the focus of numerous criticisms from various schools of thought. Of these, the most documented ones point to a lack of explicitness, clarity, and viability throughout his political proposal. This paper analyzes three of these criticisms, expressed by Perreau-Saussine, Pierre Manent, Keith Breen, Ronald Beiner, and Daniel Edward Young. Firstly, it presents and briefly highlights the main aspects of MacIntyrean political theory. It then analyzes the criticisms of these authors. Finally, it explores the possible existence of a viable political proposal based on MacIntyre’s political theory while also incorporating into the analysis those criticisms that seem to be well-founded.
The Recognition of Identity in Hannah Arendt’s Philosophy: The Primacy of the Spectator and the Limits of the Agent
In this paper, we address the problem of recognition in relation to identity through the lens of Hannah Arendt’s philosophy. We analyze the possible incompatibility between an actor’s self-perception (whether individual or collective) and the perception others have of her. We argue that this problem can be explored through the lens of both vita activa and vita contemplativa. We maintain that recognition, as a political phenomenon, depends more on the gaze of the spectator than on the will of the agent. Although it does not always stem from deliberate intention, its pursuit requires coherence in conduct and an appeal to persuasion, avoiding violence. Violence, insofar as it is tied to the logic of work in Arendt’s thought, tends to nullify the political character of recognition and the necessary conditions for it to take place.
The Dialectical Interpretation of Hermeneutics
The rise of the theme of interpretation in contemporary philosophy has sparked criticism of those positions that treat all human praxis as a form of interpretation, promoting a relativism for which no objective truth exists. This paper argues that Hans-Georg Gadamer´s hermeneutics avoids this criticism by developing a dialectical notion of interpretation in which interpreting does not mean imposing an arbitrary meaning, but rather mediating a particular concrete situation through a common space of meaning. Here it is examined how, according to Gadamer, this mediation takes place both in the understanding of the social world and at the more fundamental level of living language. Finally, some avenues for further development opened up by this examination are suggested, in particular that of a hermeneutic social philosophy capable of providing guidance on meaning to contemporary capitalist societies.
Interpretation of Space and Understanding of Self: Reading Foucault and Ricoeur in One Frame
This paper explores how the interpretation of space opens possibilities for self-understanding in the later works of Michel Foucault and Paul Ricoeur. First, the thinkers’ projects in post-structuralist hermeneutics of the subject/self are situated in the aftermath of the “overthrow of the Cogito” by the “masters of suspicion.” Next, an analysis of space as a text-analogue is passed through to understand the self’s exteriorisation of meaning in built space. Here, Foucault’s history of the Western concept of space is unpacked through Stephan Günzel’s exposition, and Foucault and Ricoeur are discussed as thinkers on space. Finally, “refiguration of space” is identified as the phase in which possibilities for the revealing and transforming of the self are opened. The paper shows that “spatiality of the self” offers another point of intersection to further imaginary conversations between Foucault and Ricoeur in the context of their shared concern for the self.
The The Absence of Need in Husserl as an Explanatory Concept of the Phenomenon of Value: A Proposal from Carl Menger and Ludwig Feuerbach
This paper explores some of the problems raised by the Husserlian explanatory model of affective acts in relation to the phenomenon of value. It is divided into two main parts. In the first, Husserl’s theory of value is analyzed from the perspective of its foundational acts, paying special attention to the problem of the relation between objectifying and non-objectifying acts. This section concludes that the intentional schema with which Husserl analyzes affective acts presents problems that derive from his “visual” interpretation. In the second part, the converging ideas of Carl Menger and Ludwig Feuerbach on value theory and action are presented, based on which it is proposed that the missing element in the Husserlian schema is the concept of need. With this concept, an extended intentional scheme of affective acts is developed, featuring a double intentionality of consciousness directed to both the subject and the object.
Descartes, an Absolute Beginning: The Genesis of Modern Thought in the Heideggerian Reading of Descartes’ Regulae
Although Heideggerian research has extensively studied the influence of Aristotle, the figure of Descartes has not received equivalent attention, despite the near-complete publication of the Gesamtausgabe and the abundance of available documentation. From his earliest lectures in Freiburg and Marburg, Heidegger maintains an interpretative confrontation with the thought of Descartes, which extends even to the Zollikon Seminars of the 1950s and 1960s. Unlike Aristotle, whose presence is affirmative and formative, Descartes appears as a contrasting figure, which may explain the relative academic neglect of this connection. This paper examines the beginning of modern thought through Heidegger’s interpretation of the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, a text that permeates a significant portion of his reflections on Descartes. In doing so, it contributes to a more precise study of their relationship and offers new impulses for specialized research.
Interruption in Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s system of absolute objectivity
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s realism is inseparable from the philosophical controversies in which he was involved. The most famous of them involves the Kantian “thing-in-itself”. However, Jacobi’s realism has to be interpreted also according to its relation to Spinoza’s philosophy. Starting from a passage of the novel Allwill, rarely studied and yet highly valued by Jacobi himself, we propose to explore Jacobi’s realism (the system of absolute objectivity) using the notion of “interruption” as a reference point. This notion allows us not only to decipher conceptual aspects of Jacobi’s thought, but also to understand the way in which he works concretely with written culture. The interruption of the pure emptiness of thought is, for Jacobi, the beginning of life (as free acting) expressed from the conditions of conceptual discourse, which are not really appropriate for such expressions.