Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía is a specialized publication aimed at professionals within the national and international philosophical community. It has appeared uninterruptedly from 1991 thanks to the support and financial aid of Universidad Panamericana’s School of Philosophy. We accept unsolicited, unpublished, original manuscripts in Spanish, English, French, Italian, German, and Portuguese. The contents and methodology of all articles must be predominantly philosophical. The journal is not limited to a specific area of field within philosophy, so long as there is rigor and methodological sophistication in the research done and in the mode of exposition. We do not publish manuscripts that are non-academic, general, or theological, nor do we publish survey articles, articles focusing on art or literary criticism, or interdisciplinary studies that are not carried out with a predominantly philosophical methodology and content. Each article shall be submitted to a rigorous peer review process, following the double-blind method of evaluation. The format and quality specifications which authors must follow are found in the section Submission Guidelines. Our code of ethics is found below. The journal is issued in the months of January and July of each year, both in open-access digital format and in print. The latter is distributed internationally by means of exchange and donations. In 2023, 45% of articles received were accepted for publication, and 55 % were rejected. Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía appears in the following indexes, catalogs, and databases: The Philosopher’s Index, Répertoire bibliographique de la philosophie, DIALNET, Latindex, Filos, Clase, REDALyC, SCIELO, DOAJ, REDIB, EBSCO, ELSEVIER, SCOPUS.
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Self-Control and Pleasure: Xenophon’s Claim and His Critique of Cyrenaic Philosophy in Mem. II.1
This article studies the idea of enkráteia in Xenophon based on the analysis of the dialogue between Socrates and Aristippus in Memorabilia II.1. This conversation allows us to observe, on the one hand, the way in which Xenophon constructs his own conception of pleasure based on the critique of the Cyrenaic theory, and, on the other hand, the two sides of enkráteia, individual and political. I show that in this dialogue, and in Xenophon’s works in general, we find two types of enkráteia: a strong or maximal one, which implies abstaining from most pleasures even when a physiological need appears, and a weak or minimal one, which implies satisfying desire according to physiological needs and which does not exclude the pursuit of pleasure, but is the necessary condition for feeling any pleasure.
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Kempe, M. (2024). El mejor de los mundos posibles. Los 7 días que cambiaron la vida de Leibniz. J. Chamorro Mielke (trad.). Taurus. 300 pp.
Artificial Intelligence, Superintelligence, and Cognitive Enhancement
Transhumanism is a philosophical movement that considers the attainment of a higher evolutionary stage possible because of the feasibility of the “singularity.” Some positions consider that this is not possible due to the intrinsic limits of artificial intelligence (AI). I claim that, despite the impossibility of reaching superhuman stages, AI satisfies the criteria of cognitive enhancement (at some restorative level and within limits). This enhancement manifests itself in specific capabilities that result in an increase that transcends human limits but does not lead to a higher evolutionary stage. To defend this, I examine what AI, artificial superintelligence (AIS), and the singularity are; subsequently I discuss some objections to the possibility of achieving a general artificial intelligence (GAI) drawn from John Searle, Roger Penrose, and Hubert Dreyfus; finally, I argue (by means of a taxonomy) at which levels AI can be said to represent cognitive enhancement.
Trujillo Liñán, L. (2022). Formal Cause in Marshall McLuhan’s Thinking: An Aristotelian Perspective. Institute of General Semantics. 132 pp.
The Triad “Being, Living, and Thinking” and the Dynamic Structure of Thought in Plotinus
This article examines the dynamic character of the Plotinian conception of reality based on his particular appropriation of the identity of the notions of being, living, and thinking. It is argued that this proposal is characterized both by its adoption of classical sources (above all, Aristotelian epistemology) and by the extension of the triadic structure of the Intellect to reality as a whole. This extension allows Plotinus both to show the continuity between the different levels of reality (because of the origin of life in general from the Life of the Intellect) and to account for the necessity and possibility for the human soul to ascend to the Intellect. In this way, it is shown how the dynamic structure of the Intellect determines the contemplative, self-constitutive, and creative moments of each of the hypostases of Plotinus’s system.
Was Leibniz a Nominalist? A Critical Survey of the Nature and Scope of Leibnizian Nominalism
In this article, I discuss the problem concerning the nature and scope of Leibniz’s nominalism. Considering several manuscripts from Leibniz’s youth to his later years, I provide textual evidence refuting the interpretation according to which he could be considered a nominalist. In contrast, following certain Leibniz’s scholars, I suggest that Leibniz’s ontology can be better understood as conceptualist. Thus, the main claim of this article is that even if—against Scholastics—Leibniz calls for the elimination or avoidance of abstract or universal terms in philosophical language, given some specific requirements of his ontology, he was pushed to reestablish them.
Bastos Andrade, L. (2024). Afectividad y emociones. Aportes selectos desde la filosofía con apertura interdisciplinar. Editorial Tirant lo Blanch. 199 pp.
Meaning and Scope of the Concept of Taste
The meaning of taste was considered from many perspectives during the modern era, which is evidence of its inexhaustible significance. Recognized as a criterion of aesthetic attitude, it plays a moral as well as a religious roll, transcending mere sensibility and manifesting a broad and rich nature. Its practical origin as a criterion of flavor confirms its essentiality. Being the first judgement of all that is good, it expresses perhaps the source of the understanding of human existence. Taste is a sense that appears as a philosophical object during the 17th century, displacing sight from its position of pre-eminence, to help form an idea of the human being that was conceived, reformulated, and reinterpreted during the 18th century. The meaning and scope of the concept of taste is decisive not only as a sign of its philosophical relevance, but also because this importance reveals a type of knowledge that seems still unexplored.
Virtuality and Transcendence in The Philosophy of Redemption: An Objection against Immanentism
Mainländer wanted to develop a philosophical system that would defeat the pantheistic ideas represented, according to him, by Schopenhauer and Hegel. In this article, the relevance of Mainländer’s philosophical project is evaluated considering his immanentist claim. It is argued that the construction of his immanent system is hindered by the presence of realities over and above individuals: virtuality. This appears as both an actual and a dormant phenomenon, which cannot be accommodated by an immanentist philosophical system. It is concluded that a moderate perception of the disintegration of transcendence must be applied in the interpretation of his philosophy.
Overcoming Nihilism: Reflections Based on Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, and Camus
This article raises the problem of overcoming nihilism in Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, and Camus. After analyzing the meaning of this concept, focusing on the Kirillov case raised in the novel The Demons, the responses of these authors to this phenomenon are addressed, namely, Nietzsche’s eternal return, Camus’s reconciliation with absurdity, and Dostoevsky’s return to Christianity. The central claim is that any philosophy or ideology that disregards God will fail in its attempt to overcome nihilism.
Two conceptions outline contemporary reflections on the sublime: one unfolds by differentiating itself from its modern definition; the other emphasizes continuity between both moments. Against the idea of a radical opposition between these conceptions, we propose reconsidering the relationship between changes and continuities in the theorization of the sublime in modern German philosophy (Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Simmel). We make two claims: 1) since the transition from the modern (natural) sublime to the contemporary (technological-political) sublime is based on the increasing exploitation of nature, this transition is progressive, not abrupt; 2) at the limits of this transition (in Simmel), the opposition between the natural sublime and the anthropological sublime calls into question the ethical and aesthetic issues involved in attaining these feelings as absolutes. This problematization, also present in later philosophy, marks a point of transition between modern and contemporary aesthetics.
The Ethical in Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophy
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein claims that there cannot be ethical propositions. However, in the Lecture on Ethics he tells us about his own ethical-religious experiences, which are described through statements like “I wonder at the existence of the world”, “I am safe whatever happens”, or “God disapproves of our conduct”. If ethics can find no adequate expression in language, then how could the author of the Lecture convey to us his ethical experiences? In this article, I propose an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s conception of the ethical which reconciles the ineffability of ethics with its apparent expressability in Wittgenstein’s early texts. I also show that this interpretation can account for the idea that the very writing and publication of the Tractatus was, for its author, an ethical act: his way towards the philosophical revelation that ethics belongs to the domain of paradox and nonsense because it is situated outside the space of the world’s possibilities.
The Temporization of Factual Living in Martin Heidegger’s Early Works (1924-1927): A Bidirectional Ontology? Part Two
In this second article, we discuss an oscillation or fluctuation in the model of temporization observed in the period prior to SZ (particularly between 1924 and 1926). We show that, in contrast to the projective model that emphasizes the future-being (which we described in the first article in this series), Heidegger seems to see the need to propose a retrojective model, whose central concept is that of “making present” (Gegenwärtigen). We propose that, in this second characterization, prior to SZ, one would see a bidirectional ontological model, both projective and retrojective, according to which understanding something would imply manifesting the truth of being as “being-for-itself.” We consider the alethiological implications of this retrojective movement regarding natural being and address whether it is possible to reconcile this model of temporization with the standard (unidirectional) model found in SZ.
The Emergence of the Question of Language in Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behavior
This article examines the emergence of the question of language in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behaviour, which precedes Phenomenology of Perception and yet has often been overlooked in studies of his philosophy of language. Contrary to the interpretation that places the beginning of this problem in a later work, it is argued that the foundations of his linguistic conception are already present in nuce in his first book. Through an analysis of his critiques of behaviourism and the dialogue with Kurt Goldstein’s organismic theory, two central themes are examined: the philosophical implications of aphasia and the notion of “linguistic consciousness.” It is shown how Merleau-Ponty understands language as an a priori material structure, inseparable from the body and intersubjectivity. Finally, the continuity between The Structure of Behaviour and Phenomenology of Perception is highlighted, as well as the relevance of the former for understanding the subsequent development of his thought.
Situating Oneself in the Virtual: A Merleau-Pontian Approach to the Virtual Status of Corporeality
This article discusses how the corporeality proposed in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology refers to an original virtual dimension. To this end, the relationship between movement and perception as constitutive of all lived bodes is reviewed. Subsequently, this relationship is problematized based on the Merleau-Pontian distinction between concrete movement and virtual movement. It is shown that movement not only permits the opening of fields of meaning, but fundamentally indicates a virtuality of these fields. Lastly, it is suggested to rethink the apriorism of the body, shifting it towards an apriorism of the virtual, insofar as the genesis of sensible being arises from a virtual dimension.
The Early Reception of Emilio Uranga’s Analysis of Mexican Being
This article discusses the first reviews of Emilio Uranga’s Analysis of Mexican Being: the first one, brief and anonymous; María Elvira Bermúdez’s, who wrote with a focus on gender; Arturo Rivas Sáinz’s, a perceptive reader (like Uranga) of Ramón López Velarde’s poetry; Enrique González Rojo’s Marxist review; and Abelardo Villegas’s, for whom the relationship between Mexicans and the rest of humanity would seem contradictory and impossible within Uranga’s framework. The article evaluates the objectives of these reviews and the intellectual and historical context in which they and the Analysis appeared.
Exteriorization as a “Particular” Faculty of the Soul and Spirit: Nuances and Processes in the Philosophy of Pavol Strauss (1912-1994)
Exteriorization expresses different meanings in the field of philosophy that often lead to various conclusions categorized within the theories of extended mind. Slovak philosopher Pavol Strauss (1912-1994) tends to focus on the notion of exteriorization under his phenomenological-existentialist optic. Strauss understands exteriorization under the structure of his anthropological conception of human beings and examines its functions, manifestations, and processes. Both exteriorization and interiorization are located by Strauss among the human faculties, but their function is not that assigned to them by the Augustinian or Thomistic traditions: Strauss does not define these two faculties only as powers of the soul, but also as powers of the spirit. Exteriorization and interiorization are both faculties particular to human beings. In this article, I discuss the principal descriptions of ten processes in which the faculty of exteriorization plays a role and manifests its singularity and impact.
Nihilistic Interpretation: A Postmodern View of Hermeneutic Ontology
This research lies halfway between philosophical hermeneutics and postmodern thought. With Gadamer, I analyze the phenomenon of interpretations to search for the experience of the contemporary world through language. I also delve into the postmodern perspective of Lyotard on the end of grand narratives and I add to the debate Vattimo’s reflections from the perspective of weak ontological thought. I take these authors as a basis for the critique of philosophical hermeneutics from postmodern thought, which ultimately leads to a kind of bridge towards an interpretative ethics, necessary in our times.
In Defense of the Naive Conception of Set
In this paper, I reply to Incurvati’s (2020, pp. 101-127) objections against the naive conception of set. This is the conception according to which a set is the collection of objects that satisfy a given property. Following Incurvati’s objections, I claim that (i) the weakness of a variety of inconsistent theories is no reason to reject them, (ii) naive set theories are as ad hoc as ZFC (and others classical theories), and that (iii) there is no compelling reason to believe that naive set theories (formalized in relevant logics) are theories of non-extensional objects.