

WHAT IS AN INTELLECTUAL “TURN”?

THE *LIBER DE CAUSIS*, AVICENNA, AND AQUINAS’S TURN TO PHANTASMS

Therese Scarpelli Cory
Seattle University
coryt@seattleu.edu

Abstract

This paper seeks to elucidate Aquinas’s “turn to phantasms” by investigating what he means by “turning”. It argues that the key to the underlying conceptual framework of “intellectual turning” is found in two Islamic sources that were immensely influential on thirteenth - century Latin philosophical psychology, and that present specific technical concepts of “turning” as a kind of dependence: the anonymous *Liber de causis*, and the Persian philosopher Avicenna’s *Liber de anima*. This paper, then, aims at recovering this underlying historical paradigm, by examining how these two key sources conceive of “turning” and how Aquinas incorporates their insights into his account of the “turn to phantasms”.

Key words: “turn to phantasms”, Aquinas, *Liber de Causis*, Avicenna.

Resumen

Este artículo pretende dilucidar la expresión utilizada por Tomás de Aquino “vuelta al fantasma”, con la intención de esclarecer lo que entiende por “vuelta”. Se argumenta que el marco conceptual subyacente al “giro intelectual” se encuentra en dos fuentes islámicas que fueron ampliamente influyentes en la psicología filosófica latina del siglo XIII, y que presentan conceptos técnicos específicos de la “vuelta” como un tipo de

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dependencia. Las obras son: *Liber de Causis*, de autor anónimo; y *Liber de anima*, del filósofo persa Avicena. Así, este artículo busca recuperar este marco histórico subyacente, examinando cómo estas dos fuentes clave conciben la “vuelta” y cómo Tomás de Aquino incorpora estas fuentes en su concepción de la “vuelta al fantasma”.

Palabras clave: “vuelta al fantasma”, Tomás de Aquino, *Liber de Causis*, Avicena.

For Thomas Aquinas, the human intellect’s understanding of essences depends on “phantasms,” or likenesses of particulars, which are formed by the imagination from sensory experience of particulars. From such phantasms, the agent intellect abstracts the “intelligible species” that are likenesses of universals, and which inform the possible intellect, making possible acts of cognizing ‘man’ or ‘horse’ universally.¹ But Aquinas also insists on another, more puzzling role for the phantasms in intellectual cognition: In the moment of cognizing ‘man’ or ‘horse’, the intellect “turns toward the phantasms in order to behold the universal

¹ For the texts in which Aquinas presents his cognition theory most comprehensively, see his commentary on the *Sentences* II.17.2.1, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima* qq. 3–5, commentary on *De anima* III, *Summa theologiae* Ia qq. 78–79 and 84–89, and *De unitate intellectus*. I have used the Editio Leonina Manualis (abbreviated “Leon. Man.”) for the *Summa theologiae* (3rd ed., Rome: Edizione San Paolo, 1999) and *Summa contra gentiles* (Rome: Apud Sedem Commissionis Leoninae, 1934). The commentary on the *Liber de causis* is cited according to the edition by H.-D. Saffrey (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1954). The commentary on the *Sentences*, books I–III according to the edition by R.P. Mandonnet and R.P. Moos (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929–47), and book IV according to the Parma edition (Parma: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1852–1873)—abbreviated respectively as “Mand.,” “Moos,” and “Parma.” The remaining texts are cited according to the Leonine edition of Aquinas’s *Opera omnia* (abbreviated “Leon.”). Titles of commonly-cited works are abbreviated as follows: DV=*Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*; InDA=*Sentencia libri De anima*; InDeSensu=*Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato*; QDDA=*Quaestiones disputatae de anima*; QDSC=*Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis*; Sent.=*Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*; SCG=*Summa contra gentiles*; SLDC=*Super librum de causis*; ST=*Summa theologiae*. Works are cited, according to standard practice, by their primary internal divisions, and all translations into English are mine unless otherwise noted.

nature in the individual of which it is the essence.”² The authority for this view comes from Aristotle’s statement in *De anima* that “the soul in no way understands without phantasms,” and that “it understands the species of intellectives in the phantasms.”³

The nature and significance of this “turn to phantasms” (*conversio ad phantasmata*) in Aquinas has proven remarkably resistant to interpretation, since it is not at all clear from the texts what an intellectual “turn” is, or what aspect of our experience it is supposed to address. The visual metaphors in some texts can give the impression of a shift of intellectual attention⁴: The intellect “gazes at,” “looks back toward,”

² ST Ia.84.7 [Leon. Man., 408a]: “Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem.” Aquinas mentions a *conversio ad phantasmata* approximately 80 times throughout his writings, from *Sent.* III.14.1.3.5 ad 3, to *ST* III.34.2 ad 3. More rarely, he refers to a *conversio ad sensibilia*, e.g., in *Sent.* III.14.1.3.5 ad 4; *ST* IIa-IIae.154.5 ad 3; *ST* IIa-IIae.173.3–5.

³ Aristotle *De anima* 431a15–16: “[N]equaquam sine fantasmate intelligit anima”; and 431b2: “Species quidem igitur intellectuum in fantasmatis intelligit” (in the Latin translation of William of Moerbeke, as edited by Gauthier in Aquinas’s *InDA*, Leon. 45/1.229). Aquinas discusses these texts in depth in his *InDA* III.6 and *InDeSensu*; and see *ST* Ia.86.1 [Leon. Man., 419b]: “Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, [intellectus noster] potest cognoscere singulare, quia, sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in III de anima.”

⁴ The use of *conversio* to indicate the direction of attention was common among mid-thirteenth-century thinkers, as in *Summa theologiae fratri Alexandri*, inq. 2, trac. 3, sect. 2, q. 1, tit. 2, memb. 2, cap. 2 [Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1928, 2.175]: “Concedimus etiam quod non sufficit angeli praesentia [for knowing another angel], sed ulterius requiritur conversio ipsius cognoscentis supra cognitum, accipiendo eius similitudinem”; *ibid.*, inq. 4, tract. 1, sect. 2, q. 3, a. 3, cap. 3, a. 2 [Quar. 2.456]; *Glossa in Sententiarum* I, dist. 3 [Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951, 1.55]. William of Auvergne, Bonaventure, and Albert also speak of a “turn to oneself” (*conversio ad seipsam*), which appears to be more specifically a shift of attention away from sensory reality, toward oneself. See for instance William of Auvergne, *De anima* 3.13 [in *Guilielmi Alverni Episcopi Parisiensis opera omnia* (Paris: Pralard, 1674), 2.103–4]: “Causa autem in hoc est, quia animae nostrae adeo vel natae sunt vel assuetae sequi signa seu notas quae in eis sunt; sequi inquam signa ut signa sunt, et

or “looks toward” (*inspiciat, respiciat, aspiciat*) the phantasms,⁵ or “beholds (*speculat*) the nature in them.”⁶ Sometimes Aquinas even describes two intellectual “motions,”⁷ one from things to the soul (abstraction) and another back again from the soul to things (looking at “examples” in phantasms).⁸ In view of such formulations, Pasnau interprets the turn to

abire per ea quae significant, ut difficillimum sit eis ad se ipsas converti, et a rebus hujusmodi avocari”; Albert, *De homine* 2.4.1 ad 9 [ed. Henryk Anzulewicz and Joachim R. Söder (Cologne: Aschendorff, 2008), 27/2.433:62–5]: “Corpus enim non movet se, ita quod ipsum sit movens et motum, et tamen intellectus considerando convertitur supra se, ita quod ipse est considerans et consideratum et movens et motum”; Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum* II.10.3.1 [in *Doctoris seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1885), 2.269a]: “Ratio autem, quare locutio in hominibus non solum addit *actum*, sed etiam *signum* medium, haec est: quia in anima alius est actus conversionis *supra se*, et alius actus conversionis *ad alterum*; et in cogitatione convertitur anima supra id quod habet *in se*, in locutione vero offert *alteri*.”

⁵ The following early texts conveniently provide examples of all three: *Sent.* II.20.2.2 ad 3 [Mand. 2.514]: “Cum phantasma sit objectum intellectus possibilis, ut dictum est, secundum statum viae, anima ad suum actum phantasmatis indiget, non solum ut ab eis scientiam accipiat secundum motum qui est a sensibus ad animam, sed etiam ut habitum cognitionis quam habet circa species phantasmatum, ponat secundum motum qui est ab anima ad sensus, ut sic inspiciat in actu quod per habitum cognitionis tenet in mente”; *Sent.* IV.50.1.2 [Parma 7.1249]: “Cum enim est conjuncta corpori, ejus intellectus non potest aliquid considerare nec per species acquisitas, nec per aliquem influxum superioris substantiae, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata; quia, propter perfectam conjunctionem ejus ad corpus, potentia intellectiva ejus nihil cognoscit nisi per ea quae per corpus recipiuntur, unde habet phantasmata quasi objecta ad quae respicit; sed cum erit a corpore separata, intelliget per alium modum, ut supra dictum est, scilicet non aspiciendo ad phantasmata.”

⁶ *ST* Ia.84.7, cited in note 2 above; *ST* Ia-IIae.4.5 [Leon. Man., 578a]: “Nam intellectus ad suam operationem non indiget corpore nisi propter phantasmata, in quibus veritatem intelligibilem contuetur.”

⁷ In this context, the term specifies action or operation, not a material change occurring over time, as stated e.g., in *Sent.* I.37.4.1 ad 1; *Sent.* IV.49.1.2.3 ad 2; *SCG* I.13; *ST* Ia.9.1 ad 1; *ST* Ia.14.2 ad 2, etc.

⁸ *Sent* II.20.2.2 ad 3, cited in note 5; II.23.2.2 ad 3 [Mand. 2.577]: “[I]ntellectus noster, ut supra dictum est, indiget phantasmate, quod est objectum ejus, in duobus; scilicet in accipiendo scientiam secundum motum qui est a rebus ad animam, et in circumponendo illud quod apud se tenet, phantasmatis, sicut quibusdam exemplis, secundum motum qui est ab anima

phantasms as the intellect’s looking back to sensed individuals for “help in understanding” the essence it has just abstracted.⁹

The spatial metaphors in other texts, however, give the impression that the “turn to phantasms” is a static relationship between intellect and imagination. For instance, Aquinas describes a “connection” (*continuatio*) between the intellect and imagination,¹⁰ or a “grounding”

ad res”; III.14.1.3.3 [Moos 3.459]: “Habet autem se ad phantasmata dupliciter. Uno modo sicut accipiens a phantasmatis scientiam, quod est in illis qui nondum scientiam habent, secundum motum qui est a rebus ad animam. Alio modo secundum motum qui est ab anima ad res, in quantum phantasmatis utitur quasi exemplis, in quibus inspicit quod considerat, cujus tamen scientiam prius habebat in habitu.” Note that both early and late texts more succinctly refer to the intellect as “receiving from and turning toward” the phantasm (see *Sent.* III.31.2.4; and *ST* Ia.85.1 ad 5, Ia.85.5 ad 2, and Ia.118.3).

⁹ Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 289–95. For Pasnau, the “turn” refers to the experience of coming up with examples and pictures in the process of trying to understand an abstract concept.

¹⁰ *DV* 2.6 [Leon. 22.1.66:89–95]: “[I]n quantum ergo intellectus noster per similitudinem quam accepit a phantasmate reflectitur in ipsum phantasma a quo speciem abstraxit, quod est similitudo particularis, habet quandam cognitionem de singulari secundum continuationem quandam intellectus ad imaginationem”; *DV* 10.5 [Leon. 22/2.309:67–81]: “Sed tamen mens per accidens singularibus se immiscet, in quantum continuatur viribus sensitivis, quae circa particularia versantur. Quae quidem continuatio est dupliciter. Uno modo in quantum motus sensitivae partis terminatur ad mentem, sicut accidit in motu qui est a rebus ad animam. Et sic mens singulare cognoscit per quamdam reflexionem, prout scilicet mens cognoscendo obiectum suum, quod est aliqua natura universalis, redit in cognitionem sui actus, et ulterius in speciem quae est sui actus principium, et ulterius in phantasma a quo species est abstracta; et sic aliquam cognitionem de singulari accipit. Alio modo secundum quod motus qui est ab anima ad res, incipit a mente, et procedit in partem sensitivam, prout mens regit inferiores vires”; and *SCG* 2.59. [Leon. 13.415]: “Similis igitur continuatio est intellectus possibilis per formam intelligibilem ad phantasma quod in nobis est, et potentiae visivae ad colorem qui est in lapide.” See also the term *applicatio* in such contexts, as in *Sent.* II.3.3.3 ad 1 [Mand. 2.121–2]: “[I]deo ex [speciebus] singularia non cognoscuntur, quae individuantur per materiam, nisi per reflexionem quandam intellectus ad imaginationem et sensum, dum scilicet intellectus speciem universalem quam a singularibus abstraxit applicat formae singulari in imaginatione servatae”; *SCG* 2.96; *QDDA* 20 arg. 12. For discussion

of the intelligible species in the phantasm.¹¹ Thus as Kretzmann reads it, turning to phantasms is “not something intellect has to do over and over again, but is, rather, its essential cognitive *orientation*.”¹²

Given the peculiarly metaphorical language involved, how can we resolve the identity of Aquinas’s turn to phantasms? The key, I would argue, is found in two Islamic sources that were immensely influential on thirteenth-century Latin philosophical psychology, and that present specific technical concepts of “turning” as a kind of dependence: the anonymous *Liber de causis*, and the Persian philosopher Avicenna’s *Liber de anima*.¹³ I contend that this notion of turn-as-dependence, though not so familiar to modern readers of Aquinas, was well-known to Aquinas

of this terminology, see George P. Klubertanz, “St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular,” *New Scholasticism* 26 (1952): 148–50.

¹¹ SCG 2.73 [Leon. Man., 176a]: “Sed post speciem in eo receptam, indiget eo quasi instrumento sive fundamento suae speciei: unde se habet ad phantasmata sicut causa efficiens”; and 2.96 [Leon. Man., 219a]: “Operatio igitur intellectualis eius erit intelligibilem quae non sunt fundata in aliquo corpore. Omnia autem intelligibilia a sensibilibus accepta sunt in aliquibus corporibus aequaliter fundata: sicut intelligibilia nostra in phantasmatis, quae sunt in organis corporeis.”

¹² See Norman Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, ed. Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 142. See also Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, ed. David B. Burrell (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), 160; and Anthony J.P. Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind*, (New York: Routledge, 1993), 93–99, who argues that Aquinas means that it is impossible to think abstractly without concomitant imaginative picturing.

¹³ The Arabic-to-Latin project of translation is discussed in C. Burnett, “Arabic into Latin: The Reception of Arabic Philosophy into Western Europe,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 370–404. For the influence of Avicenna, see the groundbreaking study by Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000). For the influence of the *Liber de causis*, see *Von Bagdad nach Toledo: Das ‘Buch der Ursache’ und seine Rezeption im Mittelalter*, ed. Alexander Fidora and Andreas Niederberger (Mainz: Dieterich’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 2001). The notion of “reversion” or “return” in the *De divinis nominibus* of the Greek theologian Pseudo-Dionysius, though influential, operates in the realm of an affective turn toward a final good and is not particularly helpful for illuminating Aquinas’s turn to phantasms. For texts on the “turn” or “return” in Pseudo-Dionysius, see

himself and that this notion is in fact what renders intelligible his “turn to phantasms.”

To shed light on Aquinas’s “turn to phantasms,” then, the present study aims at recovering the underlying historical paradigm, by examining how these two key sources conceive of “turning” and how Aquinas incorporates their insights into his theory of human cognition. I will conclude with some implications for the difficult relationship between intellect and imagination in Aquinas, but a complete philosophical investigation into these implications will have to be set aside for a separate study.

I. Turning as Ontological Dependence: Aquinas and the *Liber de causis*

The use of the imagery of “turning” (*conversio*) or “returning” (*reditio*) to refer to a relation of dependence on a principle is commonplace in Neoplatonic thought.¹⁴ The anonymous author of the *Liber de causis*¹⁵ outlines this classic position in prop. 15, as part of an argument for the self-subsistence of intellectual substances.

De divinis nominibus 4.7 and 4.9, with discussion in Eric D. Perl, *Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius* (New York: SUNY Press, 2007), 38ff.

¹⁴ To the modern reader of medieval philosophy, words like “turn” often evoke the historical paradigm of a departure-and-return. This kind of paradigm is, of course, present in Aquinas’s theology —for instance, in the trajectory of salvation history from creation to the last judgment, or in the even more dramatic paradigm of loss-and-recovery in man’s fall from grace and restoration to communion with God (see for instance SCG 3.149; *ST* Ia.62.2 ad 3). But it is not the paradigm that is in question here. For some of the key studies on the theological notion of “turn” or “return” in Aquinas, see Thomas Hibbs, *Dialectic and Narrative in Aquinas: An Interpretation of the Summa contra gentiles* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996); M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, trans. Albert M. Landry and Dominic Hughes (Chicago: Regnery, 1964).

¹⁵ For the medieval Latin translation of the *Liber de causis*, see the 1966 edition by Adriaan Pattin, reprinted in *Miscellanea*, vol. 1 (Leuven: Bibliotheek van de Faculteit der Godgeleerdheid, 2000); corrections to this edition were proposed by Richard Taylor in *Von Bagdad nach Toledo*, ed. Fidora and Niederberger.

Every knower knows his essence and therefore is returning to his essence with a complete return.¹⁶ The reason is that knowledge is nothing more than an intelligible action; therefore when a knower knows his essence, he then returns through his intelligible operation to its essence. And this is so only because the knower and the known are one thing, because the knowledge of one knowing his essence is from himself and toward himself: it is from himself, because he is a knower, and toward himself because he is the known. The reason is that, because knowledge is the knowledge of a knower, and the knower knows his essence, his operation is returning to his essence once again. And by ‘the return of a substance to its essence’ I do not mean anything other than that it is standing fixed by itself, not lacking in its fixity and its essence any other thing to hold it up,¹⁷ because it is a simple substance, sufficient by itself.¹⁸

¹⁶ The first sentence here is cited according to the version preserved in ms. Toledo *Bibl. dei Cabildo* 97–1 of the *Liber de causis* (for discussion of this manuscript, see Pattin, 14), because this is the version that Aquinas uses in his commentary. But the weight of the medieval manuscript tradition of the *Liber de causis* favors the reading: “Every knower who knows his essence is returning to his essence with a complete return” [Pattin, 79].

¹⁷ *Rigente* (“stabilizing”) is the reading given in Pattin’s edition, in agreement with ms. Toledo *Bibl. dei Cabildo* 97–1. Variants, however, include *erigente* (“holding something up”). I would suggest that the text with which Aquinas was working read *erigente*, given the reference to a “foundation” or “support” in his gloss on this portion of the text: Self-subsisting things are self-sufficient, “as though not needing a material support (*quasi non indigens materiali sustentamento*)” [Saffrey, 91].

¹⁸ *Liber de causis* 15 [Pattin, 79–80]: “Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa <Aquinas’s version: Omnis sciens scit essentiam suam, ergo est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa>. Quod est quia scientia non est nisi actio intellectibilis. Cum ergo scit sciens suam essentiam, tunc redit per operationem suam intellectibilem ad essentiam suam. Et hoc non est ita nisi quoniam sciens et scitum sunt res una, quoniam scientia scientis essentiam suam est ex eo et ad eum: est ex eo quia est sciens, et ad eum quia est scitum. Quod est quia propterea quod scientia

In other words, to “return to *one’s own* essence” is to have a sort of independence—ontologically insofar as it is self-subsisting, and/or psychologically insofar as it cognizes its own essence (rather than being dependent on, i.e., turning toward, some external essence).

The notion of the “turn” or “return” as a metaphor for dependence is expressed even more clearly in the text of Proclus’s *Elementatio theologiae*, which Aquinas recognized as a source for the doctrine of the *Liber de causis* once it was translated into Latin in 1268. For instance, prop. 35 states that “Every caused thing both remains in its cause and proceeds from it and turns to it.”¹⁹ Prop. 39 identifies different kinds of turns: “Every being is turned, either substantially only, or vitally, or also cognitively.”²⁰

In his early commentary on the *Sentences*, Aquinas is already demonstrating familiarity with this notion of turn-as-dependence from the *Liber de causis*.²¹ But it is not until late in his career, in the commentary on the *Liber de causis* (approx. 1272²²), that he takes the time to explain in detail how he understands it. In commenting on the *Liber’s* prop. 15, Aquinas uses the Proclean word for the “turn” (*converti*) interchangeably with the term used by the Latin translation of the *Liber*,

est scientia scientis, et sciens scit essentiam suam, est eius operatio rediens ad essentiam suam; ergo substantia eius est rediens ad essentiam ipsius iterum. Et non significo per reditionem substantiae ad essentiam suam, nisi quia est stans, fixa per se, non indigens in sui fixatione et sui essentia re alia rigente <Aquinas’s version: erigente> ipsam, quoniam est substantia simplex, sufficiens per seipsam.”

¹⁹ Proclus *Elementatio theologiae* 35 [ed C. Vansteenkiste, “Procli *Elementatio Theologica* translata a Guilelmo de Moerbeke,” *Tijdschrift voor filosofie* 13 (1951): 279–80]: “Omne causatum et manet in sua causa, et procedit ab ipsa, et convertitur ad ipsam.”

²⁰ *Elementatio theologiae* 39 [Vansteenkiste, 281]: “Omne ens aut substantialiter convertitur solum, aut vitaliter, aut etiam cognitive.”

²¹ See note 29 below.

²² Torrell assigns Aquinas’s *SLDC* to the first half of 1272 (*Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1, *The Person and His Work*, rev. ed., trans. Robert Royal [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005], 222–23 and 346), but as he notes in the “Additions and Corrections to the Second Edition,” 434, Gauthier more recently dated it to 1272–73 (see Gauthier, *Index scriptorum ab ipso Aquinas nominatorum*, in Leon. 25/2.498).

“return” or (*redire*).²³ He more explicitly distinguishes the two kinds of “return” that appeared in the *Liber*, which together constitute the *Liber’s* “complete return to one’s essence”: 1) a substantial return that refers to the ontological property of self-subsistence²⁴; 2) an operational return that refers to the act of thinking about one’s own essence.²⁵

In discussing the substantial return, Aquinas explains that “turning” is a metaphor for dependence on a principle of being: “Each thing is turned toward that which gives it concrete being (*id quo substantificatur*)²⁶;

²³ It should be noted, however, that although for the most part Aquinas follows the *Liber’s* text faithfully in commenting on prop. 15, he takes some liberties. For instance, while the *Liber’s* author intended prop. 15 as a statement about separate intelligences (and Aquinas elsewhere takes it as applicable to intellectual beings in general), in his commentary Aquinas insists on interpreting it in reference to the human soul. Here, however, we are interested only in how he articulates the concept of intellectual “turning.”

²⁴ See note 29 below. Aquinas explains that one can reason from the fact that a being engages in an operational return to its essence, to the conclusion that it also substantially returns to its essence; *SLDC* 15 [Saffrey, 89]: “Quartam propositionem sumamus XLIV [propositionem] libri [Procli]: Omne quod secundum operationem ad seipsum est conversivum, et secundum substantiam est ad se conversum. Et hoc probatur per hoc quod, cum converti ad seipsum sit perfectionis, si secundum substantiam ad seipsum non converteretur quod secundum operationem convertitur, sequeretur quod operatio esset melior et perfectior quam substantia.”

²⁵ *SLDC* 15 [Saffrey, 90]: “[C]um dico quod *sciens scit essentiam suam*, ipsum scire significat operationem intelligibilem, ergo patet quod in hoc quod *sciens scit essentiam suam, redit*, id est convertitur, *per operationem suam intelligibilem ad essentiam suam*, intelligendo scilicet eam.”

²⁶ Guagliardo, Hess, and Taylor translate “*id quo substantificatur*” here as “that through which it is made a substance” (*Commentary on the Book of Causes* [Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 1996], 99). This translation is not consistent with the example that Aquinas gives later in *SLDC* 15 (see note 29 below), i.e., accidents turning toward their subjects. “Whiteness” has real being *as inhering* in a substance (we can speak of a “white thing”), so in that sense it is perhaps “substantiated,” but it does not itself become *a substance*. Whiteness remains an accident; what the subject gives the accident is a “support”—something “standing under it” in the literal sense of “sub-stans.” So since the text cited here seems to be laying out a general analysis of what it means to “turn to something,” I would argue that *id quod substantificatur* should be taken in a much more general sense as “that which gives something concrete being.”

so if anything is turned toward itself in its being (*esse*), it must subsist in itself.²⁷ Here he seems to have in mind not just any principle of being, but the principle that grounds, determines, or makes concrete—the material cause or substrate. He goes on to explain that something “turns to itself substantially” if and only if it does not need a substrate supporting its concrete existence²⁸:

Those things are said to turn toward themselves substantially that subsist by themselves, having fixity in such a way that they do not turn toward anything else that holds them up, as accidents turn toward their subject. And thus it is proper to the soul and to each being that knows itself, that every being of this kind is a simple substance, sufficient unto itself by itself, as though not needing a material support.²⁹

We can shed light on these cryptic comments by examining more closely Aquinas’s two examples of “turning” to a grounding principle. One example appears here in *SLDC*:

(1) Accidents turn to their subjects.

²⁷ *SLDC* 15 [Saffrey, 89]: “Tertiam propositionem sumamus XLIII libri [Procli], quae talis est: Omne quod ad seipsum conversivum est, authypostaton est, id est per se subsistens. Quod probatur per hoc quod unumquodque convertitur ad id per quod substantificatur; unde, si aliquid ad seipsum convertitur secundum suum esse, oportet quod in seipso subsistat.”

²⁸ It is not clear to me whether this “turn to oneself” should be applied to the soul in a merely negative sense (i.e., not needing a material support), or whether self-subsistence could be understood in a positive way.

²⁹ *SLDC* 15 [Saffrey, 91]: “Illa enim dicuntur secundum substantiam ad seipsa converti quae subsistunt per seipsa, habentia *fixionem* ita quod non convertantur ad aliquid aliud sustentans ipsa, sicut est conversio accidentium ad subiecta; et hoc ideo convenit animae et unicuique scienti seipsum, quia omne tale *est substantia simplex, sufficiens sibi per seipsam*, quasi non indigens materiali sustentamento.” For similar texts, likewise citing *Liber de causis* 15, see *Sent.* I.17.1.5 ad 3 [Mand. 1.406]: “[C]ujuscumque actio redit in essentiam agentis per quamdam reflexionem, oportet essentiam ejus ad seipsam redire, idest in se subsistentem esse, non super aliud delatam, idest non dependentem a materia”; *Sent.* II.19.1.1 [Mand. 2.482]: “Et dicitur redire complete ad essentiam, ut ibi Commentator exponit, cujus essentia est fixa stans, non super aliud delata.”

The other example emerges elsewhere in Aquinas's writings, i.e., in *DV* 2.2, ad 2, and *ST* Ia.14.2 ad 1. There, the language is that of "being poured out upon something" rather than that of "turning to something." Nevertheless, in both texts he presents the imagery of "pouring" as explicating the "complete return to one's essence" in the *Liber's* prop. 15.

(2) Substantial forms turn toward their material substrate: "For forms that do not subsist in themselves are poured out upon another and in no way gathered unto themselves; but forms that subsist in themselves are poured out upon other things, by perfecting them or by flowing into them, in such a way that they remain in themselves."³⁰ (*DV* 2.2, ad 2)

These examples show that for Aquinas, the language of "turning to a foundation" is linked to the ontological inter-dependence of form and matter as the co-principles of a hylomorphic substance. Although substantial form is the principle of actuality in hylomorphic substances, all substantial forms other than the human soul lack "being in themselves" (i.e., self-subsistence). Thus although such forms are the principle of actuality in the substance, they exist only as concretized in matter. In this way, not only does matter depend on form, but form depends on matter, so that when the composite is destroyed, the form perishes too.³¹ The same is true of accidental forms: The being of an

³⁰ *DV* 2.2 ad 2 [Leon. 22/1.45:229–46:241]: "Sed tamen sciendum, quod reditio ad essentiam suam in libro de causis nihil aliud dicitur nisi subsistentia rei in seipsa. Formae enim in se non subsistentes, sunt super aliud effusae et nullatenus ad seipsas collectae; sed formae in se subsistentes ita ad res alias effunduntur, eas perficiendo, vel eis influendo, quod in seipsis per se manent"; *ST* Ia.14.2 ad 1 [Leon. 4.168–69]: "[R]edire ad essentiam suam nihil aliud est quam rem subsistere in seipsa. Forma enim, in quantum perficit materiam dando ei esse, quodammodo supra ipsam effunditur, in quantum vero in seipsa habet esse, in seipsam redit."

³¹ For a discussion of matter as limiting form to this individual, see John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 304–312, especially 311: "Because the receiving and potential principle limits the form or act principle, we may also say that the former, the matter, participates in the latter, the form" (citing texts such as *Sent.* I.8.2.1; *De ente et essentia* 4; and the commentary on Boethius's *De hebdomadibus*, lect. 2).

accident like ‘redness’ depends on the substance in which that redness inheres. This substance can be loosely construed as the “matter” for the accident, since it is the receiver of that accident.³²

Now for Aquinas, the reason that such forms are ontologically dependent on their substrates is that they can only exist *as expressed* in a subject. For instance, consider the analogy of a form whose expression requires a specific kind of artistic matter. For instance Napoleon’s effigy can only exist in reality *as expressed* in the matter of marble, or paint, or plaster (but not sound). Although the form ‘Napoleon’s effigy’ is the principle of actuality in whatever composites it inform, its very existence depends on the matter, because *this kind of actuality cannot express itself by itself; it must be concretized in a specific kind of substrate.*

Something similar can be said of all non-subsisting substantial and accidental forms: Although form is the actualization of a material substrate, this actualization can exist nowhere other than in the substrate. Such forms require their substrate for their concrete expression; they are thus just as much dependent on the substrate as the substrate is on them (though in a different way). For instance, although a Ferrari is red only by the accrual of the accidental form of ‘being-red’, the concrete existence of this ‘being-red’ reciprocally depends on the Ferrari as the subject in which ‘being-red’ is expressed. That is why there is no subsisting ‘red’, but only red things.³³ Similarly, a fern is what it is in virtue of its substantial form ‘fern’—but that form’s own real being is reciprocally dependent on the organic matter in which it expresses itself.³⁴ In this

³² *De principiis naturis* 1 [Leon. 43.39:23–35]: “Quod autem illud quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale dicatur subiectum, signum est quia dicuntur esse accidentia in subiecto, non autem quod forma substantialis sit in subiecto. Et secundum hoc differt materia a subiecto, quia subiectum est quod non habet esse ex eo quod aduenit, sed per se habet esse completum, sicut homo non habet esse ab albedine; sed materia habet esse ex eo quod ei aduenit, quia de se habet esse incompletum. Vnde simpliciter loquendo forma dat esse materie, sed subiectum accidenti, licet aliquando unum sumatur pro altero, scilicet materia pro subiecto et e conuerso.”

³³ Aquinas sometimes describes substance as the “foundation” of accidents, in language closely echoing that found in his discussions of the soul’s “return”; see *De potentia* 9.1.

³⁴ Incidentally, Aquinas insists that the composite is the product of generation; form and matter reciprocally depend on each other for their being, and can only exist *as* a composite.

sense, then, the “turn” or “return to that which gives something concrete being” refers to the static ontological dependence of certain forms on a substrate, whether the latter is prime matter or an already-constituted hylomorphic substance.

But what about the “operational return to one’s essence” that Aquinas also discusses in *SLDC* 15, and in which “turning” or “returning” refers to an act of intellectual cognition? Clearly this cognitive “turn” is not a static ontological dependence on a substrate. Aquinas unmistakably describes the intellect as operationally “turned,” not to the *substrate of intellectual activity* (i.e., the subject of which the intellectual operation is an accidental form), but to the *object of cognition*. The “operational return to one’s essence” thus refers to an act of cognizing one’s essence as opposed to some other object.

And that [the operation of thinking about one’s own essence] ought to be called a return (*reditus*) or turn (*conversio*) is clear, from the fact that when the soul knows its own essence, ‘the knower and the known are one thing,’ and therefore the knowledge by which it knows its essence (namely, that intellectual operation itself) is ‘from itself insofar as it is knower and toward itself insofar as it is known.’ And thus there is here a circulation of sorts, connoted in the words ‘returning’ (*redeundi*) or ‘turning’ (*convertendi*).³⁵

Here Aquinas makes clear that in the case of intellectual operations, that toward which the knower “turns” is the object of attention.³⁶ As applied to an intellectual act, then, “turning toward” refers to the direction of intellectual attention.

Nevertheless, closer scrutiny shows that Aquinas thinks the direction of intellectual attention, too, is predicated on a certain kind of static ontological dependence. Although neither the object nor our

³⁵ *SLDC* 15 [Saffrey, 90]: “Et quod hoc debeat vocari *reditus* vel *conversio*, manifestat per hoc quod, cum anima scit *essentiam suam*, *sciens et scitum sunt res una*, et ita *scientia qua scit essentiam suam*, id est ipsa operatio intelligibilis, est ex ea in quantum est *sciens et est ad eam in quantum est scita*: et sic est ibi quaedam circulatio quae importatur in verbo *redeundi* vel *convertendi*.”

³⁶ In the text just cited, Aquinas stresses that the “scientific knowing” in question is an intellectual *operation* (and not, say, a habitual self-knowledge).

sensory experience thereof is the material *substrate* of an act of cognition, sensory experience (and more proximately, the phantasm) is “in some way” the material cause of intellectual cognition, as Aquinas states in *ST Ia.84.6*:

The intellectual operation is caused by sense in virtue of the phantasms. But because the phantasms are not sufficient for affecting the possible intellect but must be made intelligible-in-act by the agent intellect, one cannot say that cognition of the sensible object is the total and perfect cause of intellectual cognition, but rather in some way the material cause.³⁷

The reason is that just as the material substrate is the principle that determines a substance to this rather than that singular being, so too sensory experience is the principle that determines the act of intellection to be *about this rather than that intelligible* (horseness rather than catness). Seeking to explain why neither the agent intellect nor the phantasm can be the sole cause of the intelligible-in-act in the intellect, Aquinas states that each completes what the other lacks. The agent intellect is the active principle of the act of intelligibility but this actuality lacks determinacy—while the phantasm has actual determinacy (it is a phantasm of a horse rather than of a cat) but is in potency to actual intelligibility.³⁸ Consequently, in the resulting intelligible species that

³⁷ *ST Ia.84.6* [Leon. Man., 407a]: “Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae”; and see *DV 18.8 ad 3* [Leon. 22/2.559:118–28]: “[S]pecies intelligibilis id quod in ea formale est, per quod est intelligibilis actu, habet ab intellectu agente qui est potentia superior intellectu possibili quamvis id quod in ea materiale est a phantasmatis abstrahatur. Et ideo magis proprie intellectus possibilis a superiori accipit quam ab inferiori, cum id quod ab inferiori est, non possit accipi ab intellectu possibili nisi secundum quod accipit formam intelligibilitatis ab intellectu agente.”

³⁸ *SCG II.77* [Leon. Man., 185a]: “Habet enim anima intellectiva aliquid in actu ad quod phantasma est in potentia: et ad aliquid est in potentia quod in phantasmatis actu invenitur. Habet enim substantia animae humanae immaterialitatem, et, sicut ex dictis patet, ex hoc habet naturam intellectualem: quia omnis substantia immaterialis est huiusmodi. Ex hoc autem nondum habet

informs the intellect, the intelligibility contributed by the light of the agent intellect plays the role of the actualizing form, while the content taken from the object via the phantasms plays the role of the determining matter.³⁹

If the cognized object is the ultimate source of the determinacy in an act of cognition, then the psychological “turn to the object of attention” has much more in common with the substantial “turn to the substrate” than we might have originally thought. Both could be described as a turn toward a quasi-material cause, construed broadly as a principle of determination. Or to put it another way, when the discussion of “turning” in *SLDC* 15 is set against the background of Aquinas’s position on the role of the object in cognition, the resulting paradigm of “turning” can be stated as follows: *A* turns to *B* if and only if *B* is the ontological principle of *A*’s determinacy. This turning can occur in two ways. In terms of hylomorphic composition, a form turns to the material substrate that provides the “grounding” for its expression. In terms of psychological attention, a knower “turns” toward the object of attention that determines his act of intellectual cognition (horseness vs. catness), and which is as it were, the “matter” of cognition. In neither case, however, does “turning” signify a dynamic shift; rather, it indicates the direction of causal dependence.

quod assimiletur huic vel illi rei determinate, quod requiritur ad hoc quod anima nostra hanc vel illam rem determinate cognoscat: omnis enim cognitio fit secundum similitudinem cogniti in cognoscente. Remanet igitur ipsa anima intellectiva in potentia ad determinatas similitudines rerum cognoscibilium a nobis, quae sunt naturae rerum sensibilibus. Et has quidem determinatas naturas rerum sensibilibus praesentant nobis phantasmata.” See also *QDDA* 4 ad 6; *QDDA* 5, *QDSC* 10 ad 4; *InDA* III.4; and *ST* Ia.79.4 ad 4.

³⁹ *Sent.* II.3.3.4 ad 4 [Mand. 2.124]: “Similiter etiam lumen intellectus agentis in nobis non sufficit ad distinctam rerum cognitionem habendam, nisi secundum species receptas quas informat ut lux colores”; *Sent.* II.20.2.2 ad 2 [Mand. 2.514]: “Sicut autem in objecto visus est aliquid quasi materiale, quod accipitur ex parte rei coloratae, sed complementum formale visibilis in quantum huiusmodi est ex parte lucis, quae facit visibile in potentia esse visibile in actu: ita etiam objectum quasi materialiter administratur vel offertur a virtute imaginativa; sed in esse formale intelligibili completur ex lumine intellectus agentis, et secundum hanc formam habet quod sit perfectio in actu intellectus possibilis”; *Sent.* III.14.1.1.3; *Quodlibet* 8.1.2; *De malo* 16.12 ad 3; and *DV* 18.8 ad 3.

The latter—the psychological “turn”—is the one that will be in play in Aquinas’s theory of the turn to phantasms. But so far we have only achieved a rather rough-hewn portrait of what it means for a psychological power to be “turned” toward the object of attention. A much more sophisticated portrait of psychological “turning” will emerge in Avicenna’s *Liber de anima*.

II. The Great Chain of Attention: Aquinas and Avicennian Psychology

Avicenna. In his *Liber de anima*,⁴⁰ Avicenna sketches a fascinating and complicated account of how cognitive powers “turn” to higher or lower powers. The sub-intellectual psychological powers of the soul, for Avicenna, are arranged hierarchically in a sequence of apprehensive powers paired with retentive powers. At the first level, the external senses apprehend sensory “forms,” i.e., the sensory features of Milo the athlete. At the second level, these forms are apprehended in a “bundle” by the common sense, and retained by the formative or retentive imagination as a single image of the particular Milo (equivalent to Aquinas’s “phantasm”⁴¹). At the third level, the compositive imagination composes and divides those images to produce different kinds of images, such as Milo the robot-man. The highest internal sense, the estimation, grasps “intentions” such as danger and benefit (Milo’s status as a potential threat or friend), as well as sensory characteristics that are not properly sensed, but inferred (the roughness of his skin, inferred from its chapped, red appearance). These intentions are stored in memory.⁴² In

⁴⁰ Avicenna is here being studied as he was known to the Latin tradition, so I will use Simone Van Riet’s edition of the “Latin Avicenna,” *Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus* [hereafter, “AviLat LDA”], 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1972 and 1968). All translations into English are mine unless otherwise noted.

⁴¹ Aquinas uses Avicenna’s vocabulary of *formae* in *ST* Ia.78.4, but more usually he calls them *phantasmata* or the *similitudo rei particularis*.

⁴² For analysis of Avicenna on the internal senses, see Deborah Black, “Estimation in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions,” *Dialogue* 32 (1993): 219–58; and “Rational Imagination: Avicenna on the Cogitative Power,” in *Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought and the Latin Aristotelianism of the Thirteenth Century*, ed. Luis Xavier López-Farjeat and Jörg Alejandro Tellkamp (Paris: Vrin, 2013), 59–81; as well as Carla Di Martino, *Ratio particularis: La doctrine des sens interne d’Avicenna à Thomas d’Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 2008), ch. 1.

humans, these physical external and internal senses are overseen by the immaterial intellect, which governs them, in preparation for receiving the intelligible form “humanity” from the separate Agent Intellect.⁴³

For Avicenna, the “turn” indicates a psychological direction of attention, for which the condition is a metaphysical relation (a “relation/pairing,” *comparatio*⁴⁴ or a “conjoining,” *conjunctio*) between a cognitive power and that toward which it turns. The human soul, he explains, is capable of turning in two directions,⁴⁵ either upward to the Agent Intellect, or downward toward the lower powers. I will focus here on the downward turn—i.e., the turning of the estimative power to the imagination or of the intellect to the estimative power—which has the greater relevance for Aquinas’s turn to phantasms.

In order to understand the “turn” of the estimative power to the imagination in Avicenna, let us begin with *Liber de anima* IV.1. Here, in discussing the mechanisms of association that enable one to recall

I have here employed Black’s names for each of the internal senses. For a broad historical overview, see Harry A. Wolfson, “The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophical Texts,” *The Harvard Theological Review* 28 (1935): 69–133.

⁴³ For a sample of scholarly interpretations on the much-disputed relation between the human intellect and separate Agent Intellect in Avicenna, see Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): ch. 4; Deborah Black, “Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna,” *Mediaeval Studies* 61 (1999): 45–79; Meryem Sebti, “L’analogie de la lumière dans la noétique d’Avicenne,” *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 73 (2006): 7–28; Dag Nikolaus Hasse, “Avicenna on Abstraction,” in *Aspects of Avicenna*, ed. Robert Wisnovsky (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2001), 39–72; Jon McGinnis, “Making Abstraction Less Abstract: The Logical Psychological, and Metaphysical Dimensions of Avicenna’s Theory of Abstraction,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 80 (2007): 169–83. Hasse and McGinnis have continued their discussion most recently in Hasse, “Avicenna’s Epistemological Optimism,” in *Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays*, ed. Peter Adamson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 109–119; and McGinnis, “New Light on Avicenna: Optics and Its Role in Avicennan Theories of Vision, Cognition and Emanation,” in *Philosophical Psychology*, ed. López-Farjeat and Tellkamp, 41–57.

⁴⁴ Interestingly, the fourth meaning of *comparatio*₁ in Lewis and Short is the “pairing” or “coupling” of breeding animals.

⁴⁵ Note that *only* the human soul can turn in two opposing directions.

forgotten estimative intentions or imaginative forms, Avicenna assumes that there is some sort of "coupling" or "pairing" between an intention preserved in memory (say, "unfriendliness") and a form (say, the image of "Milo the athlete"), a pairing that is interrupted in some cases. One case is that in which the imaginative form is recalled without the corresponding estimative intention; in this case, the form can help call to mind the lost intention.⁴⁶ Perhaps an example would be my calling Milo to mind without initially having an sense of threat, but as I picture him as I last saw him, pronouncing a threatening speech, I remember that he is unfriendly.

The more interesting case, however, is the reverse: The estimative intention is recalled without the corresponding imaginative form, and must help call to mind the latter.⁴⁷ It is not clear what Avicenna means by this, but perhaps an example would be feeling a pervasive sense of dread in walking into a room without knowing why; the intention of "unfriendliness" is presented, but no corresponding image of a particular is elicited. Avicenna explains that the estimative power can restore the "pairing" (*comparatio*) by calling up the appropriate imaginative form. This is achieved by a "turning," in one of two ways. (a) The estimative power turns toward the intentions stored in its own retentive power, in order to "make the form necessarily appear [so that] once again its pairing (*comparatio*) can be turned toward that which is in the imagination." For example, Avicenna suggests, one might "consider the action to which one was attracted by [the forgotten] form, and when you will have known and found the action, you will know what flavor and what shape and what color it ought to have, and the pairing will be called back. And when you will have settled this, then the pairing (*comparatio*) to the form in the imagination will be acquired, and you will restore the pairing in the memory."⁴⁸ So the pervasive sense of

⁴⁶ See AviLat LDA IV.1 [Van Riet 2.9].

⁴⁷ AviLat LDA IV.1 [Van Riet 2.10]: "Et aliquando perveniet ab intentione ad formam, et memoria habita non habebit comparationem ad id quod est in thesauro retinendi, sed ad id quod est in thesauro imaginandi; et erit eius conversio, aut [=a] ex hoc quod convertitur ad intentiones quae sunt in retentione, ita ut intentio faciat formam necessario apparere et convertetur iterum comparatio ad id quod est in imaginatione, aut [=b] propter conversionem ad sensum."

⁴⁸ AviLat LDA IV.1 [Van Riet 2.10]: "Exemplum autem primi est quod, cum oblitus fueris comparationis tuae ad aliquam formam quam iam tu scieras,

dread that I feel upon entering a room might lead me to remember a desire to run away from this very room—which is paired with specific imaginative content, i.e., the image of Milo delivering a threatening speech in this room years earlier. Alternatively, (b) the estimative power restores the pairing by “turning to the sense.” In this case, perhaps I look around the room until I notice something that triggers the image of Milo’s threatening speech.

But why should the estimative power seek the corresponding imaginative form in the first place? The idea seems to be that estimative intentions have some sort of intrinsic reference to the imaginative forms from which they are taken, such that when they have become “uncoupled,” there is *a sense of something missing*. In other words, when estimation apprehends an intention of unfriendliness, it grasps the latter not as sheer unfriendliness, but as the *unfriendliness of some particular* (Milo) represented in an imaginative form. The intrinsic reference of this higher intention to the lower form is such that when one has forgotten the correlative form, one feels that something is missing from one’s apprehension of “unfriendliness” and seeks to restore the paired form, as above.

Now as I read it, this intrinsic reference is the key to understanding the “turn” of higher powers to lower powers. Because these estimative intentions “refer” downwards to specific forms in the imagination, the presentation of an intention triggers the presentation of the corresponding form in the compositive imagination. In other words, the estimative power co-actualizes the compositive imagination. These “nested” or “embedded” acts together direct the soul’s attention downwards (i.e., from the higher to the lower), so that it does not merely consider unfriendliness, but *the unfriendliness of Milo*.⁴⁹

considerabis actionem quae appetebatur per illam et, cum scieris actionem et inveneris eam, scies quem saporem aut quam figuram aut quem colorem debebat habere, et revocabitur comparatio; et cum posueris hoc, acquiretur comparatio ad formam quae est in imaginatione et restitues comparisonem in memoriam. Thesaurus enim intellectus memoria est, quae retinet intentionem.”

⁴⁹ Di Martino, *Ratio particularis*, 38–9: “Une perception estimative est liée intimement à son corrélatif imagitatif, et inversement... Là ou il y a jugement, l’âme entière agit, de manière que formes et intentions se retrouvent liées dans l’âme comme elles l’étaient dans la réalité...”

It is this downward-directing of attention that constitutes the “turn” of the estimative power to the compositive imagination. Avicenna explains that “turning” is the mechanism for unifying cognitive attention under the leadership of the soul’s highest power. In animals, the estimative power “is the mistress, pronouncing in the animal a judgment that is not definitive, like an intellectual judgment, but an imaginative judgment conjoined with singularity and the sensible form.”⁵⁰ Although estimation cannot itself apprehend the forms in the imagination, it “operates in the forms,”⁵¹ summoning them into conscious attention. To put it another way, the conjunction of estimative and imaginative activity causes a sort of “nesting” of estimative activity within imaginative activity, ordering the intention of “unfriendliness” to “Milo.” My attention to “the unfriendliness of Milo” is thus a joint effort of estimation and imagination, in which the estimative intention is grasped precisely as pointing or referring downward to the imaginative form. And in “making present again... forms that are in the imagination,” the estimative power “in some way sees the things to which these forms belong.”⁵²

⁵⁰ AviLat *LDA* IV.1 [Van Riet 2.8]: “Et haec virtus sine dubio consistit in nobis; quae est domina, iudicans in animali iudicium non definitum sicut iudicium intellectuale, immo iudicium imaginabile coniunctum cum singularitate et forma sensibili, et ex hac emanant quamplures actiones animalium”; compare IV.4 [Van Riet 2.59]: “Aestimatio enim habet dominium inter virtutes apprehendentes in animalibus; cupiditas autem et ira habent dominium inter virtutes moventes, quas sequuntur virtutes desiderativae et deinde virtutes motivae quae sunt in musculis.”

⁵¹ AviLat *LDA* IV.1 [Van Riet 2.11]: “Videtur autem quod virtus aestimativa sit virtus cogitativa et imaginativa et memorialis, et quod ipsa est diiudicans: sed per seipsam est diiudicans; per motus vero suos et actiones suas est imaginativa et memorialis: sed est imaginativa per id quod operatur in formis, et memorialis per id quod est eius ultima actio, sed retentiva est virtus sui thesauri.”

⁵² See AviLat *LDA* IV.1 [Van Riet 2.9]: “Quae virtus vocatur etiam memorialis, sed est retinens ob hoc quod id quod est in ea haeret firmiter, et est memorialis propter velocitatem suae aptitudinis ad recordandum per quod formatur cum rememorat post oblivionem, quod fit cum aestimatio convertitur ad suam virtutem imaginativam et repraesentat unamquamque formarum quae sunt in imaginatione, ita ut quasi modo videat quod ipsae sunt formae eius.” Van Riet notes that the “quod... eius” in the last phrase is a literal translation

In *LDA V.6*, Avicenna further analyzes this notion of a higher power conjoining its operation with that of a lower power, in discussing the “turning” of the human intellect toward the internal senses of estimation and imagination. There he clearly equates psychological attention (*occupatio*, being busy with something) with the “turn” of any “apprehending and judging power” to the forms held in the retentive powers. By “turning” to a form, the soul calls it out from a retentive “storehouse” into the corresponding apprehensive power, where it is perceived.⁵³

What you need to know about the disposition of forms that are in the soul is what we will say, namely, that when the soul turns away (*avertitur*) from imagined things and whatever adhere to them, they are laid to rest in their conserving powers, which are truly not apprehending (for if they were, they would have to be at once both apprehending and conserving); rather they are the storehouse, to which the apprehending and judging power—namely estimation or the soul or the intellect—turns itself, and finds that it already has [those forms]. But if it does not find [those forms] it will have to return to searching and recollection. And if that did not happen, we would have to doubt whether any form with which any soul is occupied (*occupata*)

of the Arabic and should be read as follows: “(comme si l’estimative voyait) les choses auxquelles appartiennent ces formes.”

⁵³ AviLat *LDA V.7* [Van Riet 2.158]: “[Virtus apprehens], ex hoc quod est id quod est, recipit formam apprehensam et intelligit eam.” Incidentally, this is the mechanism by which the soul verifies that those forms represent really existing things. This judging is part of the intellect’s work of guiding and correcting the lower powers, “preserving them from their error and leading them into the right path”; IV.2 [Van Riet 2.14]: “Anima etenim cum occupata fuerit circa interiora, non solet curare de exterioribus quantum deberet; et cum occupata fuerit circa exteriora, praetermittit gubernare virtutes interiores. Ipsa enim cum intente considerat sensibilia exterius, ea hora qua de his tractat, debilitatur eius imaginatio et memoria”; see also IV.2 [Van Riet 2.31]: “Voluntaria autem sunt cum cogitatio animae fuerit conversa in vigilia ad considerandum aliquid et gubernandum illud; cum vero dormit, imaginativa repraesentat ei illud aut quod est de genere illius rei; et hae sunt reliquiae cogitationis diurnae.”

has existence, or whether it has [existence] only in potency...⁵⁴

Once again, the “turn” involves the cooperative focusing of higher and lower apprehensive powers together on a single particular (Milo) with which the soul as a whole is “occupied.”

Thus in explaining why the soul withdraws (*retrahit*) from certain actions while engaging in others (for example, “fear draws [one] away from pain”), Avicenna notes, “There is one cause of all this: namely, that the soul turns the whole of itself to some one thing.”⁵⁵ For Avicenna, the direction of the soul’s attention presses into service multiple powers, each presumably apprehending its own form. Avicenna describes this single act of attention as being held together by a “chain” (*vinculum*) of relations (*comparationes*) among the corresponding intentions and forms.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ AviLat LDA V.6 [Van Riet 2.144–5]: “Quod autem debes scire de dispositione formarum quae sunt in anima hoc est quod dicemus, scilicet quod imaginata et quaecumque adhaerent eis, cum anima avertitur ab eis), sunt reposita in virtutibus conservativis eorum, quae vere non sunt apprehendentes (si enim hoc esset, essent apprehendentes et conservantes simul, sed sunt thesaurus ad quem cum converterit se virtus apprehendens et iudicans, immo aestimatio, aut anima, aut intellectus, inveniet ea iam haberi; si autem non invenerit ea, necesse habebit redire ad perquirendum et reminiscendum. Quod si non fieret, necesse esset nobis dubitare de omni anima occupata ab aliqua forma, an ipsa forma haberet esse, an non haberet nisi in potentia...”

⁵⁵ This quote is particularly interesting in context: “Retractio autem animae ab actionibus suis non provenit ex diversitate utrarumque partium actionum animae tantum, sed ex multitudine actionum suarum ad unam partem: timor enim retrahit a dolore, et concupiscentia ab ira, et ira a timore. Causa autem huius totius una est, scilicet quia anima totam se convertit ad unum quodlibet. Manifestum est igitur quod, cum aliquid non exercuerit actionem suam eo quod impeditur ab alio, non possit agere actiones suas dum illud quod impedit habuerit esse” (AviLat LDA V.2 [Van Riet 2.100–101]).

⁵⁶ AviLat LDA V.7 [Van Riet 2.158–9]: “His ergo propositis, dicemus oportere ut omnes hae virtutes habeant vinculum aliquod in quo coniungantur omnes, cuius comparatio ad omnes has virtutes sit sicut comparatio sensus communis ad sensus attrahentes. Verissime enim scimus quod harum virtutum altera impedit alteram et altera imperat alteri, quod constat ex praedictis. Si autem non haberent vinculum in quo coniungerentur et quod eis dominaretur et quod propter alias impediretur regere alias et dominari aliis, aliae non

To summarize, then: In the previous section, we discussed the notion of an intellectual “turn” as an ontological dependence on a principle (the phantasm) that is “quasi-material” in the sense of determining what the act is about. Avicenna’s downward “turn” adds the notion that this dependence establishes a kind of relation between the higher intention and the lower intentions from which it is derived, which draws the soul’s attention downward through a chain of related forms to the original sense-object. A higher power that is turned toward lower powers is organizing them in service of a single attentive “occupation.” Here the concept of “turning” indicates the static direction of attention, and only derivatively the dynamism of a shift in attention, as when Avicenna says that the soul turns *away from* one intelligible to another (*convertitur ab... ad...*),⁵⁷ or from the intelligible realm to the sensible realm.⁵⁸ This usage mirrors the two ways in which we can use the verb ‘turn’ in English: By saying, “He turned his head toward the light,” we describe a dynamic motion or change, and by saying, “Sitting there, he is turned toward the light,” we describe a static directional relation.

retraherent alias a propria actione: quaelibet enim virtus, si non haberet aliquid in quo coniungeretur alii, non prohiberet aliam virtutem a sua actione, scilicet si instrumentum non esset commune, nec subiectum commune, nec aliquid aliud in quo coniungerentur esset commune.” In its “occupation,” the soul engages one set of powers in this chain of actualized apprehensions, thus “weakening” the other, unnecessary powers (see note 58 below).

⁵⁷ AviLat LDA V.6 [Van Riet 2.146]: “...ipsa intelligibilia quae apprehendunt et deinde convertuntur ab illis ad alia...”

⁵⁸ AviLat LDA V.2 [Van Riet 2.99]: “Dicemus ergo quod substantia animae habet duas actiones: unam actionem comparatione corporis quae vocatur practica, et aliam actionem comparatione sui et principiorum suorum quae est apprehensio per intellectum; et utraeque sunt dissidentes et impediennes se, unde cum occupata fuerit circa unam retrahetur ab alia; difficile est enim convenire utraque simul. Occupationes autem eius circa corpus sunt sentire et imaginari et concupiscere et irasci et timere et tristari et dolere. Tu autem scis quod, cum cogitaveris de intellectu, postpones haec omnia, nisi fuerint haec praevalentia super animam et subegerint eam et converterint eam ad partem suam. Tu scis etiam quod sensus retrahit ab intellectu: anima enim cum intenta fuerit sensibilibus, retrahetur ab intellectu, quamvis ipsi instrumento intelligendi non accidat infirmitas ullo modo.” Aquinas is certainly familiar with this usage; see *Sent.* IV.50.1.1.

Aquinas. It is hard to prove definitively that Aquinas recognized the “turn” in Avicenna as a directional relation among cognitive powers, guiding attention to its object. He is certainly familiar with Avicenna’s theory of cognizing natures by “turning to the separate intellect,” and reports on it as early as the commentary on the *Sentences*, as a theory opposed to his own theory of understanding by “turning to phantasms.”⁵⁹ But it is not clear from the text whether this Avicennian “turning,” as he understands it, refers to a static directional relation or whether it essentially includes the notion of a shift of attention. In addition, I have not found any cases in which he uses the term *comparatio* in Avicenna’s technical sense of a pairing among forms.

Nevertheless, Aquinas does insist, more generally, on the intellect’s being “related” to the phantasms, using the term *comparatio*.⁶⁰ In fact, against the background of Avicenna’s theory, one can notice some striking conceptual similarities, regardless of whether or not an Avicennian genealogy can be proven.

Consider, for instance, Aquinas’s well-known discussion of the turn to phantasms in *ST* Ia.84.7:

It is impossible for our intellect, according to the state of the present life in which it is joined to a passible body, to understand anything actually except by turning itself to phantasms... The proper object of the human intellect,

⁵⁹ *Sent.* IV.50.1.1. On the Avicennian influences on Aquinas’s doctrine of the internal senses generally, see Di Martino, *Ratio particularis*, ch. 4.

⁶⁰ See for instance *Super Boetium De Trinitate* 6.2 ad 5 [Leon. 50.166:171–80]: “[P]hantasma est principium nostre cognitionis ut ex quo incipit intellectus operatio, non sicut transiens, set sicut permanens ut quoddam fundamentum intellectualis operationis; sicut principia demonstrationis oportet manere in omni processu scientie, cum phantasmata comparentur ad intellectum ut obiecta in quibus inspicit omne quod inspicit, uel secundum perfectam repraesentationem, uel per negationem”; *Sent.* IV.50.1.1 ad 4 [Parma 7.1248a]: “[C]omparatio illa intelligitur de anima intellectiva ex parte illa qua corpori coniungitur, et non prout est intellectiva simpliciter: quia intellectus, in quantum huiusmodi, non respicit phantasmata, sicut patet de intellectu angelico.” See also similar usages in *ST* Ia.54.4 s.c. and IIIa.9.4. ad 2 [Leon. Man., 1922b]: “Oportuit autem quod etiam secundum hunc respectum anima Christi scientia impleteretur, non quin prima plenitudo menti humanae sufficeret secundum seipsam; sed oportebat eam perfici etiam secundum comparisonem ad phantasmata.”

which is conjoined to the body, is the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. But it belongs to the account of this nature that it exist in some individual that is not without corporeal matter, just as it is included in the account of the nature of a stone that it be in this stone... Whence the nature of a stone or of any other material thing cannot be cognized completely and truly except insofar as it is cognized as existing in the particular. But we apprehend the particular by sense and imagination. And therefore it is necessary, in order for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, that it turn itself toward the phantasms, in order to behold the universal nature existing in the particular.⁶¹

Against the background of the Avicennian notion of “turning” as a directional relation in which the higher intention points or refers downwards to a lower intention, the phrase “[the nature] is cognized as existing in the particular” takes on special significance. One might argue that Aquinas means to say that in understanding “humanity,” the intellect understands it as “the humanity of [*insert singular here*]” — leaving the imagination to fill in with an apprehension of the singular. Because intelligible species are abstracted from phantasms, they refer back to the phantasm from which it was taken, demanding to be completed by that phantasm. Consequently, when the intellect employs the species, its attention is drawn toward the corresponding phantasm, moving the imagination to present the appropriate phantasm. For

⁶¹ *ST Ia.84.7* [Leon. Man., 408a]: “[I]mpossibile est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata... Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens. De ratione autem huius naturae est, quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali, sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem.”

Aquinas, the intelligible species thus seems to carry an intrinsic reference to the phantasm from which it is taken, just as in Avicenna the estimative intention refers downward to the imaginative form. The abstracted intelligible species refers back to or is grounded in the phantasm as its “instrument or foundation.”⁶²

A further conceptual similarity between the two thinkers appears in the fact that Aquinas describes intellect and imagination as cooperatively engaged in a single act of attention turned toward a single multi-layered object (e.g., “the graniteness of this boulder”), similar to the cooperation of estimative and imaginative powers in Avicenna. Aquinas insists that the “operation of the possible intellect is completed by a corporeal organ, in which it is necessary for there to be phantasms.”⁶³ He even goes so far as to say that the human operation of thinking is “shared in common” with the soul (intellect) and body (imagination),⁶⁴ though he explains that this commonality results from the conjunction of intellect and imagination via the phantasms, and not because the intellect uses any bodily organ for its operation to think.⁶⁵

⁶² SCG 2.73 [Leon. Man., 176a]: “Sed post speciem in eo receptam, indiget eo quasi instrumento sive fundamento suae speciei.”

⁶³ Incidentally, this is a claim he makes in the context of attacks on Averroes’s unicity of the possible intellect. SCG 2.60 [Leon. Man., 160b]: “Sed operatio intellectus possibilis completur per organa corporea, in quibus necesse est esse phantasmata. Natura igitur intellectum possibilem corporeis univit organis. Non est igitur secundum esse a corpore separatus.”

⁶⁴ DV 19.1 ad 1 [Leon. 22/.566:404–412]: “[O]peratio intellectus quae est communis animae et corpori est operatio quae modo animae intellectivae competit in ordine ad corporeas potentias, sive hoc accipiatur secundum superiorem partem animae, sive secundum inferiorem. Sed post mortem habebit anima a corpore separata operationem quae nec fiet per organum corporale, nec aliquem ordinem habebit ad corpus.”

⁶⁵ See *Sent.* IV.50.1.1 ad 2 [Parma 7.1248a]: “[I]ntelligere, secundum quod exit ab intellectu, non est actio communis animae et corpori (non enim intellectus intelligit mediante aliquo organo corporali), sed est communis animae et corpori ex parte objecti, in quantum intelligimus abstrahendo a phantasmatis, quae sunt in organo corporali; et hunc modum intelligendi anima separata non habet”; SCG 2.80 [Leon. Man., 192b]: “Unde et consequenter operatio propria eius, quae est intelligere, etsi non dependeat a corpore quasi per organum corporale exercita, habet tamen obiectum in corpore, scilicet phantasma”; *ST Ia-IIae*.50.4 ad 1 [Leon. Man., 759b]: “Ipsam autem intelligere non dicitur commune

Consequently, even though for Aquinas the human intellect cannot extend its own immaterial operation all the way to the material singular, its attention is drawn via the imagination to the singular. The reason is that the species that it uses refers to the phantasm, and the phantasm in turn refers to the singular, as he explains in *DV* 2.6:

Just as the species in the [external] sense is abstracted from those things, and sensory cognition is continuous with those sensible things by that species, so too our intellect abstracts the species from the phantasms, and by that species its cognition is continuous in some way with the phantasm. But there is just this difference: that the likeness in the sense is abstracted from the thing as from its cognizable object, and therefore the very thing itself is cognized directly by that likeness; but the likeness in the intellect is not abstracted from the phantasm as from a cognizable object, but as from a means of cognition, in the way in which our sense receives the likeness of a thing that is in a mirror, being carried (*fertur*) to the likeness not as a thing in itself, but as the likeness of a thing. For this reason our intellect is not carried directly from the species that it receives to cognizing the phantasm, but to cognizing the thing of which that is a phantasm.

The intelligible species thus “directs” or “carries” the intellect toward the phantasm, which directs the imagination toward the singular object, in a single chain of attention. This chain of attention retraces the order of causality whereby the singular cognitive object Milo causes intellectual cognition in a chain of dematerialization beginning in the external senses, and continuing from the common sense to the imagination to the intellect. This is why Aquinas speaks of two reverse motions, an inward-bound motion (dematerializing impressions) by which Milo causes cognition, and an outward-bound motion (hierarchically ordered apprehensions) by which Milo is cognized.⁶⁶

esse animae et corpori, nisi ratione phantasmatis, ut dicitur in I de anima. Patet autem quod phantasma comparatur ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum.” The source is Aristotle *De anima* I.1, 403a3–27.

⁶⁶ See texts in note 8 above.

Moreover, because of the relation or “continuity” between intellect and imagination as powers of the same soul,⁶⁷ their distinct operations do not demarcate distinct centers of consciousness, but the single soul’s apprehension via distinct powers of distinct aspects of a multi-layered reality (Milo). To put it another way, because intellect and imagination are “continuous” powers of the soul, as long as they are focused in the same direction, they do not detract from each other, but reinforce each other. As Aquinas explains in describing how angels can simultaneously cognize the same thing “by the Word” (i.e. via the beatific vision) and by the species in their intellect: “The angel is not weakened in one operation by attending to the other, but rather it is reinforced (*confortatur*); just as

⁶⁷ See *DV* 2.6 [Leon. 22/1.66:62–80]: “[S]icut species quae est in sensu abstrahitur a rebus ipsis et per eam cognitio sensus continuatur ad ipsas res sensibiles, ita intellectus noster abstrahit speciem a phantasmatis et per eam eius cognitio quodam modo ad phantasmata continuatur. Sed tamen tantum interest quod similitudo quae est in sensu abstrahitur a re ut ab obiecto cognoscibili, et ideo per illam similitudinem res ipsa per se directe cognoscitur; similitudo autem quae est in intellectu non abstrahitur a phantasmate sicut ab obiecto cognoscibili sed sicut a medio cognitionis, per modum quo sensus noster accipit similitudinem rei quae est in speculo dum fertur in eam non ut in rem quamdam sed ut in similitudinem rei, unde intellectus noster non directe ex specie quam suscipit fertur ad cognoscendum phantasma sed ad cognoscendum rem cuius est phantasma.” Notice that Aquinas describes the turn to phantasm as a *result* of the conjunction of soul and body as form and matter; *ST* Ia.84.7, cited in note 58 above; *ST* Ia 89.1 [Leon. Man., 430b–431a]: “[A]nima, quandiu est corpori coniuncta, non potest aliquid intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata”; *QDDA* 19 ad 18 [Leon. 24/1.167:362–8]: “Eorum ergo que apprehendit anima separata secundum modum sibi proprium, idest absque phantasmatis, remanet cognitio in ea postquam ad pristinum statum redit, corpori iterato coniuncta, secundum modum tunc sibi convenientem, scilicet cum conuersione ad phantasmata.” Compare *AviLat LDA* IV.2 [Van Riet 2.16]: “Aliquando autem anima praevallet super [virtutem imaginativam] in suis actionibus quae continuantur ei de cognitione et cogitatione.”

the imagining of a seen thing is reinforced when that thing is actually seen by the exterior eye."⁶⁸

III. What To Conclude About Aquinas's Turn to Phantasms?

To summarize, then: the paradigms of "turning" in the *Liber de causis* and Avicenna's *Liber de anima* are echoed in Aquinas's discussion of the relationship between the intellect and the phantasms. In the *Liber de causis*, "turning" is presented as dependence on a principle of being, either a material substrate, or a material principle more loosely construed as the object that "materially" specifies what a cognitive act is about. Avicenna amplifies the notion of a cognitive "turn" by explaining how intentional content points or refers toward the forms from which it is taken, and in insisting that multiple cognitive powers can cooperate in directing the soul's attention toward an object.

Aquinas's "turn to phantasms" is built on these same notions of cognitive "turning" as signaling a relation of dependence direction of attention. The phantasms specify which intelligibles the intellect abstracts (catness rather than stoneness)—and thus in thinking about those intelligibles, the intellect is turned toward the corresponding phantasms as the object-matter of cognition, as in the *Liber de causis*. Or to put it in Avicennian terms, abstracted intelligible species are "related" to the phantasm, and this relation binds or "conjoins" the species and the phantasm so that when the intellect uses a species in its operation, it moves the imagination to present the corresponding phantasm. The intellectual activity is thus conjoined to the activity of imagination in a single, cooperative act of attending to the nature in the particular. Kretzmann, then, was right to describe the turn to phantasms as a "cognitive orientation." And our inquiry has shown that this orientation has to do with a relation of dependence whereby abstracted intelligibles point back to the phantasms whence they were abstracted.

⁶⁸ *Quodlibet* 9.4.2 [Leon.25/1.104:75-85]: "Vnde simul ex intellectu angeli procedit operatio duplex: una ratione unionis ad Verbum, qua scilicet uidet res in Verbo, alia ratione speciei intelligibilis qua informatur, qua uidet res in propria natura. Nec etiam in una harum operationum debilitatur per attentionem ad alteram, set magis confortatur, cum una sit ratio alterius, sicut ymaginatio rei uise confortatur dum uidetur in actu oculo exteriori: actio enim beatitudinis in beatis est ratio cuiuslibet alterius actionis in eis inuente."

By way of conclusion, I propose the following theses as articulating the possible implications for interpreting Aquinas’s theory of the turn to phantasms:

(1) The turn to phantasms in Aquinas does not refer primarily to an *event* such as a shift of attention or an attempt to get more content from the phantasms. Rather, it refers to a certain kind of static relation of origin or dependence that necessarily obtains between intelligible species and phantasms in the human knower, and that affects the intellect’s direction of attention.

(2) This species-to-phantasm relation is the condition for the intellect’s ability to engage in coordinated cognitive activities with the imagination, cognizing an essence as the essence of some material particular.⁶⁹

(3) This species-to-phantasm relation, for Aquinas, is imposed by the hylomorphic status of the human knower, and it defines the uniquely human mode of intellectual cognition.

These theses, I believe, are implicit in the conceptual framework laid out above, and they form the basis for Aquinas’s theory of the relationship between the intellect and the imagination. But that is a discussion for another time.

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⁶⁹ Klubertanz proposes this kind of intellectual-imaginative composition in “Knowledge of the Singular,” 164–5.

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